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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Sunday Laws
In 1961, a state-wide law to prohibit engaging in certain activi-
ties on Sunday was passed by the North Carolina General Assembly.1
The act was declared unconstitutional by the North Carolina Su-
preme Court in 1962.2 In 1963, the act was rewritten in an effort
to remove the objectionable features from it.3 The rewritten statute
was declared unconstitutional by .the court in 1964.4 Thus, Sunday
laws are a current issue. This comment-will examine them, their
constitutionality, and the policy questions involved in the hope of
shedding light on their future in North Carolina.5
I. HISTORY
"Every effort to'remodel existing Sunday legislation, or to fore-
cast its future must be made in the light of the past."" The his-
tory in recent centuries begins with the fact that secular work on
Sunday was not an offense against the common law.7 Consequently,
1 N.C. Sess. Laws 1961, ch: 1156.
' G I Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter, 257 N.C. 206, 125 S.E.2d 764. (1962).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-346.2 (Supp. 1963).
'Treasure City, Inc. v. Clark, 261 N.C. 130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964).
' Soon after the cases declaring the state-wide laws unconstitutional, the
court held that a city ordinance which regulated activities on Sunday met
constitutional requirements. Clark's Charlotte, Inc. v. Hunter, 261 N.C. 222,
134 S.E.2d 364 (1964). Local level regulations of this type are free of
many of the defects contained in the state-wide acts which are the subject
of this comment. For discussion of local level Sunday regulation see Note,
32 N.C.L. REv. 552 (1954).
'Preface to LEwIs, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF SUNDAY LEGISLATION at vi
(1888). For the ancient history of regulation of Sunday activity, see Rod-
man v. Robinson, 134 N.C. 503, 506, 47 S.E. 19, 20 (1904); JoHNsoN &
YOST, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 219-32
(1948).
'Rodman v. Robinson, 134 N.C. 503, 506, 47 S.E. 19, 20 (1904); State
v. Williams, 26 N.C. 400 (1844). It is also interesting to note that Christi-
anity is not theoretically opposed to secular work on Sunday.
[The] organic [law of Christianity] must be found in the New
Testament, and there we shall look in vain for any requirement to
observe Sunday, or indeed any day. The Master's references to the
Sabbath were not in support but in derogation of the extreme ob-
servances of the Mosaic day of rest indulged in by the Pharisees.
Rodman v. Robinson, supra at 510, 47 S.E. at 21 (Clark, C.J.) Lewis, an
early writer, agreed, saying that:
The first Sunday legislation.was the product of that pagan concep-
tion, so fully developed by the Romans, which made religion a de-
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legal restrictions on activity based upon the fact that the day is
Sunday are found. in stattutory law., English legislation in 1625
prohibited bear-baiting, bull-baiting, common plays, and the leaving
of parishes on Sunday.8 This statute may have been in force in
North Carolina during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.0
,In 1676, the first English statute prohibiting work on Sunday was
enacted."' This enactment became the foundation for nearly all
,Sunday legislation in. the United States. 1 It read:
• For the better observation and keeping holy the Lord's day...
all ... persons . .. shall on every Lord's day apply themselves
to the observation of the same, by exercising ... the duties of
piety and true religion, publikly and privately .. . and . . . no
tradesman, artificer, workman, labourer, or other person what-
soever, shall do or exercise any worldly labour, business or work
of their ordinary callings, upon the Lord's day, or any part
thereof (work of necessity and charity only excepted;) .... 12
'In 1715, North Carolina adopted an act "for the better observ-
,ance of the Lord's Day, called Sunday . . . ." This statute was
substantially the same as the 1676 English act. It added a preamble
which clearly indicated why the statute was passed.
Forasmuch as by the great neglect in keeping holy the Lord's
Day, and the little regard had, to all such other days and times
* appointed to be kept religiously, impiety is like to grow to a very
great height '(if.not timely prevented) to the great dishonour of
Sthe Almighty .... 14
Spartment of the state., This was diametrically opposed 'to the genius
of New Testament Christianity. It did not find favor in the Church
until Christianity had been deeply corrupted through the influence
of. Gnosticism and kindred pagan errors.
LEWIS, op. cit. supra note 6, at vi.8 Lord's Day Act, 1625, 1 Car. 1, c. 1.
O One codifier so reported. Collection of Statutes of England in Force
in N.C. 379 (Martin 1792).. It is, however, questionable whether the statute
'as in force because this collection was not entirely accurate. It contained
many statutes of England never in force in the colony. Preface to 1 Revised
Statutes at xii (Nash, Iredell & Battle 1837).
10 Sdnday Observance Act, 1676, 29 Car. 2, c. 7.
" Rodman v. 'Robinson, 134 N.C. 503, 506, 47 S.E. 19, 20 (1904). See
generally 22 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 656 (9th ed. 1887); Johnson,
Sunday Legislation, 23 Ky. L.J. 131, 136-37 (1934).1 Sunday Observance Act, 1676, 29 Car. 2, c. 7. (Emphasis added.)
t Laws of North Carolina Relating to the Church and Clergy 83 (Trott
1721). (Partially italicized in original.)
' Laws of North Carolina Relating to the Church and Clergy 96 (Trott
1721).
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The 1715 act was repealed in 1741"s and replaced by a similar act.1"
It is significant that the 1676 Ehiglish act and the 1715 North
Carolina act called for public and private observance of the "duties
of piety and true religion."'17 The 1741 act did not call for such
private observation, Therein lay the only material difference in the
three statutes. It led, however, to a sharp difference in the inter-
pretations given the acts in England and in North Carolina. At
common law, contracts made on Sunday were valid."8 The Eng-
lish courts held that the 1676 act invalidated contracts- made on
Sunday by persons in the exercise "of their ordinary calling."'19
The North Carolina court held that a contract nade on Sunday
was valid notwithstanding the 1741 act." The court reasoned that
the 1741 act only regulated public life and only prohibited noisy
labor that disturbed the religious devotion of others.2 The signifi-
cance of the 1741 act was reduced also because it lacked sufficient
penalty to discourage its breach." 'For many years the statute was
"almost completely ignored ' 3 It was repealed in 1951.1' North
Carolina finished the decade without state-wide regulation. *In other
1r,23 CLARK, THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 3 (1904).
"
0N.C. Sess. Laws 1741, ch. 14; Collection of All The Public, Acts 142
(Swann 1751); 23 CLARK, Op. cit. supra note 15, at 173. A religiously
oriented preamble is still-seen as part of the statute in I Public Acts 1715-
90, at 52 (Martin 1804), but was dropped in 2 Manual Of The Laws of
N.C. 229 (2d ed. Haywood 1808).
" See the provisions of the English statute in text accompanying note 12
supra, and the North Carolina statute in Laws of North Carolina Rel.ating
to the Church and Clergy 96 (Trott 1721).
18 Comyns v. Boyer, Cro. Eliz. 485, 78 Eng. Rep: 736 (B.R. 1596);
Drury v. DeFontaine, 1 Taunt, 131, 127 Eng. Rep..781, 783-84 (Com. P1.
1808). See generally CLARK, CONTRAcTS § 155, at 357 (4th ed. 1931).
" Smith v. Sparrow, 4 Bing. 84, 88, 130 Eng. Rep. 700, 701-02 (Com.
Pl. 1827) ; Fennell v. Ridler, 5 B. & C. 406, 108 Eng. Rep. 151 (K.B. 1826).
2" Melvin v. Easley, 52 N.C. 356 (1860); State v. Williams, 26 N.C.
400 (1844). Accord, Maxton Auto Co. v. Rudd, 176 N.C. 497; 97 'S.E. 477
(1918); Rodman v. Robinson, 134 N.C. 503, 47 S.E. 19 (1904).
21 Melvin v. Easley, supra note 20, at 359-60. 'Furthermore, private activi-
ties on Sunday could not have been regulated by the North Carolina act
because of N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 26: "All persons have a natural and in-
alienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of.-their
own consciences ....
-The offender was not subjected to criminal indictment. State v: Brooks-
bank, 28 N.C. 73 (1845); State v. Williams, 26 N.C. 400 (1844). Accord,
State v. Medlin, 170 N.C. 682, 86 S.E. 597 (1915) ; State v. White, 76 'N.C.
15 (1877). The sole deterrent was-a civil penalty of one dollar. 1 'Revised
Statutes 607 (Nash, Iredell & Battle 1837).
" State v. McGee, -237 N.C. 633, 638, 75 S.E.2d 783, 786, appeal dis-
missed, 346 U.S. 802 (1953).
2 N.C. Sess. Laws 1951, ch. 73..
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states, laws regulating Sunday activity were beginning to be used
for new purposes. With the rise of shopping centers and large
"discount houses" that operate seven days a week from their subur-
ban and country highway locations came a revitalization of the long
-forgotten Sunday laws. These statutes soon faced constitutional
tests.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY
In McGowan v. Maryland," the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the. convictions of seven employees of a large highway
discount st6re for violating the state Sunday law."0 The main con-
tentiori of the defendants was that the law violated the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. Before ruling on the Maryland statute, Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, speaking for the Court, discussed the relation of Sunday
'laws in general to the establishment clause. After granting that
the early Sunday laws were "motivated by religious forces,1 2 he
made a search of the evolution of these laws to determine "whether
present Sunday legislation, having undergone extensive changes
from the earliest forms, still retains its religious character."20 He
found that the present purpose and effect of most Sunday laws is
to provide a uniform day of rest for all citizens. 0 But it was con-
ceded that the defendants had suffered economic injury allegedly
resulting from. the imposition of a tenet of the Christian religion
'upon them.31 The Court relied upon Everson v. Board of Educ.12
for the principle that a statute which has a primary secular purpose
(projected into effect), consistent with constitutional guarantees,
will be upheld even though it has an incidental, indirect effect that
' 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
'MD. ANN. CODE. art. 27,§ 521 (Supp. 1964). This law prohibits the
Sunday sale of, all merchandise except specified articles including drugs,
gasoline, newspapers, and tobacco.
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion .... ." This clause was made applicable to the states via the fourteenth
amendment in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
28 366 U.S. at 431.
29 Ibid.
*0 Id. at 445.
8 tId. at 430.
330 U.S. 1 (1947). In this case the Court upheld a statute authorizing
repayment to parents of the transportation expenses of their children to
public and Catholic schools. Mr. Justice Black, for the Court, recognized
that a religion was incidently benefited and possibly promoted. However,
the primary purpose was found to be the safety of all children and there-
fore the statute was valid as "public welfare legislation." Id. at 18.
[Vol. 43
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would be unconstitutional standing alone.83 Therefore, it was con-
cluded that as presently written and administered Sunday laws "bear
no relationship to establishment of religion as those words are used
in the Constitution of the United States." 4 In ruling on the Mary-
land statute, the Court found it to have the same secular character
as Sunday laws in general and therefore sustained it on the Everson
principle 4 a
In the McGowan case, the appellants were held to lack standing
to raise the "free exercise" of religion issue because they did not
allege injury to their religious practices. They alleged economic
injury which was only sufficient to raise the "establishment" issueY5
The Court did consider the "free exercise" issue in Braunfeld v.
Brown." Appellants were Jewish merchants who sued to enjoin
the enforcement of the 1959 Pennsylvania Sunday law. 7 One of
the appellants alleged " that since his religion required closing on
Saturday, it was economically necessary for him to be open on Sun-
day; that enforcement of the Sunday law would force him to choose
between his religion and his trade; and that the effect would be a
83366 U.S. at 442-45.
2 Id. at 444.
"'[T]he statute's present purpote and effect is not to aid a religion
but to set aside a day of rest and recreation." Id. at 449. Accord, Twio Guys
From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961). Mr.
Justice Frankfurter substantially concurred with the views of the majority,
but decided the establishment issue withotit relying on the Everson case.
The test used by Frankfurter would allow a stronger religious purpose and
effect than did that of the majority. He looked for the "primary end
achieved." 366 U.S. at 466 (separate opinion). If no secular ends served
were "wholly independent of the advancement of religion" the "primary end
achieved" would be religious and unconstitutional. Ibid. This test would
uphold a statute with two independent, primary ends-one secular and one
religious. However, this permissiveness is qualified by his second, cumula-
tive test: if the statute primarily furthers both secular and religious ends
by means unnecessary to the effectuation of the secular ends alone it cannot
be upheld. Id. at 466-67. The tests of Frankfurter are a concession to the
fact that, in practice, the dissection of the direct and indirect motivating
purposes of the legislature-where one purpose is constitutional and another
unconstitutional-is slippery business with the possibility of misadventure
great. Nevertheless, he too searched for purpose and found it to be the
same as did the majority. Id. at 470-505.
" See the discussion by the Court, 366 U.S. at 429. See also Two Guys
From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, supra note 34a, at 592. Frank-
furter agreed with the Court that the appellants in McGowan and Two Guys
lacked standing to raise the "free exercise" issue. McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 468 n.6 (1961).
- 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
2  PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10 (1963).
38 366 U.S. at 601.
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violation of the free exercise clause of the first amendment.a9 Mr.
Chief Justice Warren, announcing the judgment of the Court, found
that the direct purpose of. the statute was to achieve a secular goal,
i.e., a uniform day of rest;4 that the "indirect burden" on appel-
lant's religious practice could not be eliminated by adequate alterna-
tive means to the secular end;41 and that implementation of the
direct purpose was valid notwithstanding that there was an ihdirect
burden on appellant's religious practice.4 Mr. Justice Frankfurter
"Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion] .... " This clause was made applicable to the states via the four-
teenth amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
i° 366 U.S. at 607-09.
",Id. at 608. Most of the commentators have disagreed with this finding.
They maintain that a statute allowing an exemption for those who close
on another day for religious reasons would be sufficient to provide a uni-form day of rest. See Hopp, Sunday Laws-The McGowan Decision, 13
BAYLOR L. Rnv. 225, 231 (1961) ; O'Toole, The Sunday Laws, 74 ComzmoN-
wEAL 343, 345 (1961); 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 363, 368 (1961); 40 TEXAS
L. REv. 702, 707 (1962); 23 U. PirT. L. Rzv. 222, 229 (1961). But see 7
UTAH L. Rxv. 537, 545 (1961). Warren granted that this exemption "may
well be the wiser solution to the problem," but went on to say that it was
not constitutionally necessary to validate the statute. 366 U.S. at 608-09. He
reasoned that the exemption would not help eliminate the atmosphere of
commercial noise and activity; enforcement problems would be more diffi-
cult; an economic advantage might be gained by those allowed to open onSunday; and employment problems would arise---"exempted employers wouldprobably have to hire employees who themselves qualified for the exemptioni
because of their own religious beliefs, a practice which a state might feel
to be opposed to its general policy prohibiting religious discrimination inhiring." Id. at 609. In a separate opinion, Brennan said that the difficulties
were "more fanciful than real." Id. at 615. "[T]he Court . .. has exalted
administrative convenience to a constitutional level high enough to justify
making one religion ... disadvantageous." Id. at 615-16. The administra-
tive problems are not overwhelming in view of the fact that twenty-one of
thirty-four states having general Sunday laws have exemptions of this kind.
rd. at 614. England also has the exemption. Shops Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6,
c. 28, § 53. The exemption was suggested in conjunction with the 1961
North Carolina Sunday law, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-346.2 (Supp. 1963),but after little discussion was not adopted. Raleigh News and Observer,
June 22, 1961, p. 6, col. 4.
,2 366 U.S. at 607. Accord, Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market,Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961). The test applied by the Court changes the test
for first amendment'freedoms which was theretofore in use, and to whichDouglas, Brennan, and Stewart would adhere; that is, first amendment free-doms are susceptible to restriction only to prevent great and immediate
danger to interests the state -may lawfully protect. See Kovacs v. Cooper,336 U.S: 77, 88 (1949)*; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948);
Thomas'v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) ; West Virginia Board of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.105, 115 (1943). For discussion of this "preferred position" test for first
amendment freedoms, see 40 TEXAS L. Rnv. 702 (1962);
Has the Court lost the substance of the issue in the direct-indirect test?A license tax of $15 per year on distributors of religious literature was
[Vol. 43
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concurred in a separate opinion, treating the "free exercise? --issue
as a balancing question. He found that the -secular -ptirpose -ouf-
weighed and justified the religious injury inflicted.4 "
The four Sunday law cases44 place singular emphasis, on the
search for purpose. They hold that the valid purpose which Sunday
laws may serve is that of providing a uniform day of iest. How-
ever, whether any particular statute has a valid purpose in fact -is
difficult to determine. Appropriate to the Sunday law. question is- a
warning of the Court in a different context: "It is impossible for
us to shut our eyes to the fact that many of the laws . . . , wile
passed under what is claimed to be the police power- for the purpose
of protecting the public health or welfarie, are, in reality, passed
for other motives."45 The conclusion reached by the., QUrt con-
cerning the direct purpose of the Sunday, laws has been, severely
criticized for its imperceptiveness. 40  The common defdct in these
held unconstitutional in Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944),
because it was a direct burden on religion. In Braunfeld the indirect burden
was much greater-the possible loss of an entire business enterprise. The
burden imposed on minority religions -vhieh was upheld in Braunfeld is
"certainly more serious economically" than the burden held unconstitutional
in Follett. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 235 (1953), quoted
with approval in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 578 (1961) (dissent-
ing opinion). For further discussion see Donaldson, Freedom 'of Religibn
and the Recent Sunday Closing Law Cases, 3 WILLIAm & MARY L. Rnv.
384, 392 (1961) ; 30 GEO. WASH. L. Rxv. 363 (1961) ; 7 UTAH L. REv. 537
(1961).
" McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 520-22 (1961) (separate opinion
applicable to the Braunfeld case). Douglas disagreed, finding that the fiit
amendment freedoms are absolute and admit of no balancing.' Brennan and
Stewart agreed to the balancing test but differed with Frankfurter in appli-
cation. "[T]he law requires a 5erson 'to choose between religious" faith
and his economic survival.' This is not something that can b'swept urider
the rug and forgotten in the. interest of enforced Sunday togetherness."
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 615 (1961) (separate opinion of Stewart,
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961)';
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys From Harris6n-
.Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U:S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland,
'366 U.S. 420 (1961).
"Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S' 45, 64 (1905) (dictum). ''This- ca'se
held that a labor law of the State of New York which provided that nb
employees in bakeries would be permitted to work 'more than. sixty' houi-s
in a week, or ten hours in a day, was not a legitihate exercise of 'the
police power of the state. 'the Lochner case was overruled by 'Buntinig-v.
Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). Nevertheless, the merit of the qiioted didf'ui-i
is apparent. , "
. O Douglas dissented in all fou'r cases. He said that the, present" Sunday
laws have not outgrown their religious foundations. 366 U.S. at 572-73 &
n.6. "The Court picks and chooses language from various decisions 'o
bolster its conclusion that these Sunday laws in the mbdern- setting are
1964]" ''
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criticisms is that they are mere conclusions. The underlying evi-
dentiary facts need to be explored at some length.
The language used in these statutes aids the search for purpose.47
It indisputably shows the religious purposes of the early statutes.48
History reveals the gradual disappearance of the religiously oriented
language.49 The Supreme Court has used this disappearance as an
indication of the disappearance of religious purpose.5 But such a
conclusion does not follow necessarily. For instance, the North
Carolina Supreme Court, after the 1951 repeal of the 1741 Sunday
'civil regulations.'" 366 U.S. at 572. "Sabbath is no less Sabbath because
it... has come to be expedient for some nonreligious purposes." Id. at 573
n.6. Justice Douglas might well have added the words of Cardinal Cushing,
Archbishop of Boston:
The laws ... reflect the belief of those who formulate them in a
personal God and their acceptance of the age-old tradition that one
day in seven should be set aside as the Lord's Day. It is extremely
disturbing, therefore, to be confronted with this new trend of
thought according to which Sunday is to become legally recognized
as a day on which people may if they choose seek respite from
their ordinary labors.
Quoted in Shaffer, Sunday Selling, 1960 EDITORIAL REsEARCH REPORTS,
119, 134 (1960). Professor Hanft seems to agree, saying that "[Sunday
observance laws] ... are a part of a continuing stream of religious thought
and expression in the life of the nation." Hanft, The Prayer Decisions, 42
N.C.L. REv. 567, 575 (1964). Professor Louissell praised the Douglas posi-
tion. He said: "May not ultimately there be in this kind of . .. candor
* . . more real hope for a modus vivendi in the dilemmas of American
religious pluralism, than in judicial make-believe such as that Sunday laws
are secular?" Louissell, Douglas on Religious Freedom, 73 YALE L.J. 975,
998 (1964). Mi. Justice Brennan characterized the decisions as to purpose
as "encroachments .. . cloaked in the guise of some nonreligious public
purpose." Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 612 (1961) (separate opinion).
For similar thought, see JOHNSON & YOST, op. cit. supra note 6, at 231,
255; PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 42, at 229;8 N.Y.L.F. 403 (1962); 15
OxLA. L. REv. 177 (1962).
"' Justice Frankfurter treats the language as helpful though inconclusive
in Sunday laws. 366 U.S. at 497-98 (separate opinion). It has been sug-
gested that the language used be accorded more weight. See Hopp, supra
note 41, at 228.
" See note 28 supra and accompanying text. The early cases in North
Carolina also reflect the religious purpose. Chief Justice Ruffin spoke of "the
legal injunction of all persons to apply themselves on Sunday to the duties of
religion," in Sloan v. Williford, 25 N.C. 307, 309 (1843) (dictum). (Em-
phasis added.) However, Ruffin recognized that Sunday laws also served
the purpose of providing relaxation and refreshment. State v. Williams,
26 N.C. 400, 401, 403-04 (1844). See generally BLAKELY, AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS BEARING ON SUNDAY LEGISLATION 53 (:1911); JoHNsoN & YosT,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 222.
"See, e.g., text within note 16 supra. At the time of its repeal, only
the phrase "the Lord's day" remained to give religious connotation to the
1741 North Carolina Sunday law. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 103-1 (1950).
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 434-35, 448 (1961).
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observance act,51 said that "its repeal in no sense should be construed
as a legislative intent to place the stamp of approval upon the prof-
anation of the Sabbath."5 This statement indicates that, notwith-
standing the disappearance of the religious language, the original
religious purpose of the 1741 act survived until its repeal in 1951.
Sunday laws for religious purposes early presented constitution-
al difficulties in North Carolina. In 1844, Chief Justice Ruffin said
that "however clearly the profanation of Sunday might be against
the Christian religion, it is not and could not here be made, merely
as a breach of religious duty, an offense. . . ."" He held the 1741
act valid, however, because the Legislature looked upon its viola-
tion as detrimental to the State as well as a breach of religious
duty.5 4 More emphasis was put on balancing the needs of society
and the individual in 1904 when Chief Justice Clark said: "The
only ground upon which 'Sunday laws' can be sustained is that in
pursuance of police power the State can and ought to require a
cessation of labor upon specific days to protect the masses from
being worn-out by incessant and unremitting toil."5  Thus, the
rationale that Sunday laws provide a needed rest from labor did
not originate with the 1961 Supreme Court cases. It arose during
the last century when the needs of labor were truly great and before
laws favorable to labor became common. In 1886, a twelve hour
work day with neither Sunday nor holiday the year round was
prevalent in some occupations. 6 At the turn of the century, the
1 See text accompanying notes 15-24 supra.
" State v. McGee, 237 N.C. 633, 638, 75 S.E.2d 783, 786, appeal dis-
missed, 346 U.S. 802 (1953). Chief Justice Ruffin also had characterized
the purpose of the 1741 act as to prohibit the "profanation of Sunday." State
v. Williams, 26 N.C. 400, 402 (1844).
5 Id. at 407.
Ibid.5 5Rodman v. Robinson, 134 N.C. 503, 508-09, 47 S.E. 19, 21 (1904)
(dictum). (Emphasis added.) Accord, State v. McGee, 237 N.C. 633, 640,
75 S.E.2d 783, 788, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 802 (1953). "If . . . the
cessation of labor or the prohibition or performance of any act were pro-
vided by statute for religious reasons the statute could not be maintained."
Rodman v. Robinson, supra at 508, 47 S.E. at 21. Nevertheless, religious
reasons continue to induce the enactments. For example, a Charlotte city
councilman after voting to enact a Sunday ordinance said in support of
his action, "'I have been brought up to keep the Sabbath holy!" Charlotte
Observer, March 7, 1964, § A, p. 1, col. 7, at 2, col. 1.
"' LESCOHIER & BRANDEIS, 3 HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES
101 (1935). In 1887 North Carolina children six years old worked as much
as twelve and a half hours a day. DAVIDSON, CHILD LABOR LEGISLATION
IN THE SOUTHERN TEXTILE STATES 105 (1939).
19641
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states had grave doubts about the validity of labor-hours regula-
tion.57 In North Carolina, organized labor had no leverage; the
general trend was in opposition to legislation touching any labor
problem.5 The theory and practice of allowing employers and em-
ployees to agree upon whatever terms the labor market dictated
continued into the early part of the twentieth century."0 No doubt
the masses needed any rest the Sunday laws might lend. 0 But has
the situation remained so desperate? During the twentieth century,
the shift away from judicial and governmental inaction has been
so great that a complete cycle in labor relations has occurred." Forty-
three states have labor laws regulating either maximum daily hours,
maximum weekly hours, or both. 2 "[F]ederal legislation and col-
lective bargaining contracts have created whole weekends of leisure
for most American workers. ".6.," These are the true factors that
LEscoHIER & BRANDEIS, op. cit. supra note 56, at 667.
DAVIDSON, op. cit. supra note 56, at 109, 112-13. The first attempts
at labor legislation in North Carolina were toward the establishment of a
ten-hbur day in 1887. The bill was speedily tabled. Id. at 103. See generally
id. at 102-21.
" "[Y]ellow dog contracts were originally upheld [1915], state legisla-
tion interfering with private contracts, by providing for maximum hours
of work, denounced [1905], and minimum wages legislation for women
invalidated [1923]." FORKOScH, LABOR LAW 15 (1953). See generally
PHILLIPs, FELIX FRANK FURTER REMINIscES 94-104 (1960).
" The "theory [that Sunday laws provided a day of rest] had particular
significance during this, nation's period of industrial advancement when
laborers were at a bargaining disadvantage in respect to management."
Note, 39 B.U.L. RZEv. 543, 544 (1959). In practice it is doubtful whether
they had any significant effect because they were not enforced. E.g., State
v. McGee, 237 N.C. 633, 638, 75 S.E.2d 783, 786, appeal dismissed, 346
U.S. 802 (1953). See also State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 149 N.C.
470, 62 S.E. 755 (1908). Sunday laws are not given a significant role in
labor history. E.g., LESCOHIER & BRANDEIS, op. cit. supra note 56, at 673.
The authors seem uncertain as to whether Sunday laws have any relation
to the protection of labor. There is no treatment of Sunday laws in either
DAVIDSON, op. cit. supra note 56; FORKOSCE, op. cit. supra note 59j LIEN,
LABOR LAW'AND RELATIONS (1938); or OAKES, LAW OF ORGANIZED LABOR
(1927).
" The dominant idea today is that of governmental planning for our
resources and labor to yield the maximum social welfare. RoTTscHAEFER,
THE CONSTITUTION AND Socio-EcoNoMIc CHANGE 203 (1948).
" U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, GROWTH OF LABOR LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
74 (1962). See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-17 (Supp. 1963). This statute,
originally enacted in 1937, provides in part:
No employer shall employ a female person for more that forty-eight
hours in any one week ... or on more than six days in any period
of seven consecutive days.
'No employer shall employ a male person for more than fifty-six
hours in any one week, or more than twelve days in any period of
fourteen consecutive days . ...
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protect the laboring classes. Whatever ielation Sunday laws had
in former times to the public's health, little remains today."
Further insight into the purpose served by the recent Sunday
laws can be had by examining the major proponents of the legisla-
tion. These proponents are usually the downtown merchants asso-
ciations.65 There have been charges that the Sunday laws have
become "a lethal weapon in the economic war of competition." 6
Today the downtown merchants cannot compete with the highway
discount houses that remain open on Sunday. This fact is true
whether the downtown merchants open on Sunday or retain their
"Brief for the Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae,
p. 3, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
"Nader, Blue-Law Blues, 192 NATION 499, 508 (1961). By 1940 the
Department of Labor had discounted the usefulness of Sunday laws'to
labor. Ibid.
"The Pennsylvania Retailers' Association intervened in Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). The recent state-wide Sunday law enact-
ments in North Carolina were proposed'by the .North Carolina Merchants
Association. Raleigh-News and Observer, May 24, 1962, p. 1, col. 2. See
also Charlotte Observer, March 17, 1964, § A, p. 5, col. 1; id., March 16,
1964, § B, p. 1, col. 5; id., Feb. 4, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 8, at 9, col. 1. This
association also filed a brief as amicus curiae in Treasure City, Inc. v. Clark,
261 N.C. 130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964). On the local government level, the
Downtown Charlotte Association, "an organization of downtown business
and professional interests," submitted a Sunday closing ordinance to the city
council. .Charlotte Observer, Feb. 4, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 8, at 9, col. 1.
" Brief for Appellant, p. 28, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
Metropolitan shopping areas have "been the target of a prolific attack by
intown stores which seek to enforce the Sunday laws against their com-
petitors." Ibid. "'[City] . . . retail merchants are intensifying a campaign
to force competitors to keep their doors locked on Sundays.'" State v..Fair
Lawn Service Center, Inc., 20,N.J. 468, 476, 120 A.2d 233, 237 (1956)
(dissenting opinion quoting New York Times). See KIRSTEIN, STORES AND
UNIONS 15 (1950); Editorial Note, 12 RUTGERS L. Rtv. 505, 508 (1958).
A former Charlotte city attorney, representing a discount house in.an attack
on a city Sunday ordinance, said that the Sunday laws are economic weapons
aimed at discounters by downtown merchants. Charlotte Observer, Feb. 4,
1964, § B, p. 1, col. 8. See id., March 16, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 5; id., March
10, 1964, § C, p. 2, col. 5; id., March 2, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 8; id., Feb.
29, 1964, § B, p. 2, col. 5 (quoting Ashville Citizen editorial); id., Feb. 25,
1964, § B, p. 2, col. 1; id., Feb. 21, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 5; Raleigh News
and Observer, Nov. 20, 1964, p. 1, col. 2; id., May 24, 1962, p. 1, col. 3;
id., June 22, 1961, p. 1, col. 4. In 1959 the National Council of the Churches
of Christ in the U.S.A. warned member churches against joining the strug-
gle for Sunday laws "sought by economic forces as a means to remove
• . competition, rather than for bona fide [purposes] . . . ." Quoted in
Shaffer, Sunday Selling, 1960 EDITORIAL. RESEARCH REPORTS 119, 123. In
vetoing a 1959 Sunday selling law, -Gov. George Dewey Clyde of Utah
said: "[T]he major support [for the measure] comes, from a group of
retail merchants who are seeking by this means to regulate competition
within their own industry." Quoted in Shaffer, supra at 136.
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present practice of closing.17 The best solution to the downtown
merchants' problem is to seek legislation to eliminate the Sunday
market, thereby causing the billions of dollars now spent yearly
on Sundays6" to be spent on other days, when the downtown mer-
chants are not at such a competitive disadvantage. Could this be
the reason these special interest groups seek Sunday closing laws?
Statements on behalf of the downtown merchants indicate that if
legislation is not passed removing Sunday competition they will
themselves open on Sunday in an effort to capture at least part of
the Sunday market.6" Therefore, in proper perspective it seems that
competition, not labor, is in the forefront of the proponents' collec-
tive mind.
If the primary purpose of the Sunday laws is to enable the
downtown merchants to compete, with certain religions and labor
benefitting only incidentally, can the act withstand the constitution-
al tests, assuming the purpose is projected into effect? Generally,
the courts give considerable weight to the decision of the legislature
when the police power is involved.7  In Tyson v. Banton,71 Mr.
" Most downtown stores could not compete beyond the city limits by
opening their own doors on Sunday. Some were forbidden to do
so under ordinances that did not apply in adjacent areas; even if
there was no legal bar to opening, the downtown location was a
handicap on a day when families took to the road. A number of
big stores tried to meet the competition by taking telephone orders
for articles advertised in the Sunday newspapers. Others opened
branches in the suburbs to get the Sunday trade.
Shaffer, supra note 66, at 120-121; See generally Editorial Note, 12 RUTGERS
L. Rnv. 505, 509 (1958)..
o' Shaffer, supra note 66, at 121.
69 "If these seven-day discount stores are permitted to continue to re-
main open on Sunday and the other six days of the week, it will become
necessary for other stores to likewise open on Sunday to compete." Brief
for the North Carolina Merchants Ass'n as Amicus Curiae, p. 20. Treasure
City, Inc. v. Clark, 261 N.C. 130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964). "The retail
mercantile field is highly competitive. If one store is wide open .. . others
must follow." Raleigh News and Observer, Nov. 20, 1961, p. 1, col. 4
(attorney for appellee in oral argument of Treasure City). See State v.
Fair Lawn Service Center, Inc., 20 N.J. 468, 476, 120 A.2d 233, 237 (1956)
(Jersey City Merchants Council solution-a new state Sunday law). The
President of the Raleigh Merchants Bureau said: "Rose's in Charlotte does
some $60,000 on Sunday. . . . A man has to protect himself and remain
open or seek legislation." Raleigh News and Observer, May 24, 1962, p. 40,
col. 3. To the same effect see Charlotte Observer, March 10, 1964, § A, p.
1, col. 8, at 2, col. 3 (President of Charlotte Merchants Association).
" Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Mays v. Burgess, 147
F.2d 869, 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 896 (1945); Harlow v.
Ryland, 78 F. Supp. 488, 493 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 172 F.2d 784 (8th Cir.
1949); First Nat. Bei. Soc. v. Garrison, 58 F. Supp. 972, 982 (S.D. Cal.),
aff'd, 155 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1946).
"'273 U.S. 418 (1927).
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Justice Holmes said
the proper course is to recognize that a state legislature can do
whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express
prohibition in the Constitution of the United States or of the
State, and that Courts should be careful not to extend such pro-
hibitions beyond their obvious meaning by reading into them con-
ceptions of public policy that the particular Court may happen to
entertain.72
Mr. Justice Holmes's fear that the courts will dip into political
questions should not, however, Iprevent courts from recognizing the
limitations upon the use of the police power.
To justify the State in ... interposing its authority ... it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distin-
guished from those of a particular class, require such interfer-
ence; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of
protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private
business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon
lawful occupations.73
Essential for the exercise of police power is that protection of a
specific public interest is more important than the social interest
in personal liberty.74 The public interest to be protected by the
present Sunday laws is a vague, general one. 715 On the other hand,
Id. at 446 (dissenin opinion).
"Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). This is the classic
statement of the specific criteria for a valid exercise of the police power.
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594'(1962).
' See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111-113 (1928);
Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 513 (1924); Aaron v.
McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944, 950 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd sub norm. Faubus v.
Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959). The balancing problem is discussed in State
v. Lawrence, 213 N.C. 674, 684, 197 S.E. 586, 592 (1938) (dissenting
opinion). In State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949), the
court relied on the dissent "of acknowledged power and force of reason"
in Lawrence to hold that a statute which required professional photog-
raphers to be licensed was beyond the police power. Id. at 767, 51 S.E.2d
at 733. See generally WILLIs, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
728 (1936); Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme
Court, 40 HARv. L. REv. 943 (1927).
" In the Braunfeld case, Brennan asked
what overbalancing need is so weighty in the constitutional scale
that it justifies this substantial ... limitation of appellants' free-
dom? It is not the desire to stamp out a practice deeply abhorred
by society .... It is not even the interest in seeing that everyone
rests one day a week .... It is the mere convenience of having
everyone rest on the same day.
366 U.S. at 614 (separate opinion).
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the very real and positive benefits to the particular group at the
expense of a loss of liberty by, citizens generally is quite tangible.70
It seems axiomatic that the police power cannot beused where the
primary purpose is not the health, safety, welfare, or morals of the
public but rather is to suppress competition.77 When the primary
7' In State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940), Justice Sea-
well vained'against the efforts of pressure groups.
[T]he importance of personal liberty is under constant attrition,
in the desire for more sweeping governmental control in private
affairs and ih the development of pressure groups which are unable
to, reach their objectives through voluntary association and, for
reasons not entirely altruistic, demand the powerful aid of the law.
The usual symptom is an endemic desire to have the public pro-
.tected ... although the public is not sensible of any harm.., or
any need of protection. This beau geste should not blind the Court
to the fact, when it exists, that the kind of protection afforded...
is more related to obvious 'benefits accorded to the group in its
private- -character than to the merely colorable advantage to the
public.
Id. at 762, 6 S.E.2d at 865. (Emphasis.added.) See also Hanft & Hamrick,
Haphazard Regimentatiox Under Licensing, Statutes, 17 N.C.L. REv. 1, 10
(1938). This article shows that many licensing statutes, while ostensibly
for" the protection of public ivelfare, are for the real motive of keeping
down competition. As long as the legislature continues to serve the aims
of pressure groups in the name of public welfare "a horde of guardians
6f th6 public'health, safety, morals, and welfare will continue to crowd
forward." Id. at 18.
"H. P. Hood & Sons,.Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949);
'Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S.'307, 315 (1925). In Ex parte Boebme, 12
Cal. App. 2d 424, 55 P.2d 559 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936), D was convicted
under a Sunday law prohibiting barber shop operation more than six days
a week. The court reversed the conviction. Citing the State's one-in-seven
labor law- to show that the barber shop closing law was not to provide a
uniform day of rest, the court-said: "It seems apparent to us that the real
object . . . was not to prescribe one day of rest in seven for barbers, but
plainly to restrict competition among the owners of th6 shops. Such an
object is certainly not withirr the police power .... ." Id. at -, 55 P.2d at 562.
However, many courts have not agreed with the finding of the Boehme
'case. See Two Guys from Harrison, Inc. v. Furman, 32 N.J. 199, 160 A.2d
265 (1960). In this case, the court dismissed the allegation that the statute
sought to protect the urban merchant from his highway adversary by de-
claring that it had no way of, knowing that such was the purpose, and
that this contention was in the realm of conjecture. Id. at 227-28, 160
A.2d at 280. In Gundaker Central Motors, Inc. v. Gassert, 23 N.J. 71, 127
A.2d 566 (1956), the court reasoned that since all sellers of -the proscribed
goods were required to close there was no economic advantage gained
and therefore the guarantee of equal protection was met. Id. at 81, 127
A.2d at 572. The reasoning is not sound. Suppose A and. B compete in X
industry. A adopts a- new practice to gain a competitive advantage over
B which B cannot: make up by also adopting the same practice. B seeks
and:gets police power legislation barring the use of the practice in X in-
dustry. Can it be said that no economic advantage has been gained by B?
See note 67 supra- for the indication that the supposition is a true reflection
of the facts surrounding the present Sunday law controversies between the
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purpose of an act is to suppress. competition, the fact that the act
would incidentally serve an end permissible to .the stater i.e, provid-
ing a day of rest, ought not save it.
7 8
III. WHERE NORTH CAiAOLINA STANDS
The success of the merchants associations in North Carolina,
proposers of the recent Sunday sales acts,7 9 has been prevented only
by the North Carolina Supreme Court. The 1961 actso was a sub-
stantial copy of the Pennsylvania Sunday law"' upheld by the United
States Supreme Court in the 1961 cases.8 2 A day of rest is ordered
highway discount houses (represented by A) and the downtown merchants
(represented by B).
"o Stress must be laid on the use of the word "incidentally" here. The
word is used in the sense that the unconstitutional, primary -purpose
and effect so overshadow the indirect effect that the indirect effect does
not bear a reasonable relation to the service of an end permissible to the
state. An example is Pierce v. Society'of Sisters; 268 'U.S. 510 (1925). In
this case an Oregon law which made it compulsory for children to attend
public schools was held to be beyond the limits of the police power and there-
fore unconstitutional. Although some public good might have come from the
act, the infringement upon the private interests of parochial schools so
overshadowed the possible public good that the act was held to bear no
reasonable relation to a purpose within the competency of the state. Id. at
535.
The police power is in derogation of personal liberty, and exteids only
to those measures enacted for the good of all citizens that have a substantial
,(not merely an incidental) relation to the public health, morals, safety,
or general welfare. State v. Williams, 253 N.C. 337, 117 S.E.2d 444 (1960)
(statute requiring license to solicit students for private schools held un-
constitutional); State v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 108 S.E.2d 74 (1959)
(aesthetic conditions alone insufficient to support police power); Roller v.
Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 96 S.E.2d 851 (1957) (exercise of police power to
require a license to lay tile unconstitutional); State v. Ballance, 229 N.C.
764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949) (police power requiring license to practice
photography unconstitutional).
, See note 65 supra.
"'N.C. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 1156, § 1. It provides in part:
Any person, firm or corporation who engages on Sunday in the
business of selling, or sells or offers for sale, on such day, at retail,
clothing and wearing apparel, clothing accessories, furniture, house-
wares, home, business or office furnishings, household, business or-
office appliances, hardware, tools, paints, building and lumber supply
materials, jewelry, silverware, watches, clocks, luggage, musical
instruments and recordings, excluding novelties, toys, souvenirs, and
articles necessary for making repairs and performing services, shall,
upon conviction thereof be fined or imprisoned in the discretion
of the court.
8' PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10 (1963).
82 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys From Har'ison-
Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961). See notes 35-43 supra
and accompanying text. The constitutionality of the statute considered as
an economic weapon to suppress competition was not decided.....
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only for those who sell at retail a specific list of goods, harmless
in themselves. All of the items prohibited from sale on Sunday
may be manufactured or processed on Sunday; all of the myriad
other articles may be made, processed, advertised, and sold on Sun-
day; every form of worldly employment may be pursued except the
sale of the condemned items. The idea that the 1961 act is designed
to protect a day of rest when it only partly closes the places that
sell the specified goods, allows the the sale of countless other articles,
and virtually grants a public license to all other forms of
commercial and industrial business to operate on that day with
actual financial advantage, contains within itself its negation.8 3 The
pretension that the statute is to provide a day of rest should not
be allowed to hide the obvious fact that the statute is aimed at high-
way discount houses.8 4
In G I Surplus Stores, Inc. v. Hunter,5 four highway discount
houses operating on Sunday sought to enjoin enforcement of the
1961 act on the sole ground that it was unconstitutionally vague,
uncertain, and indefinite. On appeal from a judgment below dis-
missing the action, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed.
The clause in the act allowing the sale of "articles necessary for
making repairs and performing services"' 5 was deemed so vague
that "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application."8" Therefore, said the
court, the act violated article I, section 17, of the North Carolina
Constitution s0a and the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the federal constitution. The reasoning of the court cen-
tered the vagueness charge on the word "necessary." Much reliance
was placed on a 1962 Kansas case which held the phrase "other
"These arguments were made against a similar statute in Two Guys
from Harrison, Inc. v. Furman, 32 N.J. 199, 250-52, 160 A.2d 265, 292-93(1960) (dissenting opinion).
8As the Court said in Two Guys, "'[T]he types of commodities covered
by this new enactment are principal categories of merchandise sold in these
establishments which have made the problem of Sunday retail selling newly
acute.'" 366 U.S. at 590-91 (appellant operated a large highway discount
department store).
257 N.C. 206, 125 S.E.2d 764 (1962).
"' See note 80 supra.
86 257 N.C. at 213, 125 S.E.2d at 769.
" This section of the constitution provides: "No person ought to be
taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or
outlawed or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty or property,
but by the law of the land."
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articles of immediate necessity""s unconstitutionally vaguess Al-
though the North Carolina court expressly decided only that the.
means used to implement the end were unconstitutional, consider-
able insight into the feeling of the court concerning the nature and
constitutionality of that end can be had by a closer examination
of the decision.
The court might easily have avoided declaring the act unconsti-"
tutional. The discount houses sought a constitutional test of the
act in an injunctive suit. The general rule is that the constitution-
ality of an act cannot be challenged in a suit to enjoin its enforce-'
ment. s° The court, however, said. an exception to the rule is allowed
"when it clearly appears ... . that .... fundamental human right
are denied in violation of constitutional guarantees. 90  There are
few cases extending this exception to the general rule to suits based
on the "void for vagueness" doctrine, perhaps because freedom
from vagueness 'was not always recognized as a constitutional
guarantee."1 It was originally only a non-decisive part of the rule
of strict construction of criminal statutes. 2 Today, however, it .has
crystallized into an imposing doctrine of constitutional law based
either on the requirement of sepairation of powers93 or a section of
"Kan. Sess. Laws 1859, ch. 28, § 249.
" State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403, 369 P.2d 365 (1962). The Kansas court'
said "necessity" has no generally understood objective meaning; that it
only had relative, subjective meaning. Therefore it failed to inform men
of common intelligence what conduct would render them liable to penalties,
80 257 N.C. at 214, 125 S.E.2d at 770.
go Ibid.
-912 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4920,. at 448 (3d ed.
1943). However, such is not to say that the extension is not presently
recognized as sound, for in Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), state
loyalty oath statutes were declared unconstitutional for vagueness in an
injunctive suit. Accord, Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S.
278 (1961). This point concerning the form of action is raised merely to
shed light on the inclination of the North Carolina court.
9" United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 486 (1948). For instance, in
Patten v. Aluminum Castings Co., 105 Ohio St. 1, 136 N.E. 426 (1922),
21 MI H. L. REv. 831, a statute was declared void for vagueness independ-
ently of constitutional restriction upon legislative action since the required
number of judges did not concur in order to declare a statute unconstitu-
tional. See generally Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal;
40 CORNELL L.Q. 195 (1955); Note, 23 IND. L.J. 272 (1948); Note, 109
U. PA. L. Rlv. 67 (1961); 38 HRv. L. Rzv. 963 (1925).
" If the statute is so uncertain that a court would have to rewrite it to
enforce it, the court should refuse to usurp the legislative function. Cline
v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927). See generally Collings, supra
note 92.
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a state constitution. 4 It is usually stated: The terms of a penal
statute creating an offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform
with reasonable certainty those who are subject to it what conduct
is to be penalized. 5 This is the pot calling the kettle black, for the
doctrine is itself too vague to command any consistency in the
cases.9 A court may rely on often repeated phrases either to strike
down a statute97 or to uphold it s without really making a pene-
"See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 17, quoted in note 86a supra.
.. E.g., G I Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter, 257 N.C. 206, 211, 125 S.E.2d
764, 768 (1962).
". "[B]oth sides cite and rely on the same cases to support their . . .
diametrically opposed, positions." Harvey v. Priest, 366 S.W.2d 324, 327(Mo. 1963).
"7 "The dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful cannot be
left, to conjecture." Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393
(1926). "[I]t will not do to hold an average man to the peril of an
indictment for the unwise exercise of his . . . knowledge involving so many
factors of varying effect that neither the person to decide in advance nor
the jury to try him after the fact can safely and certainly judge the results."
Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465 (1927). For similar rationale,
see State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403, 369 P.2d 365 (1962); GI Surplus Store,
Inc. v. Hunter, 257 N.C. 206, 212, 125 S.E.2d 764, 769 (1962).
""That there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine
the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient
reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense."
United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947). "[T]he law is full of
ibstances where a man's fate depends on his estimating -rightly, that is, as
the jury subsequently estimates it." Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373,
377 (1913) .(Holmes, J.). Compare the quotations cited in note 97 supra.
Compare Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 257 N.C. 367, 371, 126 S.E.2d 92,
q5"(1962) and State v. Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 33, 122 S.E.2d 768, 773 (1961)
(hoplifting statute held not vague), with G I Surplus Store, Inc. v.
Hunter, 257 N.C. 206, 212-13, 125 S.E.2d 764, 768-69 (1962).
Line-drawing distinctions based on particular words used in a statute
do' not completely account for the lack of consistency in the cases. The
line-drawing technique usually explores the countervailing pressures which
require a line to be drawn somewhere. Those countervailing pressures in
the vagueness are on the one hand to allow the legislature to use flexible
standards to insure effective application of legislative policy and on the
other 'hand to insure that the standards- used provide workable guidelines.
for those administering and subject to them. The "void for vagueness"
cases have not generally reflected these line-drawing pressures. See Cardinal
Sporting Goods Co. v. Eagleton, 213 F. Supp. 207, 219 (E.D. Mo. 1963).
Their "habitual lack of informing reasoning" gives them a "pool-rack-hung-
up appearance." Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 70-71 (1960). In the G I
Surplus case the North Carolina court did not discuss whether the phrase
"'necessary for making repairs and performing services" resulted from the
nature of the subject matter, which may impose limitations on exactitude in
phrasing in order to implement policy, or from sloppy draftsmanship-
which often happens with "floor" amendments; nor whether the vital word
'necessary" had been previously employed with success by the legislature;
nor whether the phrase must be sufficiently certain to the average man or
only to the trained minds of judges. See generally 45 HARv. L. Rn~v. 160
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trating analysisof whether the statute conveys sufficient meaning. 99
This possibility makes the concept of vagueness an "available in-
strument in the service of other ... judicially felt needs and pres-
sures" that control the cases and relegate the vagueness of the
statutory words to incidental significance.' These "spurious void
for vagueness" cases seem, to have their actual basis in either
of two settings: (1) a state imposing more prohibitory regulation
than it has a constitutional right to impose,' or (2) a court actual-
ly deciding policy questions avoided in the written opinion as "politi-
cal, questions."' 2 These uses of the doctrine, although tending to
minimize the number of occasions a court must expressly reach
issues of ultimate power, tend to veil the real issue when used in
the first kind of case and usurp the legislative function when used
in the second' 0 3
Evidence that the North Carolina Supreme Court had the first
of these uses at least "in the back of its mind" in the G I Surplus
case is not wanting. It is found in the language quoted with ap-
proval by the court: " '[A] rbitrary interference with private busi-
ness and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations are not
within the police powers of the state.' "'04
(1931) (arguing that certainty to judges is sufficient). -s it not just as
prejudicial to an individual to measure his rights by vague standards as it
is to penalize him with vague statutes?
"Mr. Justice Holmes said that "it is one of the misfortunes of the
law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long time
cease to provoke further analysis." Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347,
391 (1912) (dissenting opinion).
100 Note, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75 (1960). See Collings, supra, note
92, at 212-14 (that this use dominates the doctrine).
... [T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine may be regarded less as a
principle regulating the permissible relationship between written
law and the potential offender than as a practical instrument medi-
ating betwyeen, on the one hand, all of the organs of public coercion
of a state and, on the other, the institution of federal protection of
the individual's private interests.
Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 81 (1960).
1022 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4920, at 447 (3d ed. 1943)
("antagonisms to legislative policy rather than uncertainty concerning legis-
lative meaning"); Collings, supra note 92, at 195; Note, 23 IND. L.J. 272,
284 (1948).
... See generally State v. Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 30, 122 S.E.2d 768, 770
(1961); Note, 23 IND. L.J. 272, 285 (1948).
257 N.C. at 210, 125 S.E.2d at 767. The Supreme Court upheld a
Pennsylvania Sunday law which only prohibited "certain business activi-
ties" in Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S.
582 (1961). However, the Court made it clear that in Pennsylvania the
statute simply supplemented prior regulation which prohibited af worldly
1964] 141,
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The questionable application of the vagueness doctrine to the
phrase "necessary for making repairs and performing services" also
indicates that the court was doing more than merely insuring fair
notice. Words that have a long history of use are generally not
declared vague.'0 The concept of excepting necessary activities
from the operation of Sunday laws dates from the 1676 English
act °6 and today appears in all states that have some sort of general
Sunday law.' 07 A substantial body of courts, including the North
Carolina Supreme Court, 10' have construed the exception for neces-
sary activity without finding it so desperately unworkable as to be
unconstitutional.' Most courts today reject the vagueness attack
because they find the word "necessary" in the context of Sunday
laws sufficiently definite." 0 Indeed, the United States Supreme
employment. Id. at 590. The North Carolina court spent three paragraphs
of the G I Surplus opinion to point out that the 1961 act does not prohibit
"all occupations generally" on Sunday, but only "certain business activi-
ties." 257 N.C. at 210-11, 125 S.E.2d at 767 (1962). This has nothing
to do with vagueness. It is apparent recognition of the trend in otherjurisdictions to hold that "Sunday closing laws which are less than universal
in their application are unrelated to a universal day of rest in any manner
substantial enough to satisfy due-process requirements." Comment, 4 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 465, 471 (1957) (citing cases from California, Colorado,
Florida, Nebraska, New York and Oklahoma).
... Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 297 U.S. 216, 220-21(1936) (Cardozo, J.). See also Campbell v. City of New York, 244 N.Y.
317, 325, 155 N.E. 628, 630 (1927) (Cardozo,J.).
10' See text accompanying note 12 supra.
"'McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 551 (1961) (Appendix II to
separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.).1o" State v. Southern Ry., 119 N.C. 814, 25 S.E. 862 (1896) (involving
necessity of operation of trains on Sunday).
'09 In general, "necessary" in the context of Sunday laws is something
short of absolute or physical need but something more than merely needful,
desirable, and convenient. Williams v. State, 167 Ga. 160, 162-63, 144 S.E.
745, 746 (1928); Ungericht v. State, 119 Ind. 379, 380-81, 21 N.E. 1082,
1083 (1889); Ex parte Seward, 299 Mo. 385, 403, 253 S.W. 356, 360(1923), appeal dismissed sub nons. Seward v. Brady, 264 U.S. 599 (1924);
State v. James, 81 S.C. 197, 200, 62 S.E. 214 (1908). OHIo LEGISLATIVE
SERVICE CoMMISSION, SUNDAY PROHIBITIONS 8-11 (1963) (on file in N.C.
Institute of Government Library). The fact that no exact definition of gen-
eral application can be framed does not constitute vagueness. Great Am. Ins.
Co. v. Johnson, 257 N.C. 367, 371, 126 S.E.2d 92, 95 (1962).
110 Cardinal Sporting Goods Co. v. Eagleton, 213 F. Supp. 207 (E.D.
Mo. 1963); State v. Fantastic Fair, 158 Me. 450, 186 A.2d 352 (1961);
Marks Furs, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 365 Mich. 108, 112 N.W.2d 66 (1961);
Commonwealth v. Bauder, 188 Pa. Super. 424, 145 A.2d 915 (1958) ; Mandell
v. Haddon, 202 Va. 979, 121 S.E.2d 516 (1961); Rich v. Commonwealth,
198 Va. 445, 94 S.E.2d 549 (1956). The cases holding that the exemptions.
allowing necessary activity are too vague to be construed are recent and
parallel the use of the Sunday laws as an economic weapon to suppress
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Court did not find the "necessary" exception contained in one of
the two acts challenged in Two Guys Fron Harrison-Allentown,
Inc. v. McGinley"' to be vague. In that case, the Court upheld two
Pennsylvania Sunday acts.1 2 The first of these acts". did not con-
tain an exception for necessary activity. With the addition of the
"necessary" exception, it is the act that North Carolina adopted.""
The North Carolina General Assembly obviously adopted a copy of
the Pennsylvania act because the act had been upheld against consti-
tutional attack. The addition of the "necessary" exception was not
thought of as endangering the constitutionality of the act." 5 The
legislature's confidence was justified because the second Pennsyl-
vania act" 6 involved in Two Guys contained a "necessary" exception
that was upheld also. Although the second act was not expressly
attacked as being void for vagueness, the Court must have ruled
on the issue inferentially. Since the core of the "void for vagueness"
doctrine is that the act is so vague as to be unworkable and mean-
ingless, the Court by implication rejected that view merely by find-
ing the act to be valid and workable.
The word "necessity" has legal significance in such areas as
constitutional law,"17 contracts," 8 county government finance,"
competition. See State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403, 369 P.2d 365 (1962); Harvey
v. Priest, 366 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. 1963); G I Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter,
257 N.C. 206, 125 S.E.2d 764 (1962); State v. Woodville Appliance, Inc.,
171 N.E.2d 565 (Ohio Dist. Ct. 1960).11 366 U.S. 582, 585, 590 (1961) (by implication).
111 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4699.4, .10 (1963).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10 (1963).
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 1156.
See ESSER, RESPONSIBILITY OF COUNTY BOARDS OF COMMIssIONERs
UNDER CHArE 1156, 1961 SESsioN LAWS 3 (1962) (on file N.C. Institute
of Government Library), saying that "obviously this amendment [the "nec-
essary" exception] is vague and subject to a wide range in interpretation
but there is no indication in the opinions of the [United States] Supreme
Court that addition of the exclusion would result in tipping the scales
toward invalidity."
'11 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.4 (1963).
..
7 Mr. Chief Justice Marshall rejected the "absolutely indispensable"
definition of "necessary" as used in the necessary and proper clause of the
United States Constitution. He said:
Almost all compositions contain words, which, taken in their rigor-
ous sense, would convey a meaning different from that which is
obviously intended. It is essential to just construction, that many
words which import something excessive, should be understood in
a more mitigated sense-in that sense which common usage justi-
fies. The word "necessary" is of this description.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414 (1819).
. "'See Overman & Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 193 N.C. 86, 136 S.E.
J1964]
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domestic relations,120 infants' rights, 2 1 municipal corporation ex-
penditures;'2 2 -labor,tm possession of real property,124 pleading and
parties,1 25 taxation,1 26 and wills. 127 Furthermore, in State v. Black-
250 (1927) (candies, tobacco not necessaries under surety bond of highway
contract).
11. See Denny v. Mecklenburg County, 211 N.C. 558, 191 S.E. 26 (1937)
(dwellings for the use of teachers were not "necessary equipment" within
statute allowing county bonds for same).
E.g., Berry v. Henderson, 102 N.C. 525, 528, 9 S.E. 455, 456 (1889)
(dictum concerning "necessities" husband has duty to provide).
... In Barger v. M. & J. Finance Corp., 221 N.C. 64, 18 S.E.2d 826
(1942), an infant was allowed to recover money paid on a contract during
-minority because the article purchased was not "among those necessaries
for which a minor may be held liable." Id. at 66, 18 S.E.2d at 827. Accord,
'Jordan v. Coffield, 70 N.C. 110 (1874).
", There are a great many North Carolina cases construing the "neces-
sary expense" provision of N.C. CoNST. art. VII, § 7. This provision forbids
North Carolina municipal corporations spending tax money on expenses
other than "necessary expenses" without a vote of the people. Compare
Mayo v. Commissioners of Town of Washington, 122 N.C. 5, 29 S.E. 343
(1898) (finding that street lights were not a necessary expense), with
Fawcett v. Town of Mt. Airy, 134 N.C. 125, 45 S.E. 1029 (1903) (over-
ruling the Mayo case).
1.. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 129-30 (1944). Compare
Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942) (maintenance employees
necessary and therefore within the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act) -and Borden -Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679 (1945), with 10 East 40th
St. Bldg., Inc. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578 (1945) (maintenance employees
,here held not necessary in the same context).
-
1 2 Swink v.,Horn, 226 N.C. 713, 717, 40 S.E.2d 353, 356 (1946) (neces-
sity required to recover property subject to wartime rent controls).
"'E.g., Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y. v. Basnight, 234 N.C. 347, 352, 67
S.E.2d 390, 394-95 (1951) (Ervin, J., defining "necessary parties");
Pegram v. Wachovia-Bank & Trust Co., 219 N.C. 224, 225, 13 S.E.2d
249-50 (1941).
1 "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business. . . ." INT. Rav. CoDE of 1954, § 162(a). See Mich. Improve-
ment Ass'n v. Rockwood, 60-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9380 (D.N.D. 1960);
•Montgomery v. United States 63 Ct. Cl. 588 (1927). See generally 1964
P-H FED. TAx SERv. 11033.
S"'In Whitfield v. Garris, 134 N.C. 24, 45 S.E. 904 (1903), the court
said "'that an heir at law can only be disinherited by express devise or neces-
,.sary implication, and that implication has been defined to be such a strong
probability that an intention to the contrary cannot be supposed."' Id. at 26,
45 S.E. at 905. (Emphasis added.)
Although some of these uses do not involve criminal statutes, it does
not seem that they should be distinguished on that fact alone. The rationale
of State v. Hill, 189 Kansas 403, 411, 369 P.2d 365, 371 (1962); State v.
Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 33, 122 S.E.2d 768, 772-73 (1961), that the "void for
vagueness" doctrine requires criminal statutes to be more certain than civil
statutes is not entirely sound. It has modern basis in the principle that
"clearer warning should be given where the conduct will invoke sanctions
of greater severity." Note, 62 HARv. L. Rav. 77, 85 (1948). A light
-,criminal fine is -not as severe as many civil consequences resulting from
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welder, 2' the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld a superior
court determination that a municipal ordinance which prevented the
selling of a meal on Sunday was an "oppressive ... un r.eaonable
exercise of the police pow.er .... The rationale of the supreme
court is contained in one sentence: "[T]he ordinance in question
makes no exception as to 'works of necessity,' among which is
generally listed, 'keeping open a .. .dining-room.' "1so
Therefore, it can be concluded that the court in the GI Surplus
case could have held the injunctive suit not proper for a decision
on the constitutionality of the act; that the court used a doctrine
to declare the act unconstitutional which has previously seen sub-
stantial use in expressing motivating forces not explicitly spelled
-out in the decisions; and that such forces may have motivated, the
decision in the GI Surplus case since the application of the doctrine
to the 1961 act-solely as a means of getting rid of a yague statute
-was highly questionable. The court has been criticized for not
trying to construe the clause held vague- in GI Surplus.'"' Perhaps
construction of the word "necessary" in a statute.,'See Tank Truck Rentals,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958) ("ordinary and necessary" ex-
pense decision involving $41,000); Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90(1952) (same involving $124,000). It should be noted here, however, that
civil fines do not always carry the onerous consequences of a criminal record.
128 186 N.C. 561, 120 S.E. 196 (1923).
Id. at 563, 120 S.E. at 197.
... Ibid. The court in Blackwelder seems to make the "'necessary" ex-
ception a constitutional mandate. If so it has the support of McQuillin,
who says "certain exceptions -[to Sunday law prohibitions] must be .made.
For example, articles or works of necessity ... may and must be excepted."
6 MCQuILLImN, MuNIcIPAL Conron-vTiNs § 24.193, at 777 (1949). Yet
in G I Surplu= the court said the statute violated constitutional guarantees
because it contained the "necessary" exception. Affording Blackwelder the
least possible weight, it can be said that the court approved of the exception
for "works of necessity." "Works of -necessity" might include endless types
of work-not merely selling, endless types of sales-not merely retail sales
of specific articles, and endless types of necessity-not merely necessary
repairs and services. It seems, then, that the phrase deemed essential by
the court in Blackwelder could be considered more vague .than .the phrase
involved in the G I Surplus decision.
""1 See Cardinal Sporting Goods Co. v. Eagleton, 213 F. Supp. 207, 219
(E.D. Mo. 1963). The tradition of painstaking construction is strong -in
North Carolina. "The court must use every authorized means to . . . give
... intelligible meaning ...." State v. Partlow, 91 N.C. 550, 553 (1884).
Intrinsic language difficulties .cause problems of meaning in anything that
may be written. The giving of meaning is the "'essence of the business ,of
judges." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of -Statutes, 47
CoLum. L. REv. 527, 528 (1947). Although a court is not at liberty to
supply meaning where it is impossible to solve the doubt, the court should
avoid "abstract notions about 'indefiniteness."' Winters v. Nlew York, 333
U.S. 507, 526 (1948) (Frankfuter, J., dissenting).
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*the lack of emphasis the court put on construction can be attributed
to the use of the vagueness doctrine more for the purpose of re-
moving an economic weapon from statutory sanction than for the
purpose of insuring fair notice to potential offenders. 182 If such a
use is the substance of' the GI Surplus case, the result reached is to
be applauded. However, the means used to reach the result are
unfortunate because the vagueness issue veils this inferable holding
,and reduces the value of the case as a precedent. Viewed solely as
a vagueness case, it can be "hung on the rack" to be factually
distinguished in future cases. Hopefully, the many forces which
seem to' have forged and shaped the opinion will be appreciated.
18
The decision in GI Surplus, however, did not daunt the Sunday
law proponents. Within a year, the 1961 act was rewritten.18 4 The
"vague" phrase exempting "necessary activity" was not made more
certain; it was deleted. The policy which stood back of the phrase
was totally abandoned.' Also, 'a provision in the 1961 act which
..2 Clark's Charlotte, Inc. v. Hunter, 261 N.C. 222, 134 S.E.2d 364
(1964) ; State v. Towery, 239 N.C. 274, 79 S.E.2d 513, appeal dismissed, 347
U.S. 925 (1954); and State v. McGee, 237 N.C. 633, 75 S.E.2d 783, appeal
disnnissed, 346 U.S. 802 (1953), do not detract from this conclusion. These
cases uphold municipal ordinances prohibiting all occupations generally on
Sunday with exceptions allowing certain business activities. The ordinances
were attacked on the ground that they contained unreasonable classification
distinction between stores allowed to open on Sunday and stores required to
close. The cases assune that the purpose of the Sunday ordinances involved
is to promote public health and welfare. See Clark's Charlotte, Inc. v. Hunt-
er, supra at 228, 231, 134 S.E. at 368, 370. On that basis they allow unlimited
classification of types of businesses. If a search revealed that the purpose and
effect of the ordinances is more to suppress competition than to provide a day
of rest, the result should be the same as that which can be inferred from
G I Surplus-that the purpose underlying the Sunday laws is unconstitu-
tional. See generally text accompanying notes 70-78 supra. The cases have
avoided the search. They uniformly say that competition between the classes
is not the test of reasonableness of the classification. This reasoning over-
looks the fact that competition between the classes might have fostered
the classification, whereas differences in the types of businesses are only
incidentally involved. The reasoning of the court upholds an ordinance
where all businesses of a particular type (for instance department stores)
are required to close. Is this a sufficient test? Some stores within the
type might reap great economic advantage even though they have to re-
main closed. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra. Labor might only
incidentally benefit.
. The "working room" of the court was partially restricted by the
pleadings. The sole attack on the statute was upon the vagueness charge.
Finding that tvo other jurisdictions (Kansas and Ohio) had accepted the
contention, the court did not go beyond it to expressly settle the ultimate
'power issue..
, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-346.2 (Supp. 1963). The new act retained the
substance of the 1961 act except as hereinafter noted.
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allowed local government units to exempt themselves from the act
was abandoned in response to a warning in GI Surplus'35 that it
might raise constitutional questions. But the effect of the latter
provision-lack of uniformity throughout the state-was partially
retained. The 1963 act exempted twenty-five counties totally and
portions of four others from its operation. The legislature justified
the exemption as being to meet the needs of people visiting "resort
or tourist" areas."3 6 This justification was expressly rejected in
Treasure City, Inc. v. Clark."Bt In this case the court, in reviewing
the 1963 act, said:
Consideration of the articles of merchandise to which the 1963
act applies (e.g., business or office furnishings) dispels the sug-
gestion that there exists in a resort area or in a tourist area a
need for the sale of such merchandise on Sunday sufficiently
distinctive to constitute a reasonable basis for the separate classifi-
cation of such areas with reference to the sale of such articles
of merchandise.188
Another explanation of the exemption of the large areas from the
act may be possible. The exemption may show that these other-
wise unprotected areas are in no need of this type of legislation;
that the Sunday sale of the proscribed articles in these areas is not
really inimical to either the public health, safety, morals, or wel-
,fare."'3 If this is the reason behind the exemption, the conclusion
that recent Sunday laws are a solution to private rather than public
'problems is strengthened. 40
The Treasure City case held the 1963 act unconstitutional. The
express holding was based on article II, section 29- of the North
Carolina Cofistitution, which provides in part:
111 257 N.C. at 211, 125 S.E.2d at 768.
... N.C. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 448, § 1.
"T 261 N.C. 130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964).188 Id. at 134-35, 134 S.E2d at 100. The court might well have added
that the bill to rewrite the 1961 act had itself been amended to exempt
many of the counties before further amendment classified the exempted
counties as "resort or tourist areas." See Institute of Government Lgis-
lative Service, Daily Bulletin, March 14, April 19, 22, May 9, 10, 17, 22
(1963) (legislative history of S.B. 141).
... The thought was suggested in G I Surplus Stores, Inc. v. Hunter,
257 N.C. 206, 211, 125 S.E.2d 764, 767-68 (1962).
"' The fact that the General Assembly also expanded county powers by
allowing them for the first time to pass Sunday laws, N.C. GnN. STAT. §
153-9(55) (1964), does not explain the exemptions in the 1963 act. Six-
teen counties and portions of three others are excepted from both N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-346.2, and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-9(55). These areas are
without effective Sunday laws.
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The General Assembly shall not pass any local, private or special
act or resolution... regulating labor for] trade.... The Gen-
eral Assembly shall have power to pass general laws regulating
matters set out in this section.
The court found that the act regulated trade,4 ' was not a general
law, and therefore violated the constitutional provision. 142 As in
GI Surplus, the court neither searched for purpose nor reached the
ultimate power question of whether the purpose for which the
statute was enacted was constitutional.
However, a certain aura surrounding the recent decisions can-
not be overlooked. It indicates that the court is well aware that in
recent years the Sunday laws have taken on a new perspective;
that the banner for them is carried by business groups engaged in
a War of competition; and that when irritation for such legislation
comes only from particular interest groups, the objective to be
served should 'be questioned.
1 No mention was made that the act regulated labor. It does so only
indirectly.
' The mere fact that the act involved classification was not the defect.
-A general law may treat different parts of the state separately. But in
order for a law employing classification to be general, it must "apply to
and 'operate uniformly 'on all members of any class of persons, places or
things requiring legislation peculiar to itself in matters covered by the
law."' 261 N.C. at 135, 134 S.E.2d at 100. The court found that all areas
distinguished by characteristics sufficiently marked and important to make
'them clearly a class to be treated separately were not treated equally. Many
resort areas in North Carolina were not excepted. That finding alone
should have been enough to declare the act unconstitutional because even
though the legislature has wide discretion in making classification in statutes,
it must be based on tangible, intrinsic, germane distinctions and "must
affect all within the class uniformly." McIntyre v. Clarkson, 254 N.C. 510,
519, 119 S.E.2d 888, 894-95 (1961). If not it would be a denial of the
equal protection of law guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment and un-
der N.C. CONST. art. I, § 17. Therefore Treasure City should be a valuable
precedent in the legislative classification field, where the courts have pte-
viously shown a notorious reluctance to supervise. Consider the classes
sustained in State v. Weddington, 188 N.C. 643, 125 S.E. 257 (1924).
The ordinance allowed the sale of meals on Sunday, and with them coffee,
tea, or milk. Defendant was subject to criminal conviction for the sale
of a Coca-Cola. Treasure City inferentially recognizes that the classifica-
tion issue is the core of the case. The case arose as did G I Surplus in an
injunctive suit to test constitutionality. Both cases adopted the general rule
that constitutionality of an act cannot be challenged in a suit to enjoin its
enforcement but took exception because it "clearly" appeared necessary to
protect "fundamental human rights." G I Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter,
-257 N.C. 206, 214, 125 S.E.2d 764, 770 (1962). It seems clear that the
guarantee of equal protection is the right protected in Treasure City.
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IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
When the constitutionality of an objective is questionable,
policy considerations are generated. Ironically, these added policy
'considerations are 6ften overlooked in an effort to draft a law which
will withstand the constitutional test. The result is a law that may
not be suited to the present best interests of the state. A constitu-
tion "does not tell us what is presently wise. . . . [It] can do no
more than save us, in extreme cases, from folly."1 43 Therefore,
more attention should be directed to these policy considerations in
deciding whether this type of legislation should be enacted at all.
The legitimate end that Sunday laws allegedly achieve is the
procurement of a day of rest for the public. "A need for this kind
of supplementation of the laws protecting labor in North Carolina
has not been sufficiently shown by the proponents. 4 - Furthermore,
the disadvantages which are necessarily bound up in this type legis-
lation seem to be overbalancing. Classification distinctions allow-
ing certain business activities to continue while most businesses are
required to close are inescapable since many types -of Sunday lab6r
facilitate making Sunday a day of rest and recreation."4 5 The large
majority of these classifications in the past have extended beyond
the mere exemption of businesses for the purpose of making Sun-
day a more enjoyable day of rest and relaxation. 40 'Many distinc-
tions made to allow one activity on Sunday and disallow another
have no logical explanation." These distinctions cause responsible
1" O'Toole, The Sunday Laws, 74 COMMONWEAL 343, 345, (1961).
... The proponents have generally stated their purpose in sponsoring
Sunday legislation to be for "the protection and general welfare of the
'public as a whole and also for the protection of family life and for the
general welfare of the people as a whole, including the employee class."
Brief for the North Carolina Merchants Ass'n as Amicus Curiae, p. 20,
Treasure City, Inc. v. Clark, 261 N.C. 130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964).
... Frankfurter discusses this problem in McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 524-43 (1961) (separate opinion).
" This extended classification results either from surrender to special
interest groups or from the use of inadvertent language which is too
specific. See generally Editorial Note, 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 505, 511-12(1958). Consider the 1962 Charlotte ordinance excepting real estate deal-
ers; the 1961 act allowing wholesale but not retail sales; and the Asheville
ordinance allowing sale of ice cream but not sherbert, milk or butter. Brief
for Appellant, p. 5, State v. Trantham, 230 N.C. 641, 55 S.E.2d 198 (1949).
1" See the classifications sustained in State v. Weddington, 188' N.C.
,643, 125 S.E. 257 (1927), and in State v. Trantham, supra note 146. The
classifications in the Sunday closing ordinance adopted by Charlotte in 1962,
CiA.RLoTTE, N.C., CODE § 13-56 (1964), were widely criticized. A Charlotte
Observer editorial said that '"under the ordinance, as we read it, a drug
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public officials-even the most learned in the law-to regard the
Sunday laws as "nothing short of ridiculous,"' 48 "a miserable
farce,"' 49 "tyrannical,"' 50  and an "unbelievable hodgepodge"'51
causing a "vexing state of uncertainty and widespread confusion...
so notorious as to be the subject of judicial notice."'1 2 The classi-
fication used in state-wide Sunday laws has also failed to recog-
nize the fact that "the tranquility of the country town may admit
of different regulations than the discordant and sometimes raucous
atmosphere of the growing cities." 1
53
The Sunday laws are conducive to sporadic enforcement, 
1 4
store may sell a Sunday patron a Band-Aid, but woe be to the food store
that does. A golf shop may peddle its golf balls on Sunday, but the sport-
ing goods section of a drug store will have to be roped off." Charlotte
Observer, Feb. 4, 1964, § B, p. 2, col. 1. Furthermore, an exemption to
allow "emergency repair services" on Sunday was deleted from the final
draft of the ordinance. This deletion seems to indicate, for example, that
plumbing or automobile repairs would not be allowed on Sunday even in
an emergency. Charlotte Observer, March 6, 1964, § C, p. 2, col. 2.
"' Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S.
582, 591 n.6 (1961).
"" Cheeves v. State, 5 Okla. Crim. 361, 365, 114 Pac. 1125, 1126 (1911).
... Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (dictum) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
..1 Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc. v. Gallagher, 176 F. Supp. 466,
472 (D. Mass. 1959), rev'd, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
. Harvey v. Priest, 366 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Mo. 1963).
1.. Letter From John T. Morrisey, Sr., Charlotte City Attorney, to Brown
Hill Boswell, Sept. 15, 1964.
.. Enforcement has been neglected throughout the history of Sunday
laws. LEFLAR & NEWSomE, NORTH CAROLINA 125 (1954); MYER, Y- OLDEN
BLUE LAWS 115-16, 119 (1921); 3 SAUNDERS, THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF
NORTH CAROLINA 180 (1886) (1715 act "too little regarded"). See general-
ly WHITAxER, THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLISH SUNDAY 52-84 (1940).
Even after the 1962 Charlotte ordinance was upheld by the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court, the Charlotte Police Chief said that police would not
take the initiative nor stringently enforce it. Charlotte Observer, Feb. 3,
1964, § B, p. 1, col. 1. The fact that a short period of accommodation is a
customary prelude to strict enforcement of a new penal statute may ex-
plain the statement of the Charlotte Police Chief. Correspondence From
John T. Morrisey, Sr., Charlotte City Attorney, to Brown Hill Boswell,
Sept. 15, 1964. The Charlotte ordinance was repealed before it grew out
of this accommodation period. Ibid. However, other public officials have
expressed the same general attitude toward Sunday laws which have been
"in force" for periods of time long past the accommodation stage. For
instance, the District Attorney of Lehigh County, Pa., admitted the in-
tentional absence of Sunday law enforcement for many years. Nader, Blue-
Law Blues, 192 NATION 499, 500 (1961). One reason for lack of enforce-
ment is the administrative unworkability. In Spartanburg County, S.C.,
opponents of the Sunday laws demanded enforcement against all violators
in an effort to demonstrate the administrative unworkability. In three Sun-
days of enforcement police netted one thousand arrests. Sheriffs and judges
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which not only necessarily creates an attitude of disrespect by the
public for the authority of the law,', but which also is "hardly
compatible with the characterization of the statute as a vehicle with
which the state seeks to promote the public health and welfare."' 5
Sporadic enforcement is also inconsistent with a fundamental
principle of ordered liberty: the assurance of "responsible control
over the scope and probable'regularity of exercise of governmental
force. '1 5 7 Another significant disadvantage of the Sunday laws is
that minority religious beliefs are made more expensive than the
beliefs of the majority5 8 This disadvantage, perhaps more than
any other, has caused the view that restriction of Sunday activity,
should come about by voluntary agreement between individuals and
not by government force 9 to gain considerable support.16° , The
complained. It cost the state $25 to collect a $1 fine. Nevertheless, the law:
stayed on the books while enforcement lapsed and Sunday selling resumed..
Shaffer, Sunday SeUing, 1960 EDITORIAL RESEARcH REPORTS 119, 127,-28.
' For comments of the Governor of Utah on this aspect, see id. at 136:
See generally Editorial Note, 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 505, 508 (1958). .
Note, 37 IND. L.J. 397, 415 (1962).
""Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 90 (1960).158 The burden imposed on minority religious beliefs runs throughout
the history of this type of law, causing an early writer to remark: "No,
man can peruse these laws without a chill in every vein, and be 'ready to-
disbelieve that so uncharitable a spirit could ever have existed and been'
exercised in America, in a country whose freedom, civilly and religiously
considered, was its boast.. . ." THE BLUE LAws o NEw HAVEN COLONY
at v (1838). That the burdens still exist today-though in less degree-is
not denied. Consider the language of Warren: "[T]he statute at bar does
not make unlawful any religious practices. . ."; it simply makes the practice
"more expensive." Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961). Justice
Frankfurter says: "[T]he measure of the burden is not .. . beyond the
ower of the individual to alter." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
21 (1961) (separate opinion). Frankfurter adds that the severity of the
burden "might be offset by the industry and commercial initiative of the
individual merchant." Ibid. Might not this line of thought maintain any,
oppressive statute?
... This view is stated by Douglas in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 563 (1961) (dissenting opinion). See generally Fell, Blue Laws-A
Minority Opinion, 76 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1375 (1959); Shaffer, supra
note 154, at 136.
* , A 1962 'resolution by the United Presbyterians' General Assembly
said: "The church should not seek nor even appear to seek, the coercive
power of the state in order to facilitate the Christian's observance of the
Lord's Day." Newsweek, June 18, 1962, p. 77. A 1959 report by the Na-
tional Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. said: "[T]he
general consensus, coming from numerous areas where community-wide
efforts against economic encroachments on Sunday have developed, points
unquestionably to the greater value and dependability of solutions reached
by voluntary agreement rather than by legislative fiat." Quoted in Shaffer,
vupra note 154, at 123-24.
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step away from legislation burdened with such difficult problems of
constitutionality and policy is commendable.
BROWN HILL BOSWELL
Administrative Law-judicial Review-Procedural Due Process in
Student Disciplinary Proceedings
In the recent case of lit re Carter,1 the petitioner, having been
suspended from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill on
a charge of cheating on a quiz, appealed to the state courts for
judicial review. The trial court ruled that the evidence offered
against the petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of innocence,
that the conviction was therefore not in accordance with due process,
and that to deny petitioner readmission on the evidence presented
would be arbitrary and capricious. But because additional evidence
had been disclosed at the trial, the court remanded the case to the
Board of Trustees to refer to the proper administrative authorities
for a review taking account of the new evidence. Petitioner took
no exception to this order and made no appeal, but moved before
a, subsequent term of court that an order be issued to the Board of
Trustees to show cause why an order should not be issued reversing
the suspension and directing correction of University records ac-
cordingly. It was held that until the administrative hearing on
remand was held, petitioner had not exhausted her administrative
remedies; the motion and order to show cause were dismissed.
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the dis-
missal. Delegation of authority by the Board of Trustees in
matters of student suspension was upheld as "proper and constitu-
tional.' ' 2 The decision of the Board of Trustees upholding the stu-
dent honor council and the Chancellor was held to be "the admin-
istrative decision of a State board authorized by the Constitution
and statutes of the State to make administrative decisions . . . "a
and the petitioner was thus held to be entitled to judicial review
under the state statutes4 granting review of administrative decisions.
The Carter case thus establishes beyond doubt the jurisdiction of the
1262 N.C. 360, 137 S.E.2d 150 (1964).
Id. at 372, 137 S.E.2d at 158.
*Id. at 372, 137 S.E.2d at 159.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-306 to -316 (1953).
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North Carolina courts to exercise judicial review of student suspen-
sions from the University.
Courts have long acknowledged jurisdiction over suits challeng-
ing expulsion of students from colleges and universities.5 Yet, the
basis for their jurisdiction has seldom been clearly articulated, In
cases involving private schools, the courts have frequently held the
student-school relationship to rest in contract,' thus implicitly found-
ing their jurisdiction on the power to determine disputed contractual
rights. Where state schools are involved, jurisdiction may be based,
as in the Carter case, on state statutes granting authority to admin-
istrative boards and officers and establishing powers of review.
7
Until recently it was thought that the fourteenth amendment
of the federal constitution did not apply to cases of student disci-
pline. The only case that had specifically considered the question of
due process under the fourteenth amendment had denied its appli-
cability to student disciplinary proceedings in a state-supported insti-
tution.8 - Two recent federal cases, however, specifically grounded
federal jurisdiction in cases of student expulsion from state colleges
on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.9 By its
terms the fourteenth amendment applies only where state action is
involved, and the state action requirement has been applied in the.
Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589
(1909); People ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Medical College, 60 Hun
107, 14 N.Y. Supp. 490, aff'd vere., 128 N.Y. 621 (1891); Commonwealth
ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (1887). Contra, Carr v. St.
John's Univ., 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 802,
187 N.E.2d 18, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962); People ex rel. Goldenkoff v.
Albany Law School, 198 App. Div. 460, 191 N.Y. Supp. 349 (1921) ; Barker
v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 Ati. 220 (1923). In
Steir v. New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 966 (1960), the majority opinion was that there was no
federal jurisdiction over such cases where state schools are involved. The
concurring judge and the dissenting judge thought the requisite jurisdic-
tion was present. See generally Annot., 58 A.L.R. 2d 903 (1958); Annot.,
50 A.L.R. 1497 (1927); Annot., 39 A.L.R. 1019 (1925).
See, e.g., Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, supra note 5; Peo-
ple ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Medical College, supra note 5.
" See also State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433,
cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928).
' State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943). In Steir v. New York State Educ.
Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 966
(1960), the dissenting judge thought federal courts had jurisdiction of such
cases under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
'Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961), reversing 186 F. Supp. 945 (M.D. Ala. 1960);
Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
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area of college education. 10 The distinction between public and pri-
vate educational institutions, so far as application of the due process
clause is concerned, may not be made in the future, however, since
recent cases have demonstrated a tendency to find state action in the
activities of many groups once thought to be private."
Despite their acknowledgment of jurisdiction over cases of stu-
dent discipline, the courts have generally expressed reluctance to
alter the institution's decision, whether the school be public' - or
private.'3 The usual statement is to the effect that the courts will
not interfere in the absence of an arbitrary or unusual act or abuse:
of discretion.' 4 While this exercise of judicial restraint is commend-
able when dealing with academic areas in which the courts have
no expertise,'" and while the determination of educational policy
per 'se is the legitimate concern of the institution and not of the
" See, e.g., Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ. of La., 212 F.
Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
"See Comment, 42 T~xAs L. Rxv. 344, 345-49 (1964), and cases cited
therein. The writer there concludes that by analogy to the development in
other areas where the services in question were impressed with a deep
public interest it is entirely possible that the activities of the private col-
leges and universities will be held to fall within the limits of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 347-48. See also Williams, The Twilight of State Action,
41 TExAs L. REv. 347, 379-80 (1963).
12 See, e.g., Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 179 (M.D.
Tenn. 1961); Smith v. Board of Educ., 182 Ill. App. 342 (1913); Woods
v. Simpson, 146 Md. 547, 551, 126 At. 882, 883 (1924); Gleason v. Uni-
versity of Minn., 104 Minn. 359, 362-63, 116 N.W. 650, 652 (1908); Ver-
million v. State, 78 Neb. 107, 112-13, 110 N.W. 736, 738 (1907); People
ex rel. O'Sullivan v. New York Law School, 68 Hun 118, 121-22, 22 N.Y.
Supp. 663, 665 (1893) ; State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 113,
171 S.W.2d 822, 827-28 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943); Foley
v. Benedict, 122 Tex. 193, 200, 55 S.W.2d 805, 810 (1932).
13 See, e.g., DeHaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626, 627 (D.C.
Mass. 1957); Kentucky Military Institute v. ,Bramblet, 158 Ky. 205, 164
S.W. 808 (1914); People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton College, 40 Ill. 186
(1866); Anthony v. -Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp.
435, 439-40 (1928).
"Robinson v. University of Miami, 100 So. Zd 442, 444 (Fla. App.
1958); Woods v. Simpson, 146 Md. 547, 551, 126 Atl. 882, 883 (1924);
Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 248, 197 N.W. 510, 511 (1924);
State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 216, 263 Pac. 433, 437, cert.
denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928); Vermillion v. State, 78 Neb. 107, 112-13, 110
N.W. 736, 738 (1907); Foley v. Benedict, 122 Tex. 193, 200, 55 S.W.2d
805, 810 (1932)1
"We find it to be the unanimous holding of the authorities that the courts
will not interfere with the discretion of school officials in matters affecting
discipline of students unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion or where
their action has been unlawful or arbitrary." State ex rel. Sherman v.
Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 113, 171 S.W.2d 822, 827-28 (1942).15 See, e.g., Foley v. Benedict, 122 Tex. 193, 55 S.W.2d 805 (1932).
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courts, a more stringent application of judicial review seems appro-
priate in the area of student disciplinary proceedings."0 In the field
of punitive discipline it is the court rather than the school that has
a special expertise.17 Evaluating facts to determine whether crime
has occurred is the normal function of the courts.' 8 If the institu-
tion's decision is based on specific incidents, rather than on its total
experience with the student, the court is as qualified to review this
decision as it is those of a trial judge or jury.19
Moreover, adequate protection of the student's interests may
necessitate a more rigorous exercise of judicial review, for in dis-
ciplinary matters the college is virtually judge in its own cause and
thus acts substantially unrestrained by outside pressures.20 Legisla-
tive solutions guarding the student's interests are scarcely to be
expected, since the institution has established channels of contact
with the legislature while the political influence of students is com--
paratively quite small.2 ' Further, the objection that judicial review
will result in a rash of suits seems untenable, since the number of
students willing and able to bear the expense and publicity of litiga-
tion is likely to remain small.22
It is to be expected, however, that growing enrollments and the
augmentation in value of education in modem society will result in
some increase in adjudications stemming from student disciplinary
proceedings. That the subject of student rights in college discipli-
nary proceedings has acquired increasing significance in recent years
is reflected in the work of both courts and commentators.2" This
is scarcely surprising when viewed in light of the current value of
education. A college diploma has become a virtual prerequisite to
1 See Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1387-95 (1963).
1" Id. at 1393.
'
8 Id. at 1394.
'oId. at 1393.
°Id. at 1388-89, 1394. See also authorities cited note 11 supra.
"Id. at 1390.
Ibid.
"E.g., BLACKWELL, COLLEGE LAW (1961) ; Jacobson, The Expulsion of
Students and Due Process of Law-The Right to Judicial Review, 34 J.
HXGHE ED. 250 (1963); Seavy, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70
HAR V. L. REv. 1406 (1957); Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and
State Universities, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 368 (1963); Comment, The Con-
stitutional Rights of College Students, 42 TEXAs L. Rv. 344 (1964); Note,
The College Student and Due Process in Disciplinary Proceedings, 1962 U.
ILL. L.F. 438; Comment, Private Government on the Campus-Judicial
Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963); Annot., 58
A.L.R.2d 903 (1958).
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success;' -petfiftiary and 'otherwise. When a' student is expelled,
barriers are frequently placed in his way which effectively prevent
his continuing his education elsewhere. The expelled student "suf-
fdr the lots of a status and the destruction of a set of relation-
ships' which have unique intrinsic worth."24 When viewed in this
context, the propriety of a stricter judicial review is accentuated.20
The necessity of a stricter judicial review is further demon-
strated by the total absence of procedural due process accorded to
students in many of the recorded cases. It has been held that fair
and reasonable notice to the student of the charges against him is
not required.26 Several cases hold that no hearing at all is neces-
sary,27 while others have found various forms of informal proceed-
' Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1364 (1963).
-5 t has been urged that the courts may not inquire into a complaint
on'the part of a student that he has suffered unmerited injuries at
the hands of his instructors, so long as the latter aver them to have
been disciplinary in character. This is a grave proposition when it
is considered that there are tens of thousands of youth continually
in attendance at colleges, many of whom are of mature age and
any of whom may suffer degradation and irreparable injury to
reputation as well as pecuniary loss, by the unjust action of a facul-
ty. - -
It can never be safely admitted that the rights of so large and
mostly so worthy a body of our citizens, in whose welfare society
has such a deep and abiding interest, shall be utterly deprived in this
respect of the protection of the, law through its ordinary tribunals.
Comm onwealth ex .el' Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77, 86 (1887).
Dismissal from college affects a student's life too drastically to
be left to even the barest possibility of arbitrary action by college
administrators. Expulsion carries with it an ineradicable stigma
which usually prevents admission to another institution, with the
result that a student's chances for higher education may be gone
forever. This is much too high a price to pay for a threadbare legal
doctrine that blocks judicial review.
Jacobson, supra note 23, at 254-55.
" Vermillion v. State, 78 Neb. 107, 110 N.W. 736 (1907); Anthony v.
Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435 (1928). Contra,
Geiger v. Milford Independent School Dist., 51 Pa. D. & C. 647 (1944);
Commonwealtli ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (1887).
' DeHaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D.C. Mass. 1957);
People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees, 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 134 N.E.2d
6.35-,(,1956); Smith v. Board of Educ., 182 Ill. App. 342 (1913); White
v. Portia Law School, 274 Mass. 162, 174 N.E. 187 (1931); Anthony v.
Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435 (1928); Goldstein
v. NewYork Univ.; 76 App. Div. 80, 78 N.Y. Supp. 739 (1902). In DeHaan
v. Brandeis Univ., supra at 627, the court said, "While it might be a better
pblicy to hold a hearing whenever any disciplinary action is contemplated,
I hold as a iatter of law that the defendant is not required to do so."
Cbntra, Knight y. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961);
Morrison v. City of Lawrence, 186 Mass. 456, 72 N.E. 91 (1904); Gleason
v. University of Minn., 104 Minn. 359, 116 N.W. 650 (1908); Geiger v.
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ings to be sufficient. 2s The right of the accused "to be confronted
with the witnesses against him' 29 has often been-denied in college
disciplinary proceedings. It has been said that since honorable stu-
dents do not like to be known as snoopers and informers against
their fellow students, they should not be subjected to cross-examina-
tion."0 Further, although the right to be represented by counsel is
now regarded as an essential element of our system of criminal
justice,31 no authority specifically holds accused students entitled
to representation by counsel in disciplinary proceedings. 2 The want
of procedural due process in a case of expulsion from a state uni-
versity33 provoked one commentator to remark, "our sense of justice
should be outraged by denial to students of the normal safeguards.
... It is... shocking to find that a court supports [college officials]
, . . in denying to a student the protection given to a pickpocket."3 4
Standing in sharp contrast to these cases is the model for pro-
cedural due process set forth in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
Education,"5 the first case to hold that due process requires notice
Milford Independent School Dist., 51 Pa. D. & C. 647 (1944); Common-
wealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (1887). In Knight. v.
State Bd. of Educ., supra at 178, the court felt that
the rudiments of fair play and the requirements of due process
vested in the plaintiffs the right to be forewarned or advised of the
charges to be made against them and to be afforded an opportunity
to present their side of the case before such drastic disciplinary
action was invoked by the university authorities.
" State ex rel. Crain v. Hamilton, 42 Mo. App. 24 (1890) ; State ex rel.
Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433, cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591
(1928) (meeting with deans' council); Miller v. Clement, 205 Pa. 484, 55
Atl. 32 (1903) (hearing before committee of board, reviewed by full board);
State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943) (dean stated substance of' testimony
against relators to faculty committee).
.'See U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
"' State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 110, 171 S.W.2d 822,
826 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943). See also Morrison v. City
of Lawrence, 181 Mass. 127, 63 N.E. 400 (1902); State ex rel. Ingersoll v.
Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433, cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928). In
Steir v. New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13, 20 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 966 (1960), the concurring judge seemed contemptuous
of the idea of requiring cross-examination.
' See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Geiger v. Milford Independent School Dist., 51 Pa. D. & C. 647, 652
(1944), stated obiter dictum that the right to be represented by counsel if
the student so elects is an essential element of a proper hearing.8
'People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees, 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 134
N.E.2d 635- (1956).
8, Seavey, supra note 23, at 1406-07.
"294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1962). The
case has been noted extensively: 14 ALA. L. Rnv. 126 (1961); 50 GEo. L.J.
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and some opportunity to be heard before a student at a tax-sup-
ported college may be expelled for misconduct. The court there
stated that notice to the student should "contain a statement of the
specific charges and grounds which, if proven, would justify ex-
pulsion... ."I' A hearing should be held which allows presentation
of both sides of the case in considerable detail.8 7 While cross-
examination is not required, the student should be given the names
of the witnesses against him and a report on the facts to which
each testifies3 He should then be given the opportunity to present
his own defense against the charges and to produce oral testimony
or written affidavits of witnesses in his behalf." These rudiments
of an adversary proceeding, the court concluded, may be preserved
without encroaching upon the interests of the college. 40
All the procedural safeguards of the Dixon model, and more,
are incorporated into the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill system of student discipline, which was at issue in the Carter
case. North Carolina, both on the state and administrative levels,
seems to grant to the student the right to due process. On the state
level, the statute on which the court in Carter based its right to
review provides that the courts may reverse or modify the decision
of an administrative agency on the ground, inter alia, that it is in
violation of constitutional provisions.41 The State Constitution pro-
vides that no person ought to be deprived of his life, liberty, or
property, "but by the law of the land." 42 The "law of the land"
is equivalent to "due process of law."'43 On the administrative level,
the Board of Trustees, as the body entrusted with the management
of the University," has delegated to the faculty and Chancellor the
duty of securing to every student the right of due process and a
fair hearing.' Various provisions of the Student Constitution and
314 (1961); 75 HARv. L. REv. 1429 (1962); 60 MxcH. L. Rxv. 499 (1962);
38 N.D.L. Rxv. 346 (1962); 35 TEMP. L.Q. 437 (1962); 15 VAND. L. REV.
1005 (1962).
88 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., supra note 35, at 158.
" Id. at 159.88Ibid.
'Ibid.
'
0 Ibid.
xN.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-315 (1953).N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 17.
"State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949) ; State v. Collins,
169 N.C. 323, 84 S.E. 1049 (1915).
"N.C. GEr. STAT. § 116-10 (1960).
'nAmong the duties of the faculty and Chancellor in each of the
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the Student Judicial Procedures Bill48 effectuate this delegation of
authority.4 7
"Due notice" is guaranteed the student and is defined as notice
"seventy-two hours preceding a hearing. 4 . Notice is given by sum-
mons49 served by the office of the student Attorney General.5" The
summons must be in writing and must specify, inter alia, the na-
ture of the offense.5 At a preliminary conference with the Attorney
General, the student is further informed of the charges against
him, the possible penalties, and his rights in relation to the hearing.52
As a final guarantee of due notice, the student may move to post-
pone the hearing on the ground that he "has not been fully in-
formed of the particulars of the charge and is unable to adequately
defend himself .. .
Further provisions establish the right of the accused student to
a fair hearing-a right frequently denied by other academic institu-
tions. 4 The hearing is held by a council composed of the student's
peers, elected under campus geographical apportionment as specified
component institutions of the University of North Carolina shall
be included the duty to exercise full and final authority in the regu-
lation of student conduct and in all matters of student discipline
in that institution; and in the discharge of this duty, delegation of
such authority may be made to established agencies of student gov-
ernment and to administrative or other officers of the institution
in such manner and to such extent as may by the faculty and Chan-
cellor be deemed necessary and expedient; provided that in the
discharge of this duty it shall be the duty of the faculty and Chancel-
lor to secure to every student the right of due process and fair
hearing, the presumption of innocence until found guilty, the right
to know the evidence and to face witnesses testifying against him,
and the right to such advice and assistance in his own defense as
may be allowable under the regulations of the institution as ap-
proved by the faculty and Chancellor. In those instances where the
denial of any of these procedural rights is alleged, it shall be the
duty of the President to review the proceedings.
Resolution, Executive Committee of Board of Trustees of the University
of North Carolina, April 15, 1957 (on file in the Consolidated University
Offices, Chapel Hill, N. C.).
"Hereinafter cited as "Procedures Bill." Copies of Procedures Bill
and U.N.C. STUDENT CosT. are available from Student Government At-
torney General, Chapel Hill, N.C.
See notes 48-53, 55-61, 63-66 infra.
,U.N.C. STUDENT CONsT. art. II, § 7(c).
"Procedures Bill, art. III, § 2 (1962).
Procedures Bill, art. III, § 4 (1962).
"Ibid.
"Procedures Bill, art. IV, § 1 (1962).
"Procedures Bill, art. VIII, § 3 (1962).
"See cases cited note 27 supra.
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by the Student Legislature.55 The accused student is to be pre-
sumed innocent until proven guilty56 and is granted the right to a
speedy hearing.57 The right to a fair trial- includes the right to
disqualify members of the judicial body from sitting in judgment
in the particular case.5" And, in cases involving multiple defend-
ants, the accused student has the right to a separate trial if he so
elects. 9
The right to assistance by a defense counsel is granted,"0 but
the counsel must come "from among those students under the juris-
diction of the specific judicial body in which the case arises." 1 The
right of the accused student to face his accuser is likewise provided
for, " and the right to question any testimony0 3 assures the privilege
of cross-examination. Moreover, the accused student is guaranteed
the right to summon material witnesses, 4 and any student refusing
to comply with his obligation to serve as such may be charged by
the Attorney General with refusing to accept his responsibility under
the Honor System.65
Despite these procedural safeguards in the University's system,
the need for judicial review endures. While the system itself seems
adequate, the possibility of error in the application of the system
remains. Where such error is alleged in cases of student discipline,
the courts should review the proceedings much as an appellate court
does those of a trial tribunal. Whether the Dixon model marks a
new trend in cases involving state-supported schools and whether
the requirements of procedural due process will be applied to private
11 U.N.C. STUDENT CONST. art. II, § 3(b), (c).
IaU.N.C. STUDENT CoNsT. art. II, § 7(a).
",Procedures Bill, art. X, § 1 (1962). Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
" U.N.C. STUDENT CONsT. art. II, § 7(h); Procedures Bill, art. IX, § 1
(1962).
" Procedures Bill, art. IV, § 1(g); art. XII, § 2 (1962).
"'U.N.C. STUDENT CONsT. art. II, § 7(d); Procedures Bill, art. IV, §
1(c) (1962).
61U.N.C. STUDENT CONST. art. II, § 7(d). Quaere whether an accused
student could constitutionally be denied counsel by a member of the bar if
he desired it? "It is advisable, although probably not mandatory, that, if
[the student] . . . requests the privilege of being represented by counsel
selected and employed by him, it be accorded him." Address by Ralph F.
Lesemann, National Conference of University Attorneys, Ann Arbor, Mich.,
April 17, 1961.
*" Procedures Bill, art. IV, § 1(k) (1962).
"U.N.C. STUDENT CONST. art. II, § 7(g).
" U.N.C. STUDENT CONsT. art. I, § 7(e); Procedures Bill, art. XI § 7(1962).
"Procedures Bill, art. XI, § 7 (1962).
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institutions remain to be seen. Whatever the trend in the rest of
the country, In re Carter indicates that the North Carolina courts
stand ready to remedy any deprivation of due process in the appli-
cation of the student disciplinary system of the University."0 As
to defects in the system itself, the courts are unlikely fo insist that
the University establish a microcosm of the common law. They
may nevertheless find that the present system in the University lacks
some fundamentals of due process to which the student is entitled.17
WILLIS PADGETT WHICHARIJ
Constitutional Law-Extension of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination
The petitioner in Malloy v. Hogan was on probation from a
sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to a gambling charge. He
was brought before a referee conducting an inquiry into alleged
gambling activity in Connecticut and asked questions about the cir-
cumstances surrounding his prior arrest, among which were:
(1) for whom did he work on September 11, 1959; (2) who.
selected and paid his counsel in connection with his arrest on that
date and subsequent conviction; (3) who selected and paid his
bondsman; (4) who paid his fine'; (5) what was the name of
the tenant in the apartment in which he was arrested; and (6), -
did he know John Bergoti.2
After refusing to answer each question "on the grounds it may
tend to incriminate me," he was adjudged in contempt3 and im-
prisoned until he would cooperate. He applied for a writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment granted a privilege against self-incrimination.' A lower
state court denied the writ, and the highest state court affirmea.b
"For example, deprivation of due process may. result as in Carter, where
the trial judge found the conviction based upon evidence insufficient to rebut
the presumption of innocence.
"'For example, the courts might find the denial of counsel- by a member
of the bar to deprive the student of due process. See note 61 supra.
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Id. at 12.
' The referee had the same power to commit a witness for contempt as
a judge of superior court. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52434 (Sipp. 1963)-. " ,
'U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, provides: "No person . . ., shall be' compelld
ih any criminal case to be a witness against himself . .. 2. See generjiy
Claflin, The Self-Incrimination Clause, 42 A.BA.J. 935 (1956).
'Malloy v. Hogan, 187 A.2d 744% (cGnn': 1963).," .
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The state court reasoned that the fourteenth amendment did not
protect a state witness against self-incrimination and that the peti-
tioner's claim of the state privilege6 was not justified because he
had failed to show any "real and appreciable" danger of self-in-
crimination.7
The Supreme Court reversed,' holding that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment includes the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. It also held that the states must
apply the standard used by the federal courts to determine whether
a witness's claim of the fifth amendment privilege is justified. In
applying this standard, the Court held that petitioner's claim of the
privilege was justified because a response to the questioning "might
furnish a link in the chain of evidence" for future prosecution.0
The decision overruled Twining v. New Jersey ° and Adamson
v. California," which held the fourteenth amendment did not in-
clude a privilege against self-incrimination, by the incorporation of
the fifth amendment or otherwise. In these decisions, the Court
had characterized the privilege as a "rule of evidence."12 and said
that it was not inherent in "due process."" Twining left the states
free to treat the privilege in any manner they deemed proper.
However, all states did have a privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, by either constitutional provision'4 or judicial decision.' 5 The
SCoNN. CONsT. art. I, § 9, provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused... shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself ...
See notes 21-22 infra and accompanying text.
*378 U.S. at 3.
See note 31 infra and accompanying text.
10211 U.S. 78 (1908). Accord, Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961);
Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958); In re Citroen, 170 F. Supp. 93(E.D.N.Y. 1959); Brown v. State, 173 Miss. 542, 161 So. 465 (1935);
In re Briggs, 135 N.C. 118, 47 S.E. 403 (1904).11332 U.S. 46 (1947).
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 104-05 (1908).
1 But see Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 68 (1947), where he contended that any act which violated the
Bill of Rights also violated the fourteenth amendment. See Note, The
Fourteenth Amendment Challenged, 36 GEo. L.J. 398 (1948). For discus-
sion of the history of the privilege against self-incrimination, see Pittman,
The Colonial and Constitutional History of The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. Rnv. 763 (1935).
" E.g., N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 11, provides: "In all criminal prosecutions,
every person charged with a crime has a right to . . . not be compelled
to give self-incriminating evidence." For other jurisdictions, see 8 WIG-
moRz, EviDENCz § 2252 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMoRE].1
"Koenck v. Cooney, 244 Iowa 153, 55 N.W.2d 269 (1952); State v.
White, 27 N.J. 158, 142 A.2d 65 (1958).
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point where the majority of the states differed from the federal
courts was in the test or standard used to determine whether a
claim of the privilege was justified in any particular instance.16
More specifically, these states differed from the federal courts in
the manner a judge decided whether an answer might be incriminat-
ing. They used the standard of an early English case, Regina v.
Boyes,'7 in determining whether a claim of the privilege was justi-
fied. That standard was stated as follows:
The Court must see, from the circumstances of the case and the
nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give, that
there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger .... The danger
to be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with reference
to the ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course of things
-not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, hav-
ing reference to some extraordinary and barely possible con-
tigency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to
influence his conduct. 8
A trial judge exercised his discretion in determinating whether an
answer might be incriminating.' If there were no evidence from
which a judge could infer a reasonable apprehension, he could re-
quire a witness to show a possible danger.20 The Connecticut court
applied this test in finding the petitioner in contempt. It found that
petitioner had no "reasonable ground" to fear self-incrimination be-
cause: (1) any prosecution that might arise from answering the
first five questions was barred by the applicable statute of limita-
tions ;21- (2) petitioner refused "to show" how an answer to the
first five questions could possibly incriminate him2 and (3) Bergoti
was not described or identified on the record as having been en-
gaged in or as having been convicted of any type of unlawful
activity.
10WIGMORE § 2271.
1 B. & S. 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (Q.B. 1861). Accord, McCathy v.
Clancy, 110 Conn. 482, 148 Ati. 551 (1930); Commonwealth v. Joyce, 326
Mass. 751, 97 N.E.2d 192 (1951); LaFountaine v. Southern Underwriters,
83 N.C. 132 (1880). Contra, State v. Chitwood, 73 Ariz. 314, 240 P.2d
1202 (1952); Young v. Knight, 329 S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1959).1 B. & S. at 330-31, 121 Eng. Rep. at 738.
WIGmORE § 2271.
"See, e.g., In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8, 93 A.2d 183 (1952).
21 Questions (1) through (5) were directed to the date of his prior
arrest for gambling.
" Petitioner did not offer evidence that he had left the state during the
applicable time so as to stop the statute of limitation from running.
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On the other hand, the federal standard as set forth in Hoffm"an
v. United States2 3 says,
the privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in
themselves support a conviction... but likewise embraces those
which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute. . . . However if the witness, upon interposing his
claim, were required to prove the hazard . . . he would be com-
pelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is
designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be
evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in
which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or
an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous
because injurious disclosure could result.2 4
Furthermore, it was said in Hoffman that in applying this stand-
ard the judge must be "perfectly clear" that the answer "cannot
possibly" have a tendency to incriminate.25 But United States v.
Coffey,20 quoted with approval by the Court, 7 indicates that a judge
rarely can be "perfectly clear," by saying that "in determining
whether the witness really apprehends danger in answering a ques-
tion, the judge cannot permit himself to be skeptical; rather must
he be acutely aware that in the deviousness of crime and its detection
incrimination may be apprehended and achieved by obscure and un-
likely lines of inquiry."28  In short, a judge applying the federal
standard has little discretion in determining whether an answer
might be incriminating.2 9 The difference between the prevalent
state standard and the federal standard is illustrated by the Court's
holding in Malloy that petitioner's claim was justified.80 The Court's
reasoning was that petitioner might apprehend self-incrimination if
the person who ran the gambling operation was still engaged in
" 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
'Id. at 486-87. See Aiuppa v. United States, 201 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.
1952).
2 341 U.S. at 488.
198 F.2d 438 (3d Cir. 1952).
378 U.S. at 13 n.9.
198 F.2d at 440-41.
See WIG EOa § 2271; Falknor, Self-Incrimination Privilege: "Links
in the Chain," 5 VAND. L. Rv. 479 (1952). But cf. Hoffman, Whom Are
We Protecting? Some Thoughts on The Fifth Amendment, 40 A.B.A.J.
582 (1954). -
.'Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr, Justice Clark, dissented. 378 U.S.
at 14. Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, also dissented.
Id. at 33. This bare minority was of the opinion that the contempt convic-
tion was proper even under the Hoffman standard.
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unlawful activity. If this were so, said the Court, a response by
petitioner might link him with a more recent crime for which he
could be prosecuted." Thus, the real question involved in Malloy
was whether the federal standard for justifying a claim of the
privilege should have been the applicable standard. But, before the
.federal standard could be applied to the states, the Court had to
find that the fourteenth amendment included the privilege against
self-incrimination.
In dealing .with the .constitutional question, the Court empha-
sized that our system of criminal prosecution is "accusatorial . . .
and that the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay."32
The Court looked for support to what it regarded as analogous
situations in which the due process clause is held to prohibit the
states from using either an accused's coerced confession 33 or evi-
dence obtained by illegal search and seizure. 4 Mr. Justice Gold-
berg equated the privilege against self-incrimination with coerced
confession and concluded:
Since the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from in-
ducing a person to confess . ." far short of "compulsion by
torture" . . . it follows dfortiori that it also forbids the States to
resort to imprisonment,-as here,'to-compel him to answer "ques-
tions that might incriminate him.' The Fourteenth Amendment
secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth
Amendment guarantees against federal infringement-the right
of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the un-
f ettered exercise of his own will, and .to su~ffer no penalty... for
such silence.
35
The investigation was a "wide-ranging inquiry into crime," and, the
questions attempted to elicit the identity of the person who ran the. tn-
lawful gambling operation. It felt that the state failed to take note of the
"implications of. the question, in the setting in which it [was] asked." 378
U.S. at 14.
Id. at 7.
E.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). See generally Com-
ment, The Coerced Confession Cases inSearch of A Rationale, 31 U. Cal.
L. REv. 313 (1964).
"Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See generally Comment, The
Exclusionary Rule of Illegally Obtained Evidence: Its Development and
Applicattion, 35 So. CALIF. L., REv. 64 (1961).
" 378 U.S. at 8. The Court began'its analogy by citing Bramv. United
States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897), whei6 it said "whenever a question arises
whether a confession is inc6fapetent because not voluntary, the, issue is
controlled by . . . the Fifth Amendment [privilege against self-incriqina-
tion] . . . ." But see WIGMORE § 2266; at 400-01, where -it is stated
that the two principles are ,easily "blended" because'each protects a person
from "guilty facts." Brain was cited. Id. at 401 n.1. Wigmore has stated
1964j.
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Furthermore, the Court accepted dictum from Mapp v. Ohio80 that
the fourth and fifth amendments "cojoin" in the fourteenth amend-
ment to prevent an "invasion of the indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty, and private property" by the states.8 7 In
so doing, the Court concluded that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment must provide for the privilege against self-
incrimination. 8
The opinion rejected the idea that the fourteenth amendment
applies only "a watered-down, subjected version of the individual
guarantees of the Bill of Rights." 9 In holding that the fourteenth
amendment privilege was the same as the fifth amendment's and
that the standard for determining when it can be invoked is the
federal standard, the Court relied upon prior decisions maintain-
ing such uniformity in incorporating the first,4 0 fourth,4 1 and sixth
amendments 42 into the fourteenth amendment. The Court also
stated that it would be inconsistent to have two standards determin-
ing whether the same privilege might be invoked.4 8 The effect of
Malloy is that a state witness need only say he refuses to answer
on the grounds that such might incriminate him, and he then re-
that it is erroneous in history and in policy to compare the two: (1) they
evolved one hundred years apart to meet different needs; (2) the privilege
is confined to legal testimony, but the confession protection is not confined
to such time and place; and (3) the privilege applied to civil proceedings
as well as to criminal prosecutions. Id. at 401.
367 U.S. 643, 646-47, 657 (1961). See generally Corwin, The Supreme
Court's Construction of The Self-Incrimination Clause (pts. 1-2), 29 MiH.
L. R v. 1, 191 (1931).
87 378 U.S. at 8-9.
" Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. 378 U.S. at 14. He feared the decision,
while rejecting the "wholesale incorporation" idea, as going too far in
accepting the fourteenth amendment as "a shorthand directive to this Court
to pick and choose among the provisions of the first eight Amendments and
apply those chosen, freighted with their entire accompanying body of federal
doctrine, to law enforcement in the States." Id. at 15. For a discussion of
"wholesale incorporation," see Note, Constitutional Law-Was It Intended
That the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights, 42 N.C.L.
REV. 925 (1964).
"1 378 U.S. at 10-11. Mr. Justice Harlan did not accept the Court's
automatic application of the federal standard. He thought that the Court
should decide each case individually and, if a state proceeding did not
fulfill the requirements of the fourteenth amendment, that the Court should
apply some standard of "fundamental fairness." Id. at 20-28.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
't Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
"Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
"378 U.S. at 11.
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ceives the same protection from the fourteenth amendment as a
federal witness gets under the fifth amendment.
The Supreme Court considered another aspect of the privilege
against self-incrimination in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n.4"
Petitioners refused to answer questions put to them at a state hear-
ing on the grounds that such might incriminate them. To compel
their testimony they were granted immunity from prosecution under
state law.45 Petitioners then refused to answer on the grounds that
their answers might tend to incriminate them under federal law
from which the states have no power to grant immunity.48 They
were held in contempt, and this decision was affirmed by the state
court4 7 which said that the only immunity necessary to compel their
testimony was the state immunity. The state court reiterated the
Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Murdock,4 s which is
stated thus:
[T]he lack of state power to give witnesses protection against
federal prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute. The
principle established is that full and complete immunity against
prosecution by the government compelling the witness to answer
is equivalent to the protection furnished by the rule against
compulsory self-incrimination.4 9
The Supreme Court, however, rejected"0 its previous decisions
and held that a state witness is protected by the privilege against
incriminating himself "under federal as well as state law."51 The
Court further stated "the constitutional rule to be that a state wit-
ness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incrimi-
nating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its
fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in connec-
"378 U.S. 52 (1964).
Being a bi-state body, the Commission granted them immunity from
prosecution under the laws of New York and New Jersey. Id. at 53 n.2.
"Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905). See Feldman v. United States,
322 U.S. 487, 491-92 (1944); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141,
149 (1931) ; State v. Dominguez, 228 La. 284, 305, 82 So. 2d 12, 19 (1955);
Dunham v. Ottinger, 243 N.Y. 423, 438, 154 N.E. 298, 302 (1926).
"IIn re Application Waterfront Comm'n, 39 N.J. 436, 189 A.2d 36
(1963). The state court upheld the civil contempt conviction, but reversed
the criminal contempt on the ground that the dual proceeding deprived the
petitioners of the opportunity to show evidence in their behalf.
1'284 U.S. 141 (1931). This case was discussed in Grant, Federalism
and Self-Incrimination, 4 U.C.L.A.L. Rlv. 549 (1957).
" 284 U.S. at 149.
30 378 U.S. at 77.51 Id. at 78.
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tion with a criminal prosecution against him." 2 To allow the states
to compel self-incriminating testimony under the immunity statute,
the Court, by exercising its supervisory powers,5 3 prohibited the
federal government, "from making any . . .use of compelled testi-
mony and its fruits."54 Although the contempt conviction could
have been affirmed, the Court vacated it and remanded the case to
the state court on the ground that "fairness dictates that petitioners
should now be afforded an opportunity, in light of this develop-
ment, to answer the questions." 55
The now discarded rule of Murdock flowed from the theory
that the' federal government and the state governments are dual
sovereignties, "separate and distinct . . ., acting independently of
each other," even though both exercise their powers within the same
geographical limits.5" The Court emphasized "dual sovereignty" in
construing the privilege and consequently held that neither sover-
eignty had to recognize the possibility of a witness incriminating
himself under the laws of the other.5 7 To force a witness to testify,
the compelling sovereignty had to grant the witness an immunity
that was "coextensive" with the displaced privilege,"' i.e., a protec-
tion that was equal in scope to the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.59 Since a witness was protected only against incriminating
5 Id. at 79-
"' The Court has "supervisory authority" to formulate rules of evidence
in the federal courts. E.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
"378 U.S. at 79. For discussion of the development of the federal
exclusionary rule, see Day & Berkman, Search dnd Seizure and the Ex-
clusionary Ride: A Re-Examination in the Wake of Mapp v. Ohio, 13 W.
REs. L. REv. 56 (1962).
378 U.5. at 80.
"Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1858). See Feld-
man v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); United States v. Robinson,
74 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. Ark. 1947); State ex rel. Gibbs v. Gordon, 138
Fla. 312, 189 So. 437 (1939).
"' See Grant, Federalism and Self-Incrimination, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 549
(1957); Grant, Immunity From Compulsory Self-Incrimination in A Fed-
era'Systemof G'overnment, 9 T.EP. L.Q. 194 (1935). Cf. Fisher, Double
Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the Intruding Constitution, 28 U. Cni. L.
REv. 591 (1961); Comment, Double Jeopardy and Dual Sovereignty, 34
WAsir. L. REv. 562 (1959).
" Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). See Ullmann v.
United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); In re Watson, 293 Mich. 263, 291
N.W. 652 (1940).
" For state immunity statutes, see WIGMORE § 2281; for the federal
statute see note 69 infra. See generally Note, The Scope of Statutory hln-
munity Required by The Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Privilege, 57
Nw. U.L. REv. 561 (1963).
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himself under the laws of the interrogating sovereignty,-he had-t6
be protected only against prosecution by that sovereignty in order
to compel him to give self-incriminating statements.6 0 Therefore,
a state witness could be prosecuted in the federal courts for a crime
he had admitted under the compulsion of a state immunity statute.6'
In Murphy, the Court rejected the emphasis on "dual sovereign-
ty" because it felt prior decisions were based on a misconception
of English law.62 A construction of the privilege which recognized
and justified a claim of the privilege for fear of subsequent prose-
cution in another sovereignty was accepted.63 The Court quoted
with approval the statement by Chief Justice Marshall that "a party
is not bound to make any discovery which would expose him to
penalties . ". 6
This extention of the privilege to protect a state witness against
"°United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931). Accord, United
States v. Pagano, 171 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); In re Ferris, 175
Kan. 704, 267 P.2d 190 (1954); Wyman v. DeGregory, 101 N.H. 171, 137
A.2d 512 (1957); In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8,,93 A.2d 176 (1952); LaFountaine
v. Southern Underwriters, 83 N.C. 132 (1880); State v. Morgan, 164
Ohio St. 529, 133 N.E.2d 104 (1956); State v. Wood, 99 Vt. 490, 134 Atl.
697 (1926). Contra, United States v. Di Carlo, 102 F. Supp. 597, 605 (N.D.
Ohio 1952) (where the federal investigation concerned violation of state
as well as federal law); State ex rel. Mitchell v. Kelly, 71 So. 2d 887 (Fla.
1954); Braden v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1956); Lousiana
v. Dominguez, 228 La. 284, 82 So. 2d 12 (1955); In re Schniter, 295
Mich." 736, 295 N.W. 478 (1940).
"1 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944). Subsequent prosecu-
tion would probably be barred if there was evidence of collusion between the
federal and the state government. Id. at 494 (dictum). Immunity granted
by the federal government bars subsequent state prosecution. See notes
69 & 70 infra.
02378 U.S. at 77.
" The Court cited the following three cases: (1) United States v. McRae,
L.R. 3 Ch. 79 (C.A. 1867), where the defendant was an alleged Confederate
agent in England. Being questioned- about his affiliations, he refused to
answer on the ground that he could be made to forfeit his property under
an American statute. The Court held that the privilege was properly
asserted on the basis that there was a justified fear of imminent prosecu-
tion in another jurisdiction. (2) Ballman v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906),
which held that a federal witness could not be compelled to testify when
his refusal was clearly justified by a fear of subsequent state prosecution.
At the time the witness was testifying in the federal court, he was being
prosecuted by Ohio. (3) United States v. Saline Bank, 26 U.S. (1. Pet.)
100 (1828), where a bill was brought into a federal court to examine the
defendant's books. Being an unincorporated bank in violation of a Virginia
statute, the defendant refused to answer the questions on the ground of
fearing subsequent prosecution in a state court. The Court held that the
privilege was ,properly invoked and the defendant could not be compelled
to answer.
" Id. at 104. (Emphasis added.)
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incriminating himself "under federal as well as state law" left the
states unable to compel a witness to testify, because, not having the
power to grant immunity from federal prosecution, 5 they could
not give an immunity "coextensive" with the privilege they sought
to take away. The Court recognized that the rule which it set forth
would prevent the states from compelling valuable testimony. To
accommodate state investigation, the Court provided an exclusion-
ary rule which forbids the use of state compelled testimony in
federal courts.66
While the Court stated that a federal witness is protected against
incriminating himself "under state as well as federal law," 7 no
change in current practice will be required. The Federal Immunity
Act6" already forbids the use in state courts of testimony com-
pelled under its provisions 9 and thereby satisfies the requirement of
''coextensive" immunity.
In Malloy and Murphy, the Court took additional steps toward
attaining uniformity in criminal procedure. The Court has now
extended most of the Bill of Rights' protections, along with their
accompanying federal standards, to the states through the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause. Among these are freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures,"° the right to counsel, 71
freedom from cruel and unusual punishments,72 and the privilege
against self-incrimination.73 The last major provision of the Bill
of Rights which has not been absorbed into the fourteenth amend-
"' See note 46 supra.
60 378 U.S. at 79.
8
'Id. at 78.
18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1959), which provides:
[N]o ... witness shall be prosecuted.., on account of any transac-
tion, matter, or thing concerning which he is so compelled, after
having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify
or produce evidence, nor shall testimony so compelled be used as
evidence in any criminal proceeding... against him in any court.
"" Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954). This federal power was
said to be based on the necessary and proper and the supremacy clauses of
the Constitution. Accord, Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960);
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956) (power was based on the
war clause); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896) (Congress had power
to prohibit the prosecution itself through the commerce clause).
'6Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment).
"'Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment).
2Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth amendment).
"
8 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment).
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ment is the fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy."'
The Court rejected the incorporation of this protection in Palko v.
Connecticut,"5 where it was held that a conviction of first degree
murder following a reversal of a verdict of second degree murder
at the instance of the state did not violate " 'fundamental principles
of liberty and justice . . .' "" In view of the trend towards view-
ing all Bill of Rights protections as "fundamental principles of
liberty and justice, ' 77 it is likely that Palko will be overruled when
the question arises.
71
There is also a "dual sovereignty" aspect to double jeopardy.
It is best illustrated by United States v. Lanza,9 in which it was
held that there can be successive federal-state trials and convictions
for offenses based on the same act. The result was based on the rea-
soning that neither sovereignty has to recognize a prosecution by the
other.80 The rejection of "dual sovereignty" as the controlling prin-
ciple in the "silver platter" situation s' and in cases involving self-
incrimination 2 does not, however, necessarily herald a rejection of
it in the Lanza situation. In successive trials by both governments,
each sovereignty is protecting interests deemed vital to it, and is not
capitalizing on "dual sovereignty" to use evidence which is inad-
missible in the courts of the other. However, the Court seems
"U.S. CONST. amend. V, provides: "No person shall . . . be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .. .
" 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
'Old. at 328.
See notes 70-73 supra.
8 Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in The Fourteenth Amendnient, 73
YALE L.J. 74 (1963). The Court should also apply the standard used in
the federal courts in determining when jeopardy attaches. This uniform
standard would eliminate the variation in state standards. See generally
Note, Criminal Law--Double Jeopardy, 24 MINN. L. Ruv. 522 (1940).
7 260 U.S. 377 (1922). See also Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959) (defendant convicted in successive federal-state prosecutions for
conspiracy to destroy property); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959)
(defendant acquitted by a federal jury for robbing a bank but subsequently
convicted in a state court for the same robbery); State v. Harrison, 184
N.C. 762, 114 S.E. 830 (1922) (holding that a federal conviction for a
liquor violation does not prohibit a state conviction for the same offense).
80 See note 57 supra.
The Court has discarded the "silver platter" doctrine whereby a state
court could use evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure by federal
officers, and vice versa. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (dictum);
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See generally Comment,
The Exclusionary Rule of Illegally Obtained Evidence: Its Development
and Application, 35 So. CALIF. L. REV. 64 (1961).
8" Murphy v. Waterfront Conm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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alarmed by the hardships imposed on a defendant by double prose-
cution and should be ready to re-examine Lanza.83
COMANN P. CRAVER, JR.
Constitutional Law-Obscenity
Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
continue the case by case development of the constitutional stand-
ards to be applied in obscenity cases.'
In the first case, the manager of a motion picture theatre was
convicted of violating the Ohio obscenity statute2 by possessing and
exhibiting a French film, The Lovers.' He waived jury trial and his
conviction by a court of three judges was affirmed by the Ohio
Court of Appeals4 and the Supreme Court of Ohio.' The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction in Jacobellis v. Ohio.6
" In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), the Court held that
through the passage of the Smith Act Congress has occupied the field of
sedition so as to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.
This opinion indicated that the Court is looking for congressional intent to
pre-empt the field so as to avoid the harsh burden of double prosecution.
However, in 1959, the Court reiterated the Lanza doctrine in Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Chief
Justice Warren, and Mr. Justice Douglas, dissented. Id. at 150. Black
emphasized that state prosecution should be upheld only when the federal
government had no vital interest in preventing the crime and if there were
a conflict of interests, state prosecution should be pre-empted so as to avoid
double prosecution. Pre-emption seems too harsh. It predicates state sub-
ordination and diminishes the prerogatives of the states. A more suitable
solution would be for legislatures of both governments to enact pleas in bar
whereby a former prosecution for the same act would prohibit a second
trial.
'For a criticism of the Court's failure to establish a definite test in
obscenity cases, see Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Riddle of Ob-
scenity, 112 U. PA. L. Rxv. 834, 835 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Gerber].
The opposite view is taken in Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscen-
ity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. Rxv. 5, 121
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Lockhart & McClure].
2 "No person shall knowingly . .. exhibit . . . or have in his possession
or under his control an obscene, lewd, or lascivious . . . motion picture
film ... ." OIro REv. CODE § 2905.34 (Supp. 1963).
"'The Lovers' involves a woman bored with her life and marriage
who abandons her husband and family for a young archaeologist with whom
she has suddenly fallen in love. There is an explicit love scene in the last
reel of the film, and the State's objections are based almost entirely upon
that scene." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195-96 (1964).
'State v. Jacobellis, 86 Ohio L. Abs. 385, 175 N.E.2d 123 (Ct. App.
1961).
State v. Jacobellis, 173 Ohio St. 22, 179 N.E.2d 777 (1962).8378 U.S. 184 (1964).
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The second case, A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas,7
arose when, acting under a Kansas statute,' the state Attorney Gen-
eral obtained an order from a district court judge which directed
the sheriff to seize certain books at the business premises of a
magazine dealer. The Attorney General had filed an information
identifying fifty-nine novels by title. With the information he sub-
mitted copies of seven novels, six of which were named among
those specified in the information. All fifty-nine titles specified in
the information and the seven novels furnished to the judge were
identified on the cover by the legend "This is an original Nightstand
Book." The judge conducted a forty-five minute ex parte inquiry,
"scrutinized" the books, passages of which had been marked by the
Attorney General, and stated that the books were apparently ob-
scene, giving the court reasonable grounds to believe that all "Night-
stand" books would fall into the same category.9 Thirty-one of
the titles named in the information were found on the premises of
the dealer and all copies of those titles, totaling 1,715 books, were
seized. The thirty-one titles were found to be obscene, and the
court ordered all copies destroyed. The Supreme Court of Kansas
affirmed,"0 the Supreme Court reversed.
Cases involving alledgedly obscene material will arise, typically,
in one of two contexts. Either an individual will be charged in the
traditional criminal proceeding for some dealing with the material,
in which case the fact of obscenity becomes one element of the
proof," or the material itself is questioned in a form of in rem pro-
1378 U.S. 205 (1964).8 KAN. GEN. STAT. § 21-1102c (Supp. 1961).
The essence of these books may be ascertained with great celerity,
so replete are they with passages descriptive of sexual activities
running the gamut from ordinary intercourse to lesbianism, sadism,
public displays, and group orgies, and so lacking are they of any
other content. Moreover, they are so standardized that a judge's
estimate concerning the contents of absent books from an examina-
tion of seven books before him could be almost as surefire as a
similar estimate of the character of unseen Mickey Mouse comic
books based on a perusal of seven issues.
378 U.S. at 220 n.3 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
10 191 Kan. 13, 379 P.2d 254 (1963).
" There is at least a philosophic argument that nothing is truly obscene
and that a distinction must be drawn between the terms "obscene in fact"
and "obscene in law," the former being non-existent, the latter indicating
a judicial determination that certain material does not meet standards to
be enforced by the particular court. See Miller, Obscenity and the Law of
Reflection, 51 Ky. L.J. 577 (1963). The philosophic lists will not be entered.
As used herein the phrase "obscene in fact" and like terms refer to the
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ceeding before or after limited distribution. Jacobellis is an ex-
ample of the former, Quantity of Books of the latter. Justices
Black and Douglas maintain that the procedural setting is im-
material, inasmuch as both the criminal and the in ren action result
in an abridgment of the freedom of expression guaranteed by the
first and fourteenth amendments.' 2 The in rent procedure also carries
a connotation of prior restraint that may provide a basis for decision
on first amendment grounds without the obscenity question being
reached.1
3
But because the Court has been unwilling or unable to settle
upon any single ground for decision, the cases dealing with obscenity
handed down since 1957 have produced a series of multi-opinioned
decisions unmatched in any other field of constitutional law. The
Supreme Court first applied "modern standards" in obscenity cases
in that year.' 4 In deciding the consolidated cases of Roth v. United
States and Alberts v. California,5 the Court, in an opinion written
by Mr. Justice Brennan in which four others joined, substantially
adopted the Model Penal Code definition of obscenity,'" and specifi-
cally rejected the test first expounded in the early English case,
Regina v. Hicklin,'7 which "allowed material to be judged merely
establishment through the judicial process that the material in question is
such as to be proscribed by statute.
1"Marcus v. Search Warrent of Property, 367 U.S. 717, 738 (1961)
(Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring); Times Film Corp. v. City
of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 78 (1961) (Douglas, J., joined by Warren, C.J.,
and Black, J., dissenting); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959)
(Black, J., concurring); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the
Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 690, 697 (1959) (Black, J., concurring;
Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., concurring); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 508 (1957) (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dissenting); Kings-
ley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 446 (1957) (Douglas, J., joined
by Black, J., dissenting).
" Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 222-25 (1964)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
" Slough & McAnany, Obscenity and Constitutional Freedom, 8 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 279, 302 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Slough & McAnany].
15354 U.S. 476 (1957).
We perceive no significant difference between the meaning of
obscenity developed in the case law and the definition of the A.L.I.,
Model Penal Code, § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957), viz.:
"... A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant
appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in
nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond cus-
tomary limits of candor in description or representation of such
matters .... .
Id. at 487 n.20. Contra, id. at 499-500 (Harlan, J., separate opinion).
"T [1868] 3 Q.B. 360.
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by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptable
persons."" Substituted was a test determining "whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest."" It has been suggested that the adoption of this defini-
tion required some judicial leapfrogging ° and that the test pro-
mulgated in the Model Penal Code and in Roth are not, in fact, the
same.2' Nonetheless, the majority found that the trial judges in
Roth2" and Alberts2 had used substantially the same test as that
8 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489-90 (1957).
'Id. at 489.
20 "There is a possibility ... that Mr. Justice Brennan may have been
trying to bring existing law up to the level of the Model Penal Cole by
the tour de force of declaring that it was already there." Schwartz, Criminal
Obscenity Law, 29 PA. B.A.Q. 8, 11 (1957).
1 Gerber 838-40.
"' Roth was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York of violating the federal statute prohibiting the mailing
of obscene material. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 480 (1957).
The conviction was affirmed, 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956), and heard on
certiorari. One of the counts of the indictment
singled out one issue of a quarterly entitled American Aphrodite
which contained contributions by Herbert Ernest Bates, John
Cournos, Pierre Louys, Henry Miller and other authors of popular
works .... [Other counts] involved advertisements for American
Aphrodite, Photo and Body, and Good Times.... [Another count]
contained an advertisement for Good Times. Apparently the jury
was convinced that American Aphrodite was obscene.
Slough & McAnany 306 n.98.
[T]he trial judge instructed the jury ... . "The test is not whether
it would arouse sexual desires or sexual impure thoughts in those
comprising a particular segment of the community .... The test
in each case is the effect of the book, picture or publication con-
sidered as a whole, not upon any particular class, but upon all
those whom it is likely to reach. In other words, you determine its
impact upon the average person in the community."
Roth v. United States, supra at 490.
"Alberts was convicted in a municipal court in California by a judge
sitting without a jury of violation of a state statute proscribing the wilfull
distribution of obscene or indecent writings. Id. at 479 n.2 The conviction
was affirmed, 138 Cal. App. 2d 909, 292 P.2d 90 (1955), and was up on
appeal. The material in question consisted of
booklets bearing such titles as The Prostitute and Her Lover, The
Picture of Conjugal Love, Male Homosexuals Tell Their Stories,
and The Love Affair of a Priest and a Nun. Hundreds of items
were seized, including indecent pamphlets, bondage pictures, photo-
graphs of nude and scantily clad women, stereo slides, and mailing
lists.
Slough & McAnany 306. "[T]he trial judge applied the test ...whether
the material has 'a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt its readers
by inciting lascivious thoughts or arousing lustful desires.'" Roth v. United
States, supra note 21, at 486. "In addition ... the trial judge indicated
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announced by the Court and affirmed the convictions."' The question
of obscenity as a matter of fact was not reached.25 Only Mr. Justice
Harlan mentioned the matter.28 Judicial determination of obscenity
in fact was postponed.
On the same day that Roth and Alberts were decided, the Court,
in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Browny7 upheld the constitutionality of
a New York statute28 providing injunctive relief to prevent the sale
of obscene material.29 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by four
others, wrote in the majority opinion that there was little difference
between the effect of the injunctive relief provided in the New York
procedure with its concomitant safeguards" and the criminal stat-
that, as the trier of facts, he was judging each item as a whole as it would
affect the normal person." Id. at 489-90.
"'Mr. Chief Justice Warren concurred in the results but found the
language of the majority too broad. Id. at 494. Mr. Justice Harlan con-
curred in the result as to Alberts but dissented as to Roth on the ground
that the federal statute was invalid as against the first amendment guarantees
of freedom of expression. Id. at 496. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom
Mr. Justice Black joined, dissented in both cases on the grounds that both
the federal and the state statutes improperly abridged those guarantees.
Id. at 508.
"5 "[B]oth the Alberts and Roth cases reached the United States Supreme
Court at a very high level of abstraction-a level so high that the facts
of the two cases had become literally irrelevant. And both were argued
on this level." Lockhart & McClure 25. "An exception is Albert's belated
contention that some of the books he handled were not obscene." Id. at 25
n.112, citing Brief for Appellant.
' 354 U.S. at 508 (separate opinion). He found that the material in-
volved in Roth was not hard-core pornography.
354 U.S. 436 (1957).
2 8 N.Y. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROC. § 22-a.
"' The material in question was a series of books entitled Nights of
Horror. The opinion of the trial court said:
"Nights of Horror" makes but one "contribution" to literature.
It serves as a glossary of terms describing the private parts of the
human body ... the emotions sensed in illicit sexual climax and
various forms of sadistic, masochistic and sexual perversion ...
The authors have left nothing to fantasy or to the unimaginative
mind. The volumes are vividly detailed and illustrated. The many
drawings that embellish these stories are obviously intended to
arouse unnatural desire and vicious acts. Violence-criminal, sexual
-degradation and perversion-are the sole keynote. ... In short,
the volumes.., before me are obscene and constitute pornography
--"dirt for dirt's sake."
Burke v. Kingsley Books, Inc., 208 Misc. 150, 142 N.Y.S.2d 735, 742-43
(1955).
"' The statute provides for trial of the issue of obscenity one day afterjoinder of the issue and for decision within two days after the trial is
complete. After service of a summons and complaint anyone selling or
distributing the material is charged with knowledge of its contents. If a
final injunction is ordered the material must be surrendered or it is subject
to seizure. See N.Y. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROC. § 22-a.
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utes. approved in Roth.8 The case brought forth three dissenting
opinions. Chief Justice Warren felt that the manner of use, that
is, the conduct of the individual, should be judged rather than the
quality of the material. He distinguished the criminal statutes ap-
proved in Roth from the injunctive procedure in question in that
the latter imposed a prior restraint violative Of the Constitution."
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Black, argued for re-
versal on two grounds: first, that the injunction pendente lite gave
the state censorship power; second, that restraining distribution by
equity decree violates the first amendment.8" Mr. Justice Brennan
objected only to the fact that under the New York procedure there
was no provision for a jury determination of the fact of obsceni-
ty." The appellants did not challenge the finding of obscenity and
the nature of the material was not discussed by the Court.8"
Finally, this same day produced a per curiam opinion5" wherein
the Court upheld the the constitutionality of a Newark, New Jersey,
ordinance' which, in effect, banned burlesque shows.88 The case
arose as a declaratory judgment action and the question of obsceni-
ty was not presented.89 The Court cited Roth and Kingsley Books
without comment and the case therefore furnished no further in-
sight into the doctrine set forth in the day's major obscenity deci-
sions.
Similar treatment was afforded three cases considered during
the next term of the Court. Citing only Roth or Alberts in per
curiam opinions, the Court reversed United States Courts of Appeals
" In fact, said Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the injunctive remedy is to be
preferred because the defendent is not subject to criminal prosecution with-
out prior warning. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 442(1957).
82 Id. at 445.88Id. at 446.8
,Id. at 447.
'5 Id. at 439.
" Adams Newark Theater Co. v. City of Newark, 354 U.S. 931 (1957),
affirming 22 N.J. 472, 126 A.2d 340 (1956).
" See Adams Newark Theater Co. v. City of Newark, 22 N.J. 472, 126
A.2d 340 (1956), afd, 354 U.S. 931 (1957).
'
8 Ibid.
89 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the appellants
raised two issues-vagueness and freedom of expression. And once
again these issues were presented to the court at a high level of ab-
straction, for ... [the appellants] had instituted their action before
the city had made any attempt to enforce the ordinances.
Lockhart & McClure 31.
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decisions which had held obscene a motion picture 0 (The Game of,
Love),41 imported magazines42 (including International Journal),"
a magazine for homosexuals44 (One) ,4 and two domestic publica-
tions46 (Sunshine & Health and Sun).4' The cases indicated what
40 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35, reversing 244 F.2d
432 (7th Cir. 1957).
" [F]rom beginning to end, the thread of the story is supercharged
with a current of lewdness generated by a series of illicit sexual
intimacies and acts. In the introductory scenes a flying start is made
when a 16 year old boy is shown completely nude on a bathing
beach in the presence of a group of younger girls. On that plane
the narrative proceeds to reveal the seduction of this boy by a
physically attractive woman old enough to be his mother. Under
the influence of this experience and an arrangement to repeat it,
the boy thereupon engages in sexual relations with a girl his own
age. The erotic thread of the story is carried, without deviation
toward any wholesale idea, through scene after scene. The narra-
tive is graphically pictured with nothing omitted except those sexual
"consummations which are plainly suggested but meaningfully
omitted and thus, by the very fact of omission, emphasized. The
words spoken in French are reproduced in printed English on the
lower edge of the moving film. None of it palliates the effect of
the scenes portrayed.
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 244 F.2d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 1957).
"2 Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957) (per curiam), vacalingjudgment, 247 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1957), affirnng United States v. 4200
Copies of Int'l journal, 134 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Wash. 1955).
" [O]f the twenty-seven publications introduced in evidence as ex-
hibits for the plaintiff, twenty have on the front-cover prominently
displayed nude pictures of well-developed, shapely young women.
One would have to be naive, indeed, not to appreciate the commer-
cial value of displaying such frontcover material on the news stands.
Although an avowed purpose of the books is to explain the nudist
movement, its principles and its practices, there are relatively very
few photographs of the mixed groups of all ages which ordinarily
would be found in a nudist park. The great preponderance of the
illustrations depicts shapely, well-developed young women appearing
in the nude, mostly in front exposures.
'United States v. 4200 Copies of Int'l Journal, 134 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D.
Wash. 1955).
"One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958), reversing 241 F.2d 772
(9th Cir. 1957).
"The picture and the sketches are obscene and filthy by prevailing
standards. The stories "All This and Heaven Too," and "Not Til
the End," pages 32-36 .. .relate to the activities of homosexuals.
... Such stories are obscene, lewd and lascivious. They are offen-
sive to the moral senses, morally depraving and debasing. Such
literature cannot be classed as historical, scientific and educational
for any class of persons. Cheap pornography is a more appropriate
classification.
One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772, 778 (9th Cir. 1957).
" Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958), reversing
249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
'These magazines contain photographs of naked men, women and
children-principally women-clearly revealing ... portions of the
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the Court believed was not obscene, but did not furnish reasons for
the beliefs."
The Court did not again consider a case touching upon ob-
scenity until 1959 when, in Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents
of the Univ. of N.Y.4 1 it found that the refusal to license the film
Lady Chatterley's Lover50 on the grounds of "immorality" was un-
constitutionally violative of the first amendment's guarantee of
the "freedom to advocate ideas."'" The obscenity issue was not
reached in the majority opinion. But the decision, while unanimous
in result, produced six opinions; three members of the Court stated
that the film was not obscene, but gave no explanation for this con-
clusion.5
2
A few months after Kingsley Pictures was handed down, Smith
v. California3 added scienter as a requirement in criminal prosecu-
tions for violations of obscenity statutes. The Court unanimously
determined that the conviction of a news dealer for trading in al-
ledgedly obscene materials5 4 under an ordinance not making knowl-
body normally covered in public. It is apparent from advertisements
therein contained that they are offered freely for sale to the general
public who are not members of the nudist organization. The photo-
graphs appear to be obscene and indecent when judged by the
ordinary community standards of the vast majority of the citizens
of our country.
Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 128 F. Supp. 564, 573 (D.D.C. 1955).
" "For a brief period following the four per curiain pronouncements,
the law and obscenity were in limbo. Fortunately, Mr. Average American
was not aware of the impact of these reversals without benefit of
explanation." Slough & McAnany 314.
"360 U.S. 684 (1959).50The dominent theme of the film may be summed up in a few words
-- exhaltation of illicit sexual love in derogation of the restraints
of marriage .... [The principal characters'] relationship was pre-
sented as a true marriage. Their complete surrender to the baser
instincts was presented as a triumph over the social mores. Their
decision to live in adultery was quietly heralded as a conquest of
love over the "form" of marriage. And this entire theme was
woven about scenes which unmistakably suggested and showed acts
of sexual immorality.
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y. 4 N.Y.2d
349, 356, 151 N.E.2d 197, 199 (1958).
"Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360
U.S. 684, 688 (1959).
"Id. at 702 (Harlan, J., joined by Frankfurter and Whittaker, JJ.,
concurring).
s361 U.S. 147 (1959).
' [W]e have considered the book as a whole, under tests that the
appellant contends are applicable. There are obvious common-sense
limits to the "over all" view. We are not persuaded that a bawdy
house is any the less a brothel, because many of the rooms of the
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edge of the contents an element' must be overturned. The decision,
however, produced five opinions, all of which rested on procedural
rather than substantive points." No clarification of the nature of
obscenity was forthcoming. While it established firmly that the
dealer had to know that he was trafficking in obscene goods, the
Court specifically declined to elaborate upon the nature of the neces-
sary knowledge."
Again two years elapsed before the Court decided a case hinting
of censorship. Then, in a five-to-four decision, it upheld a municipal
ordinance requiring the submission of motion picture films prior to
licensing.5" The majority saw nothing to make the ordinance void
on its face, 9 but the minority argued that the procedure allowed
unlimited censorship." What effect the fact that no contention was
made that the film was obscene had upon the decision must be left
to conjecture, but the Court indicated that the Roth doctrine would
be broad enough if coupled with Kingsley Books to allow some
prior restraint.6 '
However, the Court would not accept wholesale seizure under a
warrant issued before judicial determination that the material was
in fact obscene, for during the next term in Marcus v. Search War-
rant of Property, a case involving search and seizure under a
house may be occupied with dining and dancing, in view of what
goes on in the bedrooms. A book is not necessarily clean or not
obscene because some of the chapters or paragraphs leading to the
bedroom, couch, summerhouse or other available place themselves
do not describe the details of adulterous fornication nor rape.
People v Smith, 161 Cal. App. 2d 860, 863, 327 P.2d 636, 638 (1958).
"'Los ANGELES, CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE, § 41.01.1.
" Mr. justice Brennan, joined by four others, held that by not requiring
scienter the ordirlance would tend to restrict circulation of constitutionally
protected material. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959). Mr.justice Black stated that Congress cannot restrict the freedom of speech
and press because of first amendment safeguards and that this limitation
is carried over to the states by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 159 (con-
curring opinion). Mr. Justice Douglas would have allowed the suppression
of expression only when that expression is inseparable from some illegal
action. Id. at 168 (concurring opinion). Mr. Justice Frankfurter would
have reversed on a due process point regarding the exclusion of testimony
concerning the literary merits of the material. Id. at 166 (concurring
opinion). Mr. Justice Harlan would have remanded for a new trial on
substantially the same grounds set forth by Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Id. at
171 (separate opinion).
"
7Id. at 154.
"' Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).59 Id. at 50.
"' Id. at 55, 78 (dissenting opinions).61Id. at 48.
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Missouri statute,12 the Court was unanimous in its belief that con-
stitutional safeguards had been breached.63 The safeguards afforded
under the New York procedure approved in Kingsley Books pro-
vided the basis for distinguishing that case from Marcus.64 Because
the decision turned on this procedural issue, the obscenity of the
material was not touched upon by the Court.6 5
A similar procedural decision could have been made a year later
when Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day66 was decided. The Post
Office Department had determined that the material was unmail-
able.6 7 Injunctive relief for the owners was denied by the district
court6 8 and the court of appeals.6" The Supreme Court reversed,
but could not agree upon an opinion. The Justices felt that the
reversal could be based upon the procedural point that the postal
authorities have no statutory authority to determine what should
be excluded from the mails,"0 upon the substantive ground that the
" Under the provisions of Mo. REv. STAT. § 542.380 (1949), a warrant
for seizure of alledgedly obscene material would issue on the strength of
a sworn complaint filed with a judge or magistrate based upon positive
fact, rather than information or belief, or if there were presented evidential
facts from which the judge or magistrate could determine probable cause.
In the case appealed, the owner of the property was not afforded a hearing
before the warrant issued; the proceeding was ex parte. The statute re-
quired that a date not less than five nor more than twenty days after
seizure had to be set for a hearing, but no time limit was specified for a
decision. If the material was found to be obscene it was destroyed; if not,
it was returned.
" Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, 367 U.S. 717 (1961). Seven
members ruled on due process grounds, two on a fourth amendment issue
that the warrant was too general.
"Ibid.
"The publications seized included so-called 'girlie' magazines, nudist
magazines, treatises and manuals on sex, photography magazines, cartoon
and joke books and still photographs." Id. at 723 n.8. "Because of the
result which we reach, it is unnecessary to decide ... whether the publica-
tions condemned are obscene under the test of . .. [Roth]." Id. at 753 n.9.
00370 U.S. 478 (1962).
Our own independent examination of the magazines leads us to
conclude that the most that can be said of them is that they are
dismally unpleasant, uncouth, and tawdy. But this is not enough to
make them "obscene." Divorced from their "prurient interest"
appeal to the unfortunate persons whose patronage they are aimed
at capturing (a separate issue), these portrayals of the male nude
cannot fairly be regarded as more objectionable than many portray-
als of the female nude that society tolerates. Of course not every
portrayal of male or female nudity is obscene.
Id. at 489-90.
" See Manual Enterprises v. Day, 289 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
"Id. at 456.
7' Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 495 (1962) (separate opin-
ion of Brennan, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas J.).
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material was not obscene, 71 or upon grounds not stated.72  There
was one dissent,7 and two Justices did not participate. A most
significant breakthrough in the decision, however, was the fact that
Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion expressed for the first time the theory
that the Court had a function of ultimate censorship and that in
determining the community standards as required by Roth the na-
tion as a whole was the community. He was careful, though, to
limit this to federal cases. 74
Finally, eight months after Manual Enterprises, in an eight-to-
one decision that produced four opinions, the Court condemned the
activities of a legislatively created state commission which attempted
to influence book distributors not to handle publications it found
objectionable.7' Again, due process provided a basis for decision
and the obscenity issue was not reached.70
Jacobellis and Quantity of Books do nothing to assuage the
diversity in obscenity decisions77 and little to solidify a basis for
trial court findings in obscenity cases.78 The cases do, however,
continue to describe guidelines.
' 'Id. at 479 (separate opinion of Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J.).
"
2Justice Black concurred without opinion. Id. at 495.
' Id. at 519.
" Id. at 488.
"Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
" Among the paperback books listed by the Commission as 'objection-
able' were [METALIOUS, PEYTON PLACE (1956)] . . . and [MERGENDAIlL,
THE BRAmBLE Busn (1958)] .... " Id. at 61-62. "Most of the other 106
publications which, as of January 1960, had been listed as objectionable
by the Commission were issues of such magazines as 'Playboy,' 'Rogue,'
'Frolic,' and so forth." Id. at 62 n.4.
"In five major obscenity cases, the Court has produced an amazing
twenty-two separate opinions: Roth (four); Kingsley Pictures
(six); Smith (five); Manual Enterprises (three); Bantam Books
(four). The lines of division have tended to follow the polarities
of Justices Black and Douglas, on the one hand, and Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan, on the other.
Slough & McAnany 336 n.205. Jacobellis and Quantity of Books add two
cases and nine opinions. The polarity apparently is weakening.7s Seven years after the "standard" was adopted in Roth, the lower
courts were confused sufficiently to be split on MILLER, TIIE TROPIC OF
CANCER (1961). For cases finding the book not obscene, see Zeitlin v.
Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800, cert. denied,
375 U.S. 957 (1963); Attorney-General v. Book Named "Tropic of Cancer,"
345 Mass. 11, 184 N.E.2d 328 (1962); McCauley v. "Tropic of Cancer,"
20 Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W.2d 545 (1963). For cases finding the book
obscene, see Grove Press, Inc. v. Florida, 156 So. 2d 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963), rev'd sub nora. Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein, 377 U.S. 577
(1964) (per curiam); Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 182 A.2d 798 (1962);
People v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 192 N.E.2d 713, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963).
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Quantity of Books indicates that any in rem proceeding must
possess the characteristics of the New York procedure approved in
Kingsley Books in order to survive the courts, if indeed any such
proceeding would now be upheld by the Supreme Court. The At-
torney General of Kansas had sought to avoid the pitfalls of Marcus
even though the Kansas statute was almost identical to that of
Missouri. The Court found his attempts lacking. 9 The Court went
to great lengths to distinguish Kingsley Books on its facts from
both Quantity of Books and Marcus after flatly stating that the
Kansas officials had attempted to avoid the shortcomings found in
Marcus." The implication is that the connotation of prior restraint
is assuming more importance as a basis for denouncing the in rem
proceedings in obscenity cases. The growing importance of the
prior restraint question, coupled with the separate opinion in
Quantity of Books arguing for reversal on the grounds that the
material was not obscene8' and the cases holding adversely to the
distributor when the substantive findings were not attacked, 2 now
make it doubtful that any obscenity case arising hereafter in the
in rent context will be argued solely on the procedural issues.
Rather, the Supreme Court may be called upon for ultimate
review, for although the Justices were unable to agree upon a ma-
jority opinion, Jacobellis contains the first judicial recognition that
the logical extension of the Roth doctrine requires the Court to
determine independently the national community standard of ob-
scenity as fact. 3 All of the opinions agreed at least upon the point
that "obscenity" is difficult of definition. It is possible that the
eventual fate of obscenity litigation is indicated by Mr. Justice
Stewart's five sentence opinion, which he ends by saying:
I have reached the conclusion... that... criminal laws in this
area are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography. I
Grove Press was decided by the Supreme Court on the same day as Jacobel-
lis and Quantity of Books.
Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 209 (1964).80Id. at 209-13.
'
1 Id. at 214 (concurring opinion of Stewart, J.).
82 See authorities cited notes 24 & 38 supra.
Separate opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Goldberg. Id.
at 189-90. Chief Justice Warren vigorously attacked the propositions that
the Court should constitute a "super censor" and that national standards
are to be imposed. Id. at 200-02. Justice Harlan was equally insistent
that the authority of his decision in Manual Enterprises for independent
review under a national community standard should be limited to the facts
of that case, specifically, federal litigation. Id. at 203.
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shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I
understand to be embraced within that shorthand description;
and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But
I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this
case is not that.8 4
One commentator suggests that the Supreme Court has enunci-
ated a "three-pronged test," to wit, the material must appeal to
sexual or scatalogical interests, it must be considered as a whole,
and it must be patently offensive; he then suggests that because
this test is impossible of application lawyers in advising their clients
and judges in framing their charges in obscenity cases must con-
sider not what the Supreme Court has said but what it has done. 5
This suggestion overlooks the necessity of also considering the
statutes and practice of the jurisdiction.
North Carolina has a forward looking statute dealing with ob-
scenity as a substantive violation."8 It was the first state to adopt
the Model Penal Code provision,8 T doing so two weeks before Roth
was handed down.88 These provisions have been criticized for mak-
ing the intended audience a factor in their test, for making a broad
range of evidence admissible to determine the fact of obscenity, and
for excluding non-commercial dissemination from liability. 9 It is
submitted that no other criteria is available if the impact upon the
intended audience is eliminated as a test and that a broad range
of evidence is necessary and desirable to provide a true evaluation
of the material;"° further, all non-commercial dissemination is not
eliminated. 1 The Model Penal Code provisions are the most work-
able yet devised in an area in which the Supreme Court admits
probable impossibility of adequate definition.02
North Carolina has no specific procedural provisions for deal-
ing with obscenity. The only legislation in this area merely places
an affirmative burden upon the several sheriffs to report violations
of the obscenity provisions to the proper judicial officials who are
8 Id. at 197.
" Gerber 84041.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-189.1 (Supp. 1963).
,Schwartz, Criminal Obscenity Law, 29 PA. B.A.Q. 8 (1957).88 Note, 36 N.C.L. Rzv. 189 (1958).
"Gerber 838-39.
90 See MODEL PENAL, CODE § 207.10, comment (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-189.1(c) (1) (Supp. 1963).
"' Note, 36 N.C.L. Rlv. 189 (1958). See generally Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 191, 197, 199, 204 (1964).
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then to issue warrants "to cause such violators to come before
their courts for immediate trial."93 It appears that this is no more
than a legislative admonition to the named officials to perform their
duties. The procedure set forth can not be distinguished from other
criminal proceedings. Certainly the provision is not broad enough
to support a pre-hearing seizure as attempted in Marcus and Quan-
tity of Books. Whether enactment of a provision similar to the New
York statute that establishes an injunctive procedure is desirable is
a question appropriate and ripe for legislative inquiry.
As a matter of practice, however, North Carolina apparently
has not attempted to control judicially the dissemination of literary
material. There were no obscenity cases reported in North Caro-
lina prior to the enactment of the present law.94 There has been
only one since, which dealt with non-commercial exhibition to chil-
dren rather than commercial dissemination.9 5
It is possible that the insulation of children from certain ma-
terial may be the primary aim of obscenity legislation."" And if
not the primary aim, it may be the only remaining effective use of
obscenity statutes. From the cases already decided, some insight
is gained into the feeling of the Supreme Court toward printed
material now in circulation. It must be remembered that the Court
has not given blanket approval to all printed matter, but an examina-
tion of the works so far approved makes it difficult to perceive
what might be held obscene. However, the Court steadfastly main-
tains its resolve to develop the law case by case. Material more
offensive than that already presented to the Court or directed at a
particular audience, such as children, may well support a proper
conviction. Provided the procedural requirements are met, the
North Carolina statute appears adequate to limit effectively distri-
bution of salacious material to children.97
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-191 (1953).
"'Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 189, 198 (1958).
" State v. Barnes, 253 N.C. 711, 117 S.E.2d 849 (1961). The defendant
was accused of exhibiting obscene photographs to three girls aged fourteen,
ten, and eight. His conviction was reversed on the ground that the warrant
and indictment, while copying the words of the statutory definition of
obscenity, was too indefinite.
" See Hoover, Combating Merchants of Filth: The Role of the F.B.I.,
25 U. PiTr. L. REv. 469 (1964); Comment, Youth, Obscenity and the Law,
1 WASHBURN L.J. 220 (1961).
" See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-189.1 (c) (Supp. 1963). It has been sug-
gested, however, that the North Carolina statute is constitutionally unsound
under the doctrine of Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 159 (1959), in that the
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The absence of cases of commercial distribution of pornography
in the North Carolina Reports indicates either that there is no such
distribution in this state or that there is no effort to restrict it. 8
provisions allow scienter to be presumed. See Note, 38 N.C.L. REv. 634(1960).
" The possibility also exists that distribution is being effectively re-
stricted without recourse to the appellate courts. Whatever the explanation
of the absence of reported "censorship" cases, recent news reports would
indicate that the matter is topical.
In a case involving the film Black Silk and Soft Skin, a theater operator
was arrested and charged with "exhibiting an immoral and obscene motion
picture" after a private citizen had filed a complaint and the sheriff had
warned the operator to discontinue exhibition. Charlotte Observer, Oct. 4,
1964, § C, p. 1, col. 1. The sheriff believed the film to be obscene because
"the girls stripped down to their shoes and stockings." Id., Sept. 27, 1964,§ C, p. 1, col. 4. The operator was found not guilty in Record's Court, id.,
Oct. 21, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 1, thus precluding consideration of the matter
by the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
In another county the sheriff appointed a citizens committee to review
publications offered for sale in the county. Id., Oct. 7, 1964, § C, p. 1, col.
5. A three man sub-committee apparently decided what was obscene, al-
though all of the publications were not read by all three and there were
conflicting reports as to whether the whole committee saw all of the books.
The publications were divided among the sub-committee and "perused" with
this "rule of thumb" as a standard:
The nude body is not itself obscene; however, when nudity is
used to arouse lustful desires, it becomes obscene. The nude body
shown in positions or poses normally used by respectable modeling
or photography concerns is not obscene.
If, however, the nude body is shown in provocative, suggestive,
lewd or other positions which seem to invite sexual activity be-
tween men and women, it thereby becomes obscene.
Id., Oct. 4, 1964, § C, p. 1, col. 5.
The committee advised the sheriff that the magazines Ace, Adam, Bache-
lor, Calvacade, Dude, Frolic, Gent, Gentleman, Madcap, Modern Man, Re-
.treat, Sir, Swank, Yes, and the Police Gazette and all paperback books
published by the Rapture, Leisure, Pillar and Ember companies were ob-
scene. Id., Oct. 2, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 8. Armed with this report, the sheriff
sent letters to selected newsstand operators in the county ordering removal
of the publications. After the dealers indicated an unwillingness to comply,
the sheriff announced that arrests would be made. Faced with this ultimatum
the operators capitulated temporarily. Id., Oct. 3, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 5.
Later, promised financial support by the publishers, the dealers threatened
to test the legality of the action. Id., Oct. 6, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 1.
At this juncture spokesmen for the committee stated that the group had
not been too hopeful of success and that it had not been anticipated that
the sheriff would take immediate action. A meeting between the operators
and the committee was scheduled. Id., Oct. 9, 1964, § C, p. 1, col. 8. At the
meeting it was announced that the operators were free to place on the
stands any material they thought was not obscene. "And the committee
left the unspecified threat of arrest by the sheriff if the voluntary system
does not work." Id., Oct. 23, 1964, § C, p. 1, col. 1. The committee attempted
to give the dealers some insight into the standards to be used in judging
material by using as exhibits two fold-out pictures taken from representa-
[Vol. 43
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Either reason, considered with the growing aversion9 9 toward the
in rem action, suggests that an injunctive procedure similar to that
expressly approved in Kingsley Books and used as a standard in
Marcus and Quantity of Books would be unused or unenforceable
legislation. The present North Carolina substantive statute, how-
ever, provides an adequate basis for criminal prosecution and an
acceptable charge to a jury, for in all of the cases since 1957 the
majority has accepted the Roth doctrine as controlling. This leaves.
as the crucial question in such prosecution the issue of obscenity in
fact, and Jacobellis indicates that this point can be settled with
finality only by the Supreme Court of the United States.
ROBERT A. MELOTT
Constitutional Law-Right to Retained
Counsel at Time of Arrest
Escobedo v. Illinois' presented once more to the Supreme Court
the problem of when the right to counsel attaches. Defendant was
brought to police headquarters after being implicated in a murder.
At the time of his interrogation, he was not formally charged; but
he "couldn't walk out the door."2 When told that he had been
tive magazines, Yes, which the committee found objectionable, and Play-
boy, which it did not. The spokesman said:
If you look at... [the one from Yes] you'll see-I don't know
what kind of a grimace you would call that on her face .... It
is such grimaces on the faces that would allow lustful desires to be
aroused .... [But] the picture from Playboy . .. [is] respectable
photography.
Ibid. The dilemma faced by the dealers might have been expressed by the
chief of police of the county seat, a member of the committee, who had
said "I don't know what's obscene. I'd hate to be the one deciding." Id.,
Oct. 6, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 1.
On the limited facts reported by the newspaper the case would appear
to be similar to Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), with
the position of the committee equally indefensible. See notes 75 & 76 and
accompanying text supra. But whatever the legality of the action taken,
the case illustrates several important points: "obscenity" is a subjective
matter difficult of definition, especially by committee; operators of local
commercial outlets will resist attempts to control distribution; those opera-
tors will be supported in their resistance by financially strong publishers;
the most effective control may lie in moral suasion aimed at the general
public.
' See text accompanying notes 78-80 supra.
378 U.S. 478 (1964). For a discussion of the case before the Supreme
Court decision, see Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1000 (1964).2 378 U.S. at 479.
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accused, defendant requested to see his lawyer.3 This request was
denied. His attorney arrived at the police station, but was not
allowed to speak with him even though the attorney reminded the
refusing officer of an Illinois statute that allowed the attorney to
consult with his client "except in cases of imminent danger of
escape."' Defendant confessed to the crime after a four-hour period
of interrogation during which he was never advised of the constitu-
tional right to remain silent and never allowed to see his attorney
despite repeated requests by him and the attorney that they be
allowed to meet. At the trial, defendant's attorney argued that the
confession should be excluded since it was obtained after a denial
of counsel. This argument was rejected, the confession was allowed,
and defendant was convicted. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed.' It stated that a denial of counsel during interrogation had
not been recognized, in itself, as a denial of due process of law
under the fourteenth amendment.' The court recognized that the
state statute showed a legislative policy against isolating a person
from his attorney, but found that the legislature did not intend to
prevent a reasonable interrogation by the police.7 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari,' and reversed.9 The Court stated that
when a suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to see
his retained attorney during interrogation and has not been effective-
ly warned of the right to remain silent, he has been denied due
'Escobedo had retained an attorney prior to this time. He had been
arrested on the day of the death, ten days before, and interrogated. After
making no statement, he was released on a state court writ of habeas corpus
obtained by his attorney. Ibid.
'All public officers... or persons having the custody of any person
committed, imprisoned or restrained of his liberty for any alleged
cause whatever, shall, except in cases of imminent danger of escape,
admit any practicing attorney at law of this state, whom such per-
son ... may desire to see or consult, to see and consult such person
so imprisoned, alone and in private, at the jail or other place of
custody ....
Ill.. Laws 1849, p. 99, § 1, 2. Repealed as of Jan. 1, 1964, in Ill. Laws
1963, p. - , § 126-1.
'People v. Escobedo, 28 Ill. 2d 41, 190 N.E.2d 825 (1963).
Id. at 46, 190 N.E.2d at 828. The court added that Escobedo had a
ten day period since a prior release in which to consult with his attorney,
and that it appeared from the record what advice the defendant thought
the attorney would have given since he testified that he saw the attorney
make a motion with his head which he took to mean that he should remain
silent. Id. at 51, 190 N.E.2d at 830.
Id. at 52, 190 N.E.2d at 831.
'Escobedo v. Illinois, 375 U.S. 902 (1963).
'Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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process of law and no statement obtained by the police during this
time may be used against him.'0
The Supreme Court has been presented with few cases involv-
ing the right to retain counsel for representation during formal
state proceedings."1 The right to retain counsel and .to appear with
him in court has been said to be the "most certain conclusion which
can be drawn . . . under the constitutional provisions regarding
counsel in forty-seven states and the ,due process clause of the
Virginia constitution."'" It was formerly unclear, however, at what
time before commencement of formal state trial proceedings the
right to counsel attached. In order to determine if a -defendant
had been denied fourteenth amendment due.process at any step in
the proceedings before trial, the Court established the fundamental
fairness rule.'" Under this rule, the means of determining the neces-
sity of counsel was through an appraisal of all the facts preceding
the trial to see if the absence of counsel resulted in such prejudice
to the defendant as to render the .trial opposed to the fundamentil
principles of fairness.' 4 If such prejudice did result, the evidence
"ld. at 490-91.
" In House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 46 (1945), where the petitioner was
forced, over protest, to plead to a burglary charge by information without
the aid of retained counsel, the Court said he was denied a fair trial. In
Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954), the Court said that to refuse a
petitioner the opportunity to retain counsel, even though waived on a specific
charge, after he learned that he would be tried as an habitual criminal, was
a denial of due process.
"BEANEY, THE RIGHT To COUNSEL 89 (1955).
's Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941). Convicted of murdering
his wife, the defendant argued that his confession was coerced through the
lack of food and sleep and continued interrogation which constituted a
denial of due process. He also argued that denial of counsel after the time
of arrest was a denial of due process. He was allowed counsel the day
after his arrest, but the attorney was not present at the time of the accused's
incriminating statements. In affirming the conviction upon appeal, the ab-
sence of counsel was considered to be only one element of fundamental
fairness.
"' As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure
to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of
justice. In order to declare a denial of it we must find that the
absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts com-
plained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevent a fair
trial. Such unfairness exists when a coerced confession is used as
a means of obtaining a verdict of guilt.
Lisenba v. California, supra note 13, at 236-37. In the federal courts the
denial of counsel is a direct violation of the sixth amendment and grounds
for reversal. This applies to the indigent defendant in the non-capital
cases as well as the capital proceeding. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938). The question of when the right attaches has been clarified by two
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW4
obtained after a denial of counsel was excluded.15
The fundamental fairness rule, as it included the right to re-
tained counsel, was closely surveyed by the Supreme Court in two
1958 cases 6 factually similar to Escobedo. Defendants confessed
to crimes after periods of interrogation during which they were
refused an opportunity to consult with counsel. The attorney in
each case argued that the confession, even if voluntary, should have
been excluded because of the denial of counsel during the interroga-
tion. The majority of the Court rejected the contention of the
petitioners that every denial of a request for counsel would be an
infringement of due process without regard to the circumstances.,
In the first case, Crooker v. California," the Court recognized the
right to counsel before trial as one element of fundamental fairness.
However, the Court said that to make it an undeniable right with
exclusion of the confession as a penalty for infringement was too.
federal decisions. In McNahh v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), the
Court passed on a statute, Act of 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat. 416, which imposed
a duty upon the arresting officer to take the arrested, without delay, before
the nearest U.S. commissioner or judicial officer for a hearing, bail or
commitment. Exercising its supervisory power over the federal courts, the
Court held that evidence obtained in violation of this law must be excluded.
The rule was later affirmed in Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449
(1957), interpreting the same provision in FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) along
with FED. R. CRIm. P. 5(b), which provides that the commissioner shall
inform the arrested of the complaint against him, of his right to retain
counsel, and allow him a reasonable time to consult with counsel. Since
the right attaches when taken before a magistrate and the defendant must
be taken to a magistrate without delay, the right to retained counsel attaches
very close to the time of arrest.
Appointed counsel, also a right under Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, is covered
by FED. R. CRIM. P. 44. If the defendant appears at the arraignment with-
out counsel, the court will assign counsel to represent him at every stage
in the proceedings unless he waives counsel or can obtain his own. In
order to correct any deficiency in the federal proceedings, as to appointed
counsel, an amendment has been proposed to rule 5(b) requiring the com-
missioner to advise the indigent defendant of his right to appointed counsel
at the time of the preliminary hearing. More important, a proposed amend-
ment to rule 44 is designed to provide for the assignment of counsel for
indigents at the earliest possible time without waiting until the defendant
appears in court. Comm. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE or THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT or
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (Dec.
1962). For the full text, see 31 F.R.D. 665 (1963). For a discussion of
the federal rules and the right to counsel in the federal courts, see Note, 39
IND. L.J. 134 (1963).
"E.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas,
356 U.S. 560 (1958).
"8 Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958); Crooker v. California, 357
U.S. 433 (1958).1 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
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devastating since it would "effectively preclude police questioning-
'fair as well as unfair'-until the accused was afforded opportunity
to call his attorney.""8 That the right to counsel before trial was
only an element of fundamental fairness was stated even stronger
in Cicenia v. Lagay :-' "Were this a federal prosecution we would
have little difficulty in dealing with what occurred under our gen-
eral supervisory power over the administration of justice in the
federal courts .... But to hold that what happened here violated
the Constitution of the United States is quite another matter.
20
In Escobedo, without expressly overruling Crooker and
Cicenia,21 the Court has established a right to retain counsel at the
time of arrest. As a result, the fundamental fairness rule has been
abolished, and the policy of allowing police officials a reasonable
period of interrogation before an accused is entitled to see his
lawyer has been terminated.'
In finding a violation of the fourteenth amendment in Escobedo,
the Court viewed two factors as controlling: (1) the suspect under-
18Id. at 441.
19357 U.S. 504 (1958).
* 20 Id. at 508-09.
"
1 The Court said that in these two cases it rejected the right to see
counsel during interrogation without regard to the circumstances, and that
s Ecobedo differed in that the circumstances necessitated the advice of coun-
sel. To the extent that Cicenia and Crooker were inconsistent with the
principle in Escobedo, they were said not to be controlling. Escobedo v.Illinois; 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).
"2 Even though most of the cases are in the area of the right to counsel
in the pre-indictment period, the Court was recently faced with a post-
'indictment question in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The
defendant was indicted for a federal narcotics offense and released on bail
after retaining counsel. Federal agents managed to eavesdrop on a conversa-
tion between the defendant and an informer by use of an electronic device
placed in the informer's car. The Court reversed a conviction on the basis
of the sixth amendment right to counsel even though the decision to exclude
could have been based on the supervisory power of the Court in federal
* proceedings. The Court followed the principle, established in Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), that the defendant is entitled to counsel
during the most critical period of the proceedings and said that the period
of consultation, investigation, and preparation was just as critical as the
trial itself. The fact that the defendant was not in police custody made
no difference to the Court. It was held that this principle, to be effective,
must apply to any indirect interrogation as well as that in the jailhouse.
As .a result, it appears that federal agents are prohibited from eliciting a
confession after the right to counsel attaches, regardless of custody. Quaere,
will this rule be applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment?
Justice Goldberg seems to think so. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,
484-85 (1964). For a discussion of Massiah after the circuit court opinion,
see 76 HAiv. L. Rnv. 1300 (1963).
: 1964]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
going interrogation had been denied his request to consult with his
counsel; and (2) the police had not effectively warned him of the
constitutional right to remain silent. These two factors must be
closely considered in determining whether any limitations may be
placed on the right to retained counsel at the time of arrest.
Would the failure of the accused to make an affirmative request
for a lawyer constitute a waiver of the right? There is little im-
portance in the failure to request counsel in the federal courts since
the absence of such a request would be considered a waiver of the
constitutional right only if made competently and intelligently.28
In Carnley v. Cochran,24 the question arose as to the application of
the principles of waiver to state courts. When the record did not
show that an indigent defendant had requested counsel,25 the Florida
Supreme Court either presumed that the defendant waived counsel
or that the trial judge had made an offer of counsel which the
petitioner had declined.2' The Supreme Court stated that the validity
of such presumptions was questionable because the only way the
accused could have protected- himself was to request counsel-'"a
formality upon which we have... said his right may not be made
to depend.""- The Court then said that the federal principles were
"equally applicable to asserted waivers of the right to counsel in
state criminal proceedings.1 28 Since Escobedo establishes a constitu-
tional right to retained counsel at the time of arrest, and since a
defendant can make a competent waiver only if he knows of his
right; it follows that the police must advise him that he is entitled
to consult with his attorney. For the same reason, a mere warning
of the right to remain silent would not be sufficient to entitle police
officials to a period of interrogation before a person in custody is
allowed to speak with his attorney. Also, any failure by a defend-
"
3Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 469 (1938). In federal proceedings
the Court has stated that the sixth amendment is designed to protect those
who have no knowledge of the law, id. at 465, and that we do not presume
acquiesence in the loss of fundamental rights, id. at 464.
369 U.S. 506 (1962).
See note 27 infra.28The Court said that it was not clear what the Florida court had
presumed. 369 U.S. at 513-14.
" Id. at 514. The Court went further to say that a plea of guilty would
raise only a question of fact as to whether there had been a competent
and intelligent waiver. For a discussion of the problems of waiver and the
implications of a guilty plea before this decision, see Comment, 31 U. Cur.
L. REv. 591 (1964).28 369 U.S. at 515.
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ant to take advantage of his right after being informed of it must
be viewed in light of the requirement that a waiver be competent
and intelligent.2"
While Escobedo clears up the problem of when the right to re-
tained counsel attaches in the state pre-trial proceedings, it says
nothing about the problem the Court now has to face: should the
right to appointed counsel attach at the time of arrest for indigent
defendants?
The effect of the denial of appointed counsel during state crimi-
nal proceedings was first squarely decided by the Supreme Court in
the Scottsboro Cases.30 The denial of appointed counsel at or near
the time of trial for one's life was held to be a violation of the
fundamental principles of justice. Later, the Court decided that the
fundamental principles of justice did not require the appointment
of counsel in every case.3 1 In non-capital criminal proceedings, it
was decided that due process required, state appointed counsel only
where special circumstances such as age, 32 mentality,33 or expeti-
ence 4 necessitated the advice of counsel for a fair trial. As' a
result, the absolute right to counsel was restricted to trials for
zapital offenses, leaving the right unclearly defined in other cases.
The absolute right to counsel in capital proceedings was ex-
panded in 1961 when it was decided that the right attached at the
time of arraignment instead of trial.35 In 1963, attachment of the
right to appointed counsel in capital cases was advanced to the time
of the preliminary hearing.36 The rationale in both cases was that
after a person pleads to a capital charge, the Court will not look to
see if the lack of counsel resulted in prejudice to the defendant.3
" There may be cases in which the law of a state is not settled and the
advice of counsel could prevent a confession or plea to the wrong crime.
See, e.g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 507-08 (1962).
"Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). "[T]he intelligent and edu-
cated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law .... He
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him." Id. at 69. For a full discussion of this case, see 31 NEB. L. REv. 15,
16 (1952).
'"Betts v. Brady, 136 U.S. 455 (1942).
2E.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haey v. Ohio, 332
U.S. 596 (1948).
"E.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
"E.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Crooker v. California,
357 U.S. 433 (1958).
" Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
"White v. Maryland, 373 US. 59 (1963).
"' Prejudice was necessary for a violation of fundamental fairness, the
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Each time the attachment of the right was advanced, the Court said
that the stage at which the right attached was a critical stage in the
proceedings where rights could be won or lost.
The last step taken by the Court with respect to appointed coun-
sel was the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,8 where it was held
that an indigent defendant was entitled to appointed counsel at the
time of trial for a non-capital felony. The requirement of special
circumstances, formally used for determining the necessity of coun-
-sel in such cases,"0 was abolished in felony cases, thus making the
'right to counsel absolute in all capital and felony cases at the time
of trial.4 0
With the distinction between the two types of crimes no longer
present at the trial stage, it would seem that any advisory safeguards
provided in the capital case should be extended to the non-capital
situation. If the right to life and liberty are equal fundamental
human rights, and it now appears that they are,41 it follows that the
-absolute right to counsel at the time of the preliminary hearing that
now attaches in the proceedings for one's life should be extended
to like proceedings for one's liberty. Likewise, to carry this reason-
ing to the logical extreme, it would seem that any right to retained
counsel at the time of arrest should be extended to include a right
to appointed counsel at the time of arrest, whether the defendant
is to be tried for his life or liberty. Lending support to this latter
conclusion are two considerations: (1) that the time of arrest was
considered in Escobedo as critical, i.e., a time when rights can be
won or lost;42 and (2) that the exercise of constitutional rights
does not seem to depend on the degree of one's wealth or ability to
standard which formerly governed the necessity of counsel during the pre-
trial period. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.8 372 U.S. 335 (1963). For a discussion of this case, see Comment,
39 Nonxm DAME LAW. 150 (1964); Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1006(1964),
"' See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
"
0Another view is that Gideon has abolished the special circumstances
rule in all cases, giving an absolute right to counsel even in misdemeanor
cases. "The case supports the proposition that the test for the right to coun-
sel is not the severity of the penalty but the need for legal assistance." Com-
nient, 39 NOTRE DAME LAw. 150, 157-58 (1964).
'Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963).
42 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964). "What happened at
this interrogation could certainly 'affect the whole trial,' . . . since rights
'may be irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted, as they are when
an accused represented by counsel waives a right for strategic proposes.'"
Ibid. (Citation omitted.)
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pay.4" Such a conclusion, though perhaps constitutionally sound,
would present grave problems of application to the states, possibly
leading to the necessity of a public defender system in each state
in order to comply with due process. 4
An immediate problem with which the courts must contend is
the retrospective application of the Escobedo case.' Even though
decisions are usually applied retroactively with no discussion,4" there
are strong arguments to the effect that the Court has the power
to define the scope and limits of a new decision and should do so.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has urged that a new requirement of due
process does not necessarily have to be applied retrospectively in
blind obediance to Blackstone's theory that a newly announced de-
cision is presently and always has been the law17 Instead, he con-
tented that the overruled decision should be considered as sound
law up to the time overruled and that the question of retrospective
or prospective application of the new rule should be determined by
the Court after considering administrative expediency.
48
An analagous situation was presented by Gideon v. Wain-
wright,4" where the question of the retroactivity of the newly an-
nounced requirement of appointed counsel in state, non-capital
trials remained unanswered. Later, because of denial of counsel
at trial, the Court vacated ten non-capital, pre-Gideon convictions
in a memorandum decision"0 and remanded the cases to the Florida
courts for consideration under the new rule. Mr. Justice Harlan
dissented, and without expressing an opinion as to the result that
" Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
"For a detailed discussion of appointed counsel and this solution for
problems arising in the state, see 38 IND. L.J. 623, 632 (1963).5 Retroactivity will not be discussed in detail in this note. For a com-
plete discussion, see Comment, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962).
" See, e.g., Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms, 357
U.S. 214 (1958). The Court applied the due process requirement of free
transcripts for the appeals of indigent defendants, a requirement announced
in 1956 in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), to the denial of a transcript
to a man convicted in 1936.
"' Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (1956) (concurring opinion). Black-
stone's theory that decisions are only evidence of the law and not sources
of the law is fully discussed in GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE
LAW 219-22 (2d ed. 1921).
"Justice Frankfurter advocated that such considerations would enable
the Court to reverse the old law as to the defendant before the Court with-
out applying the new decision to anyoie convicted prior to the date of the
decision. Griffin v. Illinois, supra note 47, at 26 (concurring opinion).
"372 U.S. 335 (1963).
"Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963).
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should be reached,5 said that the retroactivity of Gideon should be
decided.
The retrospective aspect of the Gideon decision was discussed
at last by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals when it decided that
Gideon could be invoked in a habeas corpus proceeding by one who
was convicted before Gideon was even indicted. 2 The court said
that the question of retroactivity had been settled in the memo-
randum reversal of Doughty v. Maxwell5 3 where the defendant was
also convicted before Gideon's indictment. The petitioner in
Doughty had pleaded guilty to rape in 1959 without requesting to
see an attorney. He petitioned the Ohio courts for habeas corpus
before Gideon was decided, and the petition was rejected on the
ground that counsel had been waived. 4 The petition for certiorari
was received by the Supreme Court after Gideon. The Ohio court
was reversed and the case remanded in light of both Gideon and
Carnley v. Cochran.5 In addition, the court of appeals said that even
if the Court had decided to apply Gideon prospectively, it was retro-
active at least as to Gideon himself because he was to receive a new
trial. Therefore, said the court of appeals, the decision must be
said to be retroactive to the time of Gideon's conviction and must
apply to anyone denied counsel under similar circumstances since
that time in order to provide equal protection of the law." The
latter reasoning also applies to the Escobedo situation. That is, if
it is within the power of the courts to determine a holding to be
prospective only, and a court so holds,"7 Escobedo must be applied
" Id. at 2. In stating that the Court did not have to apply a rule
retrospectively simply because changes in constitutional principles had been
so applied in the past, Justice Harlan completely agrees with the view of
Justice Frankfurter that the Court does have some control over the future
scope and application of a new decision. See note 47 supra and accompany-
ing text.
"' United States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303 (2d. Cir.
1964).
"376 U.S. 202 (1963).
Doughty v. Sacks, 173 Ohio St. 407, 183 N.E.2d 368 (1962).
' 369 U.S. 506 (1962). See notes 23-29 supra and accompanying text.
The case was first remanded by the Court in light of Gideon in Doughty v.
Maxwell, 372 U.S. 781 (1963). The Ohio court upheld the conviction on
the basis of waiver and when the case came to the Court for a second
time, the Court remanded it in light of Gideon and Carnley. Doughty v.
Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1963).
" United States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303, 310 n.4
(1964).
" It must be remembered that, so far, the Court has not made any
such determination. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
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from the date of Escobedo's arrest, not. just from the date of the
decision, in order to provide equal protection of the law to those
denied counsel since the time of his arrest under similar circum-
stances.
Since the question of retroactivity was not before the Court in
Escobedo, and the Court did not take it upon itself to answer the
question,5" the lower federal courts will perhaps have to determine
its application to prior convictions through petitions for habeas
corpus. If it is decided that a change in due process requirements
need not be applied retroactively, one of the main considerations in
reaching a decision will be the opinion of the court as to the pur-
pose of the Escobedo decision.59 Was the purpose of the decision
only to deter police from denying counsel at this stage of the pro-
ceedings, or was it to prevent convictions based on unreliable evi-
dence which was admissible under the rule of fundamental fairness?
If the court finds that the decision was simply to extend the right
to counsel, it must then be decided if granting trials to those now
imprisoned is necessary to deter any future violation. It appears
that the old policy of allowing the police a reasonable period of
interrogation before the suspect is permitted to see counsel has not
resulted in unreliable convictions,6° and that the Supreme Court's
purpose was just to set a definite stage before trial when the right
to counsel attached. If this reasoning prevails, it does not seem
that granting new trials to those now imprisoned would be neces-
sary to deter future violations of the right by the police. The ex-
clusion of evidence obtained after a denial of counsel is sufficient
to discourage any possible violators of the right.
Finally, it should be noted that a statute6' similar to that in
"Compare Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Here the court made a change in the rule for determining sanity and express-
ly decided that the decision was for prospective application. Id. at 874.
" This same analogy was discussed in Comment, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 942(1962), as to the retroactive application of the exclusionary rule in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See also 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650 (1962).
"° If there was prejudice to the defendant there was an automatic reversal
of a conviction under the rule of fundamental fairness which was the test
for determining the need for counsel at this stage in the proceedings. See
cases cited in note 15 supra.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-47 (Supp. 1963), which provides:
Upon the arrest, detention, or deprivation of the liberties of any
person by an officer in this State, with or without a warrant .... it
shall be the duty of the officer making the arrest ... to permit the
person so arrested to communicate with counsel and friends im-
19641
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Escobedo has been the basis for a reversal of convictions by the
North Carolina Supreme Court.62 Three defendants were arrested,
placed in separate jails, and not allowed to contact anyone, includ-
ing each other. Even though the court stated no flat rule, it said,
in construing the statute, that "rights of communication go with
the man into the jail, and reasonable opportunity to exercise them
must be afforded by the restraining authorities. 0 3 This language
implies that the Escobedo decision will not necessitate a great
change, if any, in North Carolina practices with respect to retained
counsel. However, as pointed out elsewhere, 64 the North Carolina
system of providing appointed counsel before trial may be inade-
quate for insuring the guidance of counsel at a sufficiently early
stage in the proceedings. The statute dealing with appointed counsel
now provides that the judge shall advise the indigent defendant
in felony cases that he is entitled to appointed counsel "before he
is required to plead."65 The inadequacy of this statute in providing
for appointed counsel in North Carolina is illustrated in the pre-
liminary hearing procedure. Under the statutory provision for pre-
liminary hearings,66 a defendant is not required to plead at the
hearing; therefore, the judge is not required to appoint counsel for
him at this time.67 But, as previously noted, the Supreme Court
held in 196368 that the right to appointed counsel in capital pro-
ceedings attached at the time of the preliminary hearing; it is likely
that the holding will be expanded to give the same right in felony
cases as well. 69 Thus, the North Carolina General Assembly is pre-
sented with the immediate problem of appointment of counsel at
mediately, and the right of such persons to communicate with coun-
sel and friends shall not be denied.
2 State v. Wheeler, 249 N.C. 187, 105 S.E.2d 615 (1958). For other
cases which have been decided in light of the statutes in other states, see
38 N.C.L. REv. 630 (1960).
"8 State v. Wheeler, supra note 62, at 192, 105 S.E.2d at 620.
"Watts, Indigent Defendants and Criminal Jitice, 42 N.C.L. Ryv. 322,
337 (1964).
°
5 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-4.1 (Supp. 1963).60N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-89 (1953).
IT The defendant is entitled to counsel at this time under N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 15-87 (1953), the pertinent part of which reads, "the defendant shall be
allowed a reasonable time before the hearing begins in which to send for
and advise with counsel." However, in looking at the language used, it is
clear that this provision pertains only to retained counsel.White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
69 See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
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this stage in the proceedings.70 In addition, the legislature is faced
with the problem of deciding whether to provide for appointed
counsel at the time of arrest.71 Even if no immediate statutory
action is taken, preparation should be made for the possibility of
such a requirement through future Supreme Court decisions.
Roy H. MICHAUX, JR.
Constitutional Law-State Taxation of Interstate Commerce
The State of Washington imposed a tax upon the privilege of
a foreign corporation's doing business in that state,' the tax being
measured by the corporation's gross receipts from sales of motor
vehicles, parts, and accessories to independent retail dealers in Wash-
ington. The taxpayer, General Motors, protested' the tax on the
grounds that it constituted a levy upon the privilege of engaging
in interstate business and thus was repugnant to both the due
process and commerce clauses of the Constitution. Concluding
that "the tax is levied on the incidents of a substantial local busi-
ness,"' the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the tax.
As typifies such a corporate giant in this modem era, the sales
organization maintained by General Motors is complex.4 For pres-
o For a discussion of the amendments proposed in the federal rules to
provide for appointed counsel before the defendant ever sees the judge,
see note 14 supra.
"' See notes 42 & 43 supra and accompanying text for the proposition
that appointed counsel should be provided at the time of arrest in all felony
cases.
I REV. CODE WAsSH. 82.04.270 (1962).2The Supreme Court of Washington sustained the tax. General Motors
Corp. v. Washington, 60 Wash.2d 862, 376 P.2d 843 (1962).
'General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 439 (1964).
'Chevrolet, Pontiac, Oldsmobile, and General Motors Parts are all sub-
stantially independent "divisions" of the corporation. For sales and admin-
istrative purposes, each "division" is geographically divided into "zones"
which in turn are further sub-divided into "districts." During the period
in question, all "divisions" except General Motors Parts maintained forml
"zone" offices in Portland, Oregon. In Seattle, Washington, was situated
a warehouse operated by the Parts Division and a "branch" office under
the Chevrolet "zone" headquarters. There were no offices at the "district"
level, and the "district managers" operated largely gut of their homes under
the jurisdiction of the Portland office. Their primary functions were to
oversee the dealer organization and to otherwise work with and advise
the dealers in the promotion of sales. It should be noted that these "district
managers" had no authority to accept orders from the dealers; this was a
function performed at the "zone" level. Note also the fact that executive
personnel from the Portland office visited each dealer in the "zone" regular-
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ent purposes, its most interesting aspect lies in the fact that, except
for one branch office of the Chevrolet Division and a warehouse
operated by the Parts Division, the corporation maintained no for-
mal offices in the taxing state. Many of the "District Managers"
of the organization were residents of Washington, but the activities
of these employees were confined to promotional work and acting
as liaison between the far-flung retail dealers and the "zone" office
in Portland, Oregon. Orders from the retail dealers for products,
and the subsequent sales and deliveries to them, were all approved
and handled through the Portland office. Practically speaking then,
the state in imposing its tax on the gross receipts from wholesale
sales made to its citizens was taxing sales that were consummated
entirely outside the state.
In both the due process and commerce clauses of the Constitu-
tion, barriers have been found which preclude certain types of state
taxation of multistate operations. Satisfaction of the due process
strictures requires that the taxing state have some threshold con-
nection with the transaction upon which to base its jurisdiction to
tax. This jurisdictional requirement is met when the state can show
"some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and
the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax."5 As stated by
one member of the present Court, this "nexus" between the state
and the taxpayer is "the most fundamental precondition on state
power to tax."' The very essence of a multistate operation, how-
ever, is that a given transaction may be factually connected with a
number of states, each of which could rationally claim sufficient
"nexus" to tax. Since multiple "nexus" claims are no rarity, the
real battleground is at the second of the constitutional barriers-
that posed by the commerce clause.
On its face,' the commerce clause prohibits all state interference
with interstate commercial activity. As a practical matter, however,
the decisions have not attempted to enforce the totality of immunity
expressed in that language. State and local enactments which clear-
ly affect such commerce have frequently been sustained in both
ly, although not frequently. See General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377
U.S. 436, 442-46 (1964).
'Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
'Brennan, J., in General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436,
450 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
"The Congress shall have power... To regulate commerce... among
the several states.... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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regulatory' and tax' spheres. In determining the validity of state
action under the prohibitions of the commerce clause, the Court has
stated a number of very general rules, none of which offer a reli-
able standard of constitutionality against which a litigant may meas-
ure his case. The Court, when faced with problems of state taxation,
has long been torn between conflicting policy considerations: requir-
ing interstate commerce to pay its fair share of the state tax burden'0
and preserving a degree of free trade among the states to which a
tariff barrier of state taxation is inimical." These conflicting
policies have spawned equally conflicting decisions. Stating the
time-honored "direct burdens" test of validity, the Court has said
that the states are not allowed "one single-tax-worth of direct inter-
ference with the free flow of commerce.'- 2 In other cases,' 3 statutes
have been sustained on the grounds that the tax was predicated
upon the "local activity" of the multistate operation, thereby affect-
ing interstate commerce only "indirectly," and not to an unconstitu-
tional degree. To the recurring, formalized question of what
constitutes "local" activity, the Court has never supplied a uniform-
ly applicable answer. 4
During one period' 5 in the recent history of the Court, how-
ever, it appeared that the decisions had finally adopted a reasonable
and workable approach. Under the guidance of Justices Stone and
Rutledge, the Court seemed to abandon the "direct-indirect" test
3E.g., Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179(1950); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913); Willson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
'E.g., McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33(1940); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938);
Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169 (1935).
" See Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252,
259 (1919).
" See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 254 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.);
McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944).
1 Freeman v. Hewit, supra note 11, at 256; quoted with approval in
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458
(1959).1 E.g., Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169 (1935); Postal Tele-
graph-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252 (1919); Banker Bros.
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 222 U.S. 210 (1911).
" See Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (dissenting
opinion of Stone, J.). See generally Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce: A Survey and an Appraisal, 46 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1069-74, 1082-
86 (1960).
"' Roughly, the period was the eight years following the decision in West-
ern Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938). The reverse
trend was signaled in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
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of tax validity in favor of an approach founded upon the actual
operative impact of the tax in question. Under this theory, assum-
ing sufficient "nexus" to confer jurisdiction, the states were per-
mitted to tax interstate transactions so long as the tax did not
subject the taxpayer to the risk of "multiple" tax burdens not borne
by competing local activity. 6 This approach represented a radical
doctrinal departure from prior decisions. As succinctly put by a
leading writer in the field,
the "direct-indirect" burdens test was predicated on the theory
that a tax on interstate commerce always is invalid. The "mul-
tiple burdens" test, on the other hand, is based on the theory that
a tax on interstate commere is valid if the tax is of such a nature
that the taxed facet of interstate commerce cannot be taxed else-
where, and thus subject interstate commerce to the risk of a
multiple tax burden not borne by local business.'
7
The new rationale offered many advantages over its predecessor.
It attempted to assess the actual economic consequences of the tax
to the taxpayer and to avoid the imposition of commercial disad-
vantage upon him. The old formalism was supplanted by substan-
tive inquiry, providing greater flexibility and ease in application to
"8 See, e.g., Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434
(1939); J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938); Western
Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, supra note 15 (alternative holding). See
generally Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: A Survey and
an Appraisal, 46 VA. L. Rxv. 1051, 1074-82 (1960); Hartman, Sales Tax-
ation in Interstate Commerce, 9 VAND. L. Rxv. 138, 185-90 (1956); Heller-
stein, The Power of Congress to Restrict State Taxation of Interstate Coln-
merce, 12 J. TAXATION 302, 303 (1960). Implicit in the "multiple burdens"
approach is the idea that even though a transaction was clearly taxable in
several states, a tax in one of them was still valid if the tax were properly
apportioned to taxpayer's business activity in the taxing state. See Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947). Thus, for example,
if taxpayer's instate activity relative to a taxed transaction represented 35%
of the total activity expended in the entire transaction, a tax rate based on
35% of gross receipts would be valid. The theory here is, of course, that
fair apportionment removes the risk of tax duplication elsewhere, since each
state will tax only that part of the whole attributable to local activity. It
should be noted that the Washington statute employed as its basis 100%
of gross receipts to General Motors from sales in Washington, and was,
therefore, as the Court pointed out, "unapportioned." 377 U.S. at 448.
" Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: A Survey and an
Appraisal, 46 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1076 (1960). It is appropriate to note at
this point that Professor Hartman's many excellent contributions to the
literature in this area of tax law are invaluable. His lucid analyses of the
complexities of state taxation problems have been an indispensable source
of aid to this writer.
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the cases.' 8 The upshot was that while interstate commerce was
taxed, it paid only its fair share of the burden.
Just as this formula was gaining acceptance, the Court apparent-
ly abandoned it in favor of a return to its previous posture by
reasserting its adherence to the "direct-indirect" test. 9 Even this
turnabout, however, did not dispose of the problem, for the Court
has since vacillated, uttering sometimes the language of the old
test,20 sometimes the language of the new,- " and more often that
of both.22
Amidst a growing clamor for consistency, the present litigation
came before the Court. Arguably, the tax could have been defeated
by due process requirements, since "nexus" is indeed slight where
a taxpayer's contacts with the taxing state are as limited as were
those of General Motors with Washington. But, even having safe-
ly skirted the due process barrier, it would still appear that the tax
must succumb under the more lethal strictures of the commerce
clause, regardless of which test of validity the Court elected to
apply.24 The transactions in question, comprised chiefly of sales
contracts formed in Oregon with f.o.b. deliveries at the Missouri
18 See the opinion of Stone, J., in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S.
34, 43 (1927) (dissenting), in which the Justice vented his ire upon the
"direct-indirect" formula as being too mechanical and remote from actual-
ities. Id. at 44. See generally Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Com-
inerce: A Survey and an Appraisal, 46 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1081-82 (1960).
"' See Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).2 E.g., Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157
(1954); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).21E.g., Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
2 E.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450 (1959).
" This was one of the grounds upon which Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined
by Justices Stewart and White, dissented from the majority opinion. 377
U.S. at 456. His opinion expressed the view that the decision in Norton Co.
v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1950) (which was one of the
cases cited by the majority) "rested solidly on the fact that the taxpayer
had a branch office and warehouse . . ." situated in the taxing state. 377
U.S. at 456. The three Justices found it "difficult... to distinguish between
the in-state activities of the [district managers] . . . and the in-state activi-
ties of solicitors or traveling salesmen. . . ," citing McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth
Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944), for the proposition that the activities of the latter
group form an insufficient basis for a levy upon interstate sales. 377 U.S.
at 456. The Norton decision, however, seems to place more emphasis upon
"business activity" than upon the location of the formal office. See Norton
Co. v. Department of Revenue, supra at 539.
"' See Note, 38 WAsH. L. REv. 277, 280-81 (1963), which was written
during the pendency of this litigation before the Supreme Court. Analyzing
the decision of the Washington Supreme Court in this case, it was predicted
that the tax would be struck down under either approach.
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factory, would seem to be clearly interstate in character; and just
as clearly, the gross receipts tax seems to be a "direct burden"
thereon. On the other hand, since the tax was unapportioned and
at least two other states appeared to have a "nexus" claim, there
was an apparent risk of tax multiplication which would be anathema
to the commerce clause under the "multiple burdens" doctrine.
In its opinion, the Court has missed yet another chance to make
a definitive pronouncement in this confused area. Instead, it again
seems to have handed down a hybrid decision." Starting "with
the proposition that '[i] t was not the purpose of the commerce clause
to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just
share of state tax burden . ,'.,"" the Court found it "well estab-
lished that taxation measured by gross receipts is constitutionally
proper if it is fairly apportioned."27 Having thus paid lip service
to the "multiple burdens" concept, the Court proceeded to recognize
that although a state cannot impose a tax on the privilege of engag-
ing in interstate commerce,2" "an in-state activity may be a sufficient
local incident upon which a tax may be based."12  This language is
clearly that of the pre-"multiple burdens" era, and from the philo-
sophical standpoint, it describes an entirely different concept of con-
stitutionality under the commerce clause. Having thus referred to
both tests, the Court does not clearly apply either. Addressing itself
to the problem of whether the gross receipts from sales were fairly
related to General Motors's business activities within the state,80
the Court offered the following:
[The tax] is unapportioned and . . . is, therefore, suspect. We
must determine whether it is so closely related to the local activi-
ties of the corporation as to form "some definite link, some mini-
mum connection, between a state and the person, property or
transaction it seeks to tax."'1
As discussed above,32 this is the language of the "nexus" test,
customarily used to determine whether, under the due process clause,
25 See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450 (1959).
" 377 U.S. at 439, quoting with approval from Western Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).
27 377 U.S. at 440.2 Id. at 446.
-29 Id. at 447.30 Id. at 441.2 Id. at 448.
See text accompanying notes 5-6 supra.
[Vol. 43
NOTES AND COMMENTS
-the state has bare jurisdiction to impose any tax. In addition to
applying the test to resolve the jurisdictional question, it seems that
the Court here used "nexus" between the tax and the activity sought
to be taxed as a basis for sustaining, in the absence of apportion-
ment, the measure of the tax. Thus, it has apparently solved the
substantive commerce clause problem of nonapportionment by ap-
plication of the once purely procedural test of due process. s3
Since the question of apportionment is not pertinent where ap-
plication of the "direct burdens" formula is sought, 4 it may be
that the Court attempted to decide the case by a "multiple burdens"
approach. The opinion, however, casts doubt upon any such con-
* clusion; for, in closing, the Court "refrained from passing on the
question"35 raised by General Motors to the effect that a decision
sustaining the present tax would subject the corporation to multiple
taxation. The reason given was that there had been no affirmative
showing that the transactions had actually been subjected to tax
elsewhere.3" Although this decision is not the first to require a
demonstration of actual tax multiplication, 7 it hardly comports with
the ideas expressed by Mr. Justice Rutledge. To him, the mere
.risk of cumulative burdens was sufficient reason to condemn an un-
apportioned tax." Thus, if the Court employed a "multiple burdens"
test in this case, that test has become quite different from the
original doctrine.
From the foregoing, it seems abundantly clear that, as between
the "direct" and "multiple" burdens approaches, the Court has
adopted or abandoned neither; nor has it really assigned to either
"This is the basis of the dissenting opinion of Brennan, J. 377 U.S. at
449-51.
" See note 16 supra.
"377 U.S. at 449.
"Ibid.
"See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450, 463 (1959), where such a requirement was imposed in a net income
tax litigation. This requirement is not to be confused with the question of
burdens of proof. State enactments have usually been accorded presumptive
validity, and the general rule applied by the Court has been that the burden
of rebuttal is on the protesting taxpaper. See Norton Co. v. Department
of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534, 537 (1951). But see Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S.
249, 253 (1946); Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: A Sur-
vey and an Appraisal, 46 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1064-65 (1960).
" "To require factual determination of forbidden effects in each case
would be to invite costly litigation, make decision turn in some cases, per-
haps many, on doubtful facts or conclusions .... ". Freeman v. Hewit, 329
U.S. 249, 279 (1946) (concurring opinion of Rutledge, J.).
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an ascendant position. In short, the Court has yet to offer a de-
pendable guide in this critical area, but has perhaps further confused
the litter upon the commerce clause battleground. It is no doubt
true, as suggested by many writers in the tax field, 9 that problems
of this complexity are more amenable to legislative than to judicial
solution. Hopefully, the solution will not be long in coming; for
if one thing is certain in light of the ever-increasing economic needs
of the states, it is that some consistent guide must be formulated
for the convenience and protection of both states and taxpayers.
It is submitted that the most equitable approach will be found
within the philosophical framework of the "multiple burdens" doc-
trine in tandem with a realistic system of apportionment. As in
other areas of life in this fast-paced world, the efforts expanded
in seeking absolute resolutions of problems will produce a greater
net return if exerted instead in pursuit of equitable compromise.
HENRY STANCILL MANNING, JR.
Corporations-De Facto Corporations-EstoppelModel
Business Corporation Act
Although the submitted articles of incorporation were re-
jected, the defendant nevertheless began doing business as a corpora-
tion. Subsequently, defendant acquired plaintiff's business, giving
the purported corporation's note therefor. Shortly thereafter, arti-
cles of incorporation were issued; but within six months, the cor-
poration failed and was left without assets. Plaintiff, suing on the
note given by the defendant on behalf of the purported corporation,
sought to hold defendant personally liable on the basis that no
corporation had existed at the time of the purchase. Defendant
resisted liability on the grounds that plaintiff had dealt with either
a de facto corporation or a corporation by estoppel. Defendant's
contentions were rejected in Robertson v. Levy,1 which construed
statutory provisions' equivalent to sections 50' and 139" of the
" See, e.g., Braden, Cutting the Gordian Knot of Interstate Taxation, 18
OHIO ST. L.J. 57 (1957); Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 1324 (1959). For a view
from the other side of the bench, see the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
476-77 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
197 A.2d 443 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964).
'D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-921c, -950 (1961).
'Upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation, the corporate
existence shall begin, and such certificate of incorporation shall be
[Vol. 43
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Model Business Corporation Act "to eliminate the concepts of estop-
pel and de facto corporations .... -"
In situations where defective incorporation precludes de jure
existence of a corporation, courts have recognized de facto exist-
ence to bar personal liability where four requisites are met: (1) a
valid law under which the corporation could have been formed,
(2) a good faith attempt to comply with such law, (3) a "color-
able" compliance with such law, and (4) actual user or exercise
of corporate powers. 7 The doctrine supposedly enables courts to
analyze the particular facts of each case and thus balance conflict-
ing policy considerations: to discourage unauthorized assumptions
of corporateness, and to favor doing justice to the parties and to
uphold security of transactions with corporations."
Application of this elastic concept varies with courts9 and has
been sharply criticized.1 0 In fact, the framers of the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act intended that section 50, providing that cor-
porate existence begins only upon the issuance of a certificate of
incorporation, abolish any significance of de facto corporateness.1
Robertson conforms with this intention. The result aids in ending
a confusing and unpredictable state of the law.
conclusive evidence that all conditions precedent required to be per-
formed by the incorporators have been complied with and that the
corporation has been incorporated under this Act, except as against
this State in a proceeding to cancel or revoke the certificate of
incorporation or for involuntary dissolution of the corporation.
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT § 50 (1953).
' "All persons who assume to act as a corporation without authority so to
do shall be jointly and severally liable for all debts and liabilities incurred
or arising as a result thereof." ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. Cop. ACT § 139
(1953).
197 A.2d at 447.
0 ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA COPORATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 11
(1964). Under the de facto doctrine it was held that although the validity
of the corporate entity was subject to direct attack by the incorporating
state, it was not subject to collateral attack by outside parties. Ibid.
'See Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Shepherd, 185 U.S. 1 (1902); Midwest
Air Filters Pac., Inc. v. Finn, 201 Cal. 587, 258 Pac. 382 (1927); Mabel
First Lutheran Church v. Calwallader, 172 Minn. 471, 215 N.W. 845 (1927);
Pearson Drainage Dist. v. Erhardt, 239 Mo. App. 845, 201 S.W.2d 484
(1947) ; Hansen v. Village of Ralston, 147 Neb. 251, 22 N.W.2d 719 (1946);
Culkin v. Hillside Restaurant, Inc., 126 N.J. Eq. 97, 8 A.2d 173 (1939).
STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 27 (1949).
' See BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS § 30 (1946).
"E.g., id. § 20 ("the conglomeration of judicial decisions present a
discouraging and baffling maze") ; STEVENS, op. cit. supra note 8, § 26 ("in-
accurate and confusing").
"I ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 50, 4 (1960).
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Robertson, however, not only denies the de facto doctrine, but
also rejects the concept of corporation by estoppel.' 2 Although some
early cases viewed de facto corporateness as a prerequisite to cor-
poration by estoppel,"3 the majority now recognizes the two con-
cepts as distinct and capable of independent application. 4 While
the de facto doctrine in many cases imparts to a defective corpora-
tion a general corporate status,'5 the concept of corporation by
estoppel applies only to some particular transaction where there
have been dealings on a purportedly corporate basis."0 However,
the term "corporation by estoppel" is somewhat misleading in that
it implies the existence of a third type of corporation in addition
to corporations de jure and corporations de facto. The term does
not refer to an entity, but rather describes a result the courts reach
by applying the equitable doctrine of estoppel to the dealings be-
tween the parties.
Assuming the desirability of eliminating the conceptualistic de
facto doctrine, its benefits may yet be retained by using estoppel
concepts to do justice in individual cases and preserve security of
transactions.
Estoppel applies where there is a misrepresentation, reliance on
the misrepresentation by a third party, and a change of position by
the third party.' Thus, if an association deals with third parties
on a corporate basis despite its failure to file a certificate, it could
be estopped from denying its corporate existence where the third
party is suing it.' Similarly, a third party could be estopped from
"2 Since N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8 (1960) is an enactment of section 50
of the Model Business Corporation Act, it seems likely that North Carolina
would rule that de facto corporateness was abolished by the enactment
of the statute. However, since North Carolina has not enacted section 139
of the Model Act, it seems very unlikely that it would go so far as to
hold that corporation by estoppel was also abolished.
"E.g., Bibb v. Hall, 101 Ala. 79, 14 So. 98 (1893); Midland Bank v.
Harris, 114 Ark. 344, 170 S.W. 67 (1914) ; Talbert v. Grist, 198 Mo. App.
492, 201 S.W. 906 (1918).
"See LATTiN, CORPORTIONS ch. 4, § 6 (1959); 14 CALIF. L. RiV. 486(1926).
See LATTiN, op. cit. supra note 14, ch. 4, § 4.
1 14 CALn. L. REv. 486, 487 (1926).1 Id. at 486.
" See, e.g., Ehrlich & Co. v. Slater Co., 183 Cal. 709, 192 Pac. 526
(1920); Russell Lumber & Supply Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 262 Ky. 388,
90 S.W.2d 372 (1936); Dobson v. Maytag Sales Corp., 292 Mich. 107, 290
N.W. 346 (1940); Empire Mfg. Co. v. Stuart, 46 Mich. 482, 9 N.W. 527
(1881); Perine v. Grand Lodge A.O.U.W., 48 Minn. 82, 50 N.W. 1022
(1892); Jewell v., Grand Lodge A.O.U.W., 41 Mich. 405, 43 N.W. 88
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denying the existence of the corporation where the corporation is
suing the third party.1" But since the third party has not represented
the association as a corporation, there is, strictly speaking, no estop-
pel.2 0  However, courts normally say that the third party is
"estopped" 2' since he admitted or acquiesced in the "corporation's"
pretension.22 The reasoning for such a holding is more persuasive
in the case of a counterclaim by the third party.'
Courts are split on the question of estoppel in situations where
(1889); Taylor v. Aldridge, 180 Miss. 635, 178 So. 331 (1938); Warren
v. Stanton County, 145 Neb. 220, 15 N.W.2d 757 (1944) (dictum); Alco
Finance Co. v. Moran, 178 Okla. 575, 63 P.2d 747 (1936); Cavaness v.
General Corp., 272 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Mauritz v. Schwind,
101 S.W.2d 1085 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
"0 See, e.g., California Fruit Exch. v. Buck, 163 Cal. 223, 124 Pac. 824
(1912); California Cured Fruit Ass'n v. Stelling, 141 Cal. 713, 75 Pac.
320 (1904); Grangers' Business Ass'n v. Clark, 67 Cal. 634, 8 Pac. 445
(1885); Flash Cleaners v. Columbia Appliance Corp., 319 P.2d 454 (Cal.
App. 1957); Wynn v. Treasure Co., 303 P.2d 1067 (Cal. App. 1956); City
of Jefferson v. Holder, 195 Ga. 346, 24 S.E.2d 187 (1943); West v. Flynn
Realty Co., 53 Ga. App. 594, 186 S.E. 753 (1936); Lowell-Woodard Hard-
ware Co. v. Woods, 104 Kan. 729, 180 Pac. 734 (1919) ; McGuire v. Bastain
Blessing Co., 275 Ky. 622, 122 S.W.2d 513 (1938); Richards v. Minne-
sota Say. Bank, 75 Minn. 196, 77 N.W. 822 (1899); Continental Ins. Co.
v. Richardson, 69 Minn. 433, 72 N.W. 458 (1897); Columbia Elec. Co. - .
Dixon, 46 Minn. 463, 49 N.W. 244 (1891); Minnesota Gas Light Econo-
mizer Co. v. Denslow, 46 Minn. 171, 48 N.W. 771 (1891); Springfield
Tobacco Redryers Corp. v. City of Springfield, 293 S.W.2d 189 (Tenn.
1956); Ingle System Co. v. Norris & Hall, 132 Tenn. 472, 178 S.W. 1113
(1915); Dickenson v. Boyd, 167 Va. 90, 187 S.E. 479 (1936).
" In Mauritz v. Schwind, 101 S.W.2d 1085 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), the
court said:
Estoppel by contract is not, strictly speaking, an estoppel in pais,
because it lacks several of the essential elements of an estoppel in
pais but is regarded merely a form of quasi estoppel based on the
idea that a party to a contract will not be permitted to take a posi-
tion inconsistent with its provisions, to the prejudice of another.
Id. at 1092.
"See cases cited note 19 supra.
-. "We agree that no full, formal, technical estoppel to deny corporate
existence arises from such a state of facts, but we think it accords with
modem views of good practice and tends to promote substantial justice ......
Lowell-Woodard Hardware Co. v. Woods, 104 Kan. 729, 730, 180 Pac.
734 (1919). "[Y]et as between private litigants they may, by their agree-
ments, admissions, or conduct, place themselves where they would not be
permitted to deny the facts of the existence of the corporation." Ingle
System Co. v. Norris & Hall, 132 Tenn. 472, 474, 178 S.W. 1113, 1114(1915).
"Mechanics' Lumber Co. v. Yates Am. Mach. Co., 181 Ark. 415, 26
S.W.2d 80 (1930); Wynn v. Treasure Co., 303 P.2d 1067 (Cal. App.
1956); Rialto Co. v. Miner, 183 Mo. App. 119, 166 S.W. 629 (1914);
Bell v. Commercial Inv. Trust Co., 118 Okla. 230, 246 Pac. 1102 (1926);
Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Biggs, 205 Ore. 473, 288 P.2d 1025 (1955). See
generally Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 1449 (1957).
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a third party, having dealt with a defective corporation on the basis
that it is a corporation, attempts to hold the members personally
liable.24 It seems the best result is to estop the third party from
denying the existence of the corporation,25 except where the mem-
bers knowingly misrepresented the status of the association. 2' To
hold otherwise allows the third party a right against the members
that he did not bargain for and imposes liability on the members
that they did not agree to assume." With the flexibility of the
estoppel doctrine, applied sparingly where justice demands it, the
intention of the parties is carried out and security of transactions is
maintained.
On this analysis, the Robertson case erred when it abolished
both the estoppel and the de facto concepts. The other eight juris-
dictions2s that have enacted these two sections of the Model Act
have not construed them as abolishing the concept of estoppel. The
injustice that would result from abolishing corporation by estoppel
as well as de facto corporations seems great. For instance, where
a purported corporation has contracted with a third party or other-
wise incurred liability before obtaining its certificate, it clearly
should not be allowed to escape liability by denying its existence.
Another example is illustrated by Cranson v. International Business
2, See Frey, Legal Analysis and the "De Facto" Doctrine, 100 U. PA.
L. REv. 1153, 1178 (1952).
2 See Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U.S. 392 (1879); Magnolia Shingle
Co. v. J. Zimmern's Co., 3 Ala. App. 578, 58 So. 90 (1912); Wesco Supply
Co. v. Smith, 134 Ark. 23, 203 S.W. 6 (1918) ; Tarbell v. Page, 24 Ill. 46
(1860); Heald v. Owen, 79 Iowa 23, 44 N.W. 210 (1890); John Lucas &
Co. v. Bernhardt's Estate, 156 La. 207, 100 So. 399 (1924); Tulane Im-
provement Co. v. S. A. Chapman & Co., 129 La. 562, 56 So. 509 (1911);
Berlin Bank v. Nelson, 231 Mich. 463, 204 N.W. 92 (1925); Tisch Auto
Supply Co. v. Nelson, 222 Mich. 196, 192 N.W. 600 (1923); Lockwood
v. Wynkoop, 178 Mich. 388, 144 N.W. 846 (1914); A. W. Mendenhall Co.
v. Booher, 226 Mo. App. 945, 48 S.W.2d 120 (1932); Mason v. Stephens,
16 S.D. 320, 92 N.W. 424 (1902). For cases contra to this view, see Frey,
supra note 24, at 1159 n.2 1.
" -iele v. Torrance Millworks, Inc., 272 P.2d 780 (Cal. App. 1954);
Ryan v. Katz, 126 Conn. 555, 12 A.2d 835 (1940); Parker Peanut Co. v.
Felder, 200 S.C. 203, 20 S.E.2d 716 (1942).
' Carpenter, De Facto Corporations, 25 HARV. L. REv. 623, 633-35
(1912); Carpenter, Are the Members of a Defectively Organized Corpora-
tion Liable as Partners?, 8 MiNN. L. REv. 409, 421 (1924).
"
8 ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 10.05.261, .810 (1962); COLO. REV. STAT. §9
31-28-4, -29-4 (Perm. Supp. 1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.49, .150
(1954); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 496A. 51, 141 (1962); N.D. REV. CODE §§
10-19-23, -55 (1960); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 57.321, .793 (1963); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 16-10-51, -139 (1962); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-36.48, .122 (Supp. 1963).
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Machs., Inc.,2" where the defendant had served as an officer and
director of what he innocently thought to be a validly organized
corporation. Because of an oversight of the attorney, the certificate
of incorporation had not been filed at the time the corporation
dealt with the plaintiff. When the corporation subsequently failed,
the plaintiff sued the defendant individually, contending that the
failure to file the certificate precluded all corporate existence. Al-
though the court did not decide whether failure to file precluded
de facto corporateness, it did expressly hold that estoppel was not
precluded by such failure and that the plaintiff was estopped to deny
the existence of the corporation and sue the defendant personally.3"
With respect to the estoppel question, such a holding seems much
sounder than that of Robertson.
The Robertson holding that a de jure corporation arises only
on issuance of the certificate of incorporation leaves uncertain the
protection to third parties where the certificate is issued but the
corporation does not complete its organization. This problem is
most acute where no capital has been paid in. The third party
cannot sue the associates personally since de jure corporateness
began when the certificate was issued. But, if the corporation is
without assets, a suit against it would avail nothing. Statutory
solutions to this problem vary. In all but seventeen states a mini-
mum capital must be paid in before a corporation starts its busi-
ness."' Many of these states, including North Carolina, 2 make
directors jointly and severally liable to the corporation if it pre-
maturely commences business.3 3 Other states expressly provide that
the directors are liable to third parties for the debts of the corpora-
tion where business is commenced before the required capital is
paid into the corporation.34 The most apparent shortcoming of these
statutes is that the directors are liable only to the extent of the
capital that was required, either by statute or by the articles of
- 200 A.2d 33 (Md. 1964).0 0Id. at 39.
1 See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoinP. AcT ANN. § 51, 2.02, 2.03
(1960, Supp. 1964).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-32 (g) (1960).
"8 See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. Coin. AcT. ANN. § 43, 2.02, at 15
(1960). States which have enacted this section are Alaska, Illinois, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Wisconsin, and the District
of Columbia.
', Id. at 16. States which have enacted this section are Idaho, Kansas,
Louisiana, Washington, and Vermont.
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incorporation, to be paid in before the corporation was to commence
business.8 5 Nevertheless, statutes of this type offer some protection
to third parties who have dealt with such corporations. In addition
to this protection, an awareness of this problem by persons who deal
with corporations and inquiry by them as to the financial condition
of such corporations should do much to protect third parties in this
situation.
WILLIAm L. STOCKS
C6rporations-Restricted Stock Transfers-First Options Consequent
Upon the Death of Shareholder
In the recent case of Globe Slicing Mach. Co. v. Hasner,1 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a bylaw2 pro-
hibiting the sale or disposition of the capital stock by a shareholder
without first offering the same to the corporation or remaining
shareholders was inapplicable to a transfer consequent upon the
death of a shareholder and effected pursuant to the shareholder's
will. The court, interpreting the bylaw provisions under the New
York policy of construing first option restraints narrowly, stated:
"First option provisions in order effectively to restrain dispositions
by will must specifically so provide. This was not done here."8
The question now arises whether or not a narrow construction
of such bylaw restrictions is justifiable in view of the reasons for
their existence.' The usual purpose of such restrictions is to main-
' See note 34 supra. But see S.C. CODE § 12-14.6(b) (Supp. 1964),
which provides:
If a corporation has transacted any business in violation of this sec-
tion, any person (whether a promoter, incorporator, shareholder,
subscriber, or director) who has participated therein, shall be joint-
ly and severally liable for the debts or liabilities of the corporation
arising therefrom.
1333 F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 1964).
' No sale or disposition of any shares of the capital stock of this
corporation by any stockholder shall be valid unless and until he
shall give notice in writing of such intention to the corporation, and
to all the present stockholders of the company . . . whereupon the
company and all of said stockholders shall jointly and/or severally
have the option and right to purchase the same within thirty days
after receiving such notice ....
Id. at 414.
3Id. at 415.
'In the management of corporations few things are more apparent
than the desire to keep the control in the same hands of people
[Vol. 43
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tain harmonious control within the corporation. This question be-
comes especially acute in the case of a close corporation,5 where the
members or shareholders are working as an incorporated partner-
ship.' The prime objective of the close corporation is to remain
close by being able to choose new "partners" in the event of retire-
ment or death of a present shareholder.7
In general, the validity of reasonable restrictions' upon the
transfer of stock of a corporation where they are imposed by the
who are congenial to the enterprise and to those who manage its
affairs. A quarreling directorate is a misfortune to the stock-
holders of any corporation. When such situations occur, as they
often do, there is no objection to the purchase by the corporation of
the shares of the disgruntled stockholders and the resale to those
more in harmony with the enterprise. In the organization of corpo-
rations it is frequently provided in the articles or bylaws that a
stockholder shall not sell his stock without first giving a stated
period with which the corporation or other stockholders may have
an opportunity to purchase. I find nothing in all this against public
policy. On the contrary, it has to do solely with common sense and
practical business.
Moses v. Soule, 63 Misc. 203, 209, 118 N.Y. Supp. 410, 414 (Sup. Ct.),
affd, 136 App. Div. 904, 120 N.Y. Supp. 1136 (1909).
'A close corporation is an enterprise in corporate form in which the
management and ownership are substantially identical and the identity re-
sults almost in a partnership. See Israel, The Close Corporation and the
Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488 (1948).
6 Ibid.
' Mr. Chief Justice Holmes stated that "Stock in a corporation is not
merely property. It also creates a personal relation analogous otherwise
than technically to a partnership. . . . [T]here seems to be no greater
objection to retaining the right of choosing one's associates in a corpora-
tion than in a firm." Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 479, 63 N.E. 934,
935 (1902).
'In Brown v. Little, Brown & Co., 269 Mass. 102, 168 N.E. 521 (1929),
the court stated, as to the validity of stock restrictions, "Restrictions on
the sale of shares of stock in a corporation are valid and binding.... No
restrictions can be declared void, unless palpably unreasonable." Id. at 110,
168 N.E. at 525. And the court in First Nat'l Bank v. Shanks, 34 Ohio
Op. 359, 73 N.E.2d 93 (C.P. 1945), observed "that in practically all of
the cases where restrictions have been invalid, the courts have based their
judgments on the fact that the restriction was a permanent prohibition."
Id. at 360, 73 N.E.2d at 95. Examples of the types of restrictions which
have been upheld are: (1) consent restraints, requiring the approval of
transfers by shareholders or directors or both, (2) first option provisions
granting the corporation or other shareholders a pre-emptive right to shares
the holder decides to sell or transfer, (3) buy and sell arrangements for
the transfer of a deceased holder's shares to the corporation or to other
shareholders at a stipulated price or valuation determined by formula, and
(4) provisions limiting the transfer to a specific class of persons. See 2
O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRAcTICE §§ 7.05-.14 (1958).
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charter or articles of incorporation, 9 or by the bylaws,10 has been
upheld: provided, however, the certificate itself complies with sec-
tion 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.1 ' But first option sale
or transfer restraints have been held not to apply to a sale between
shareholders,' 2 to a sale by a receiver pursuant to a court order,"3
nor to a sheriff's sale on execution against a shareholder. 4 Al-
though it would appear that these provisions have been interpreted
rather restrictively, the corporation would in all probability remain
status quo ante with regard to control and management of its affairs
on a sale to a shareholder, if the shareholder acted in good faith
and in the interest of the corporation. 5 This would also be true on
a sale by a sheriff or receiver, since the corporation could repur-
chase the stock by becoming the highest bidder at the sheriff's or
receiver's sale.'" But the corporation is not always able to repurchase
the shares where the shareholder dies and bequeaths his stock to a
legatee who would, in all likelihood, have no interest in the affairs
of the corporation; that is, where the legatee would be an "out-
sider" to the corporation.
Where the restrictive provisions expressly provided that on the
death of a shareholder his stock would automatically become the
'Bloomingdale v. Bloomingdale, 107 Misc. 646, 177 N.Y. Supp. 873
(Sup. Ct. 1919).10 Doss v. Yingling, 95 Ind. App. 494, 172 N.E. 801 (1930).
"
1 UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER AcT § 15 provides:
There shall be no lien in favor of a corporation upon the shares
represented by a certificate issued by such corporation and there
shall be no restriction upon the transfer of shares so represented
by virtue of any bylaws of such corporation, or otherwise, unless
the right of the corporation to such lien or the restriction is stated
upon the certificate.
Section 15 is in force in nearly all states. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-89
(1960).
"
2 Gibbon v. 3920 Lake Shore Drive Bldg. Corp., 310 Ill. App. 385, 34
N.E.2d 109 (1941); Rychwalski v. Baranowski, 205 Wis. 193, 236 N.W.
131 (1931). Contra, Casper v. Kalt-Zimmers Mfg. Co., 159 Wis. 517, 149
N.W. 754 (1914).1 In re Trilling & Montague, 140 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Pa. 1956) ; Mc-
Donald v. Farley & Loetscher Mfg. Co., 226 Iowa 53, 283 N.W. 261 (1939).1, Barrows v. National Rubber Co., 12 R.I. 173 (1878).1 9A stockholder may purchase the shares in order to become the majority
stockholder with the sole intention of "freezing out" the minority stock-
holders. Such action by the stockholder would, in all likelihood, be un-
beneficial to the corporation. For a discussion of majority transactions
which "freeze out" the minority, see 35 N.C.L. REv. 271 (1957).1 In re Trilling & Montague, 140 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Pa. 1956); Bar-
rows v. National Rubber Co., 12 R.I. 173 (1878).
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property of the corporation,'7 or that the corporation or remaining
shareholders would have the right to purchase the shares,"8 the
courts have consistently held such restrictions valid and binding
upon the executor of the deceased shareholder. 9 These provisions
have been held valid both on the ground that they were reasonable,
in view of the particular corporation, " and on the ground that
they were not testamentary in character and thus not void for fail-
ure to comply with the formal requirements of statutes governing
wills.2
On the other hand, when the provisions did not specifically pro-
vide for the death of a shareholder, as in Globe Slicing Mach. Co.,
the courts generally have held that the provisions are inapplicable
to a transfer consequent upon the death of the shareholder.2 2 This
"' In Krauss v. Kuechler, 300 Mass. 346, 15 N.E.2d 207 (1938), the
bylaw provided that the stock "shall automatically become the property of
the corporation by paying to the estate of the deceased a sum agreed upon
by the remaining stockholders." Id. at 347, 15 N.E.2d at 208.
"Schaffer v. Below, 174 F. Supp. 505 (D. V.I. 1959); Oakland Scav-
enger Co. v. Gandi, 51 Cal. App. 2d 69, 124 P.2d 143 (1942); Allen v.
Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418
(1957); First Nat'l Bank v. Coldwell, 286 App. Div. 1079, 145 N.Y.S.2d
674 (1955) (agreement between shareholder and corporation); In re
Mather's Estate, 410 Pa. 361, 189 A.2d 586 (1963); Covey v. Covey's
Little Am., Inc. 378 P.2d 506 (Wyo. 1963).
"o The executor must first offer the shares to the remaining shareholders
or to the corporation, or otherwise, pursuant to the terms of the provision,
before he may distribute to the designated legatees. This raises a collateral
problem; that is, how does the corporation afford the price of transfer?
In most states the corporation may only repurchase its shares out of sur-
plus. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55- 52 (c) (Supp. 1963). This generally
means that the corporation must establish a sinking fund if their surplus
is small. The method recognized as being most advantageous to the corpora-
tion is the taking out of business insurance on the shareholder's life. Cf.
Bohnsack v. Detroit Trust Co., 292 Mich. 167, 290 N.W. 367 (1940). In
North Carolina, insurance taken out by a corporation is regulated by statute
and provides that it may only be taken out on the life of an officer or
employee of the corporation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-17(b)(4) (1960); see
note 42 infra. But since shareholders in a close corporation are usually
either officers or employees, insurance is still a workable method for paying
the transfer price of the shares. See generally 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORA-
TIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 7.25-.28 (1958).
"Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161
N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957).
"
1Thompson v. J. D. Thompson Carnation Co., 279 Ill. 54, 116 N.E.
648 (1917) (shareholders' agreement); Chase Nat'l Bank v. Manufactures
Trust Co., 265 App. Div. 406, 39 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1943) (agreement between
two shareholders).
"Stern v. Stern, 146 F.2d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Elson v. Security
State Bank, 246 Iowa 601, 67 N.W.2d 525 (1954); Taylor's Adm'r v.
Taylor, 301 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1957); Kentucky Package Store, Inc. v.
Checani, 331 Mass. 125, 117 N.E.2d 139 (1954) ; Lane v. Albertson, 78 App.
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conclusion is most often reached by way of either a strict construc-
tion 23 or by holding that the provisions were inapplicable at the
time of the shareholder's death, since transmission or devolution
of the shares was inevitable. 24 In either case, the resolution is con-
gruent and indifferentiable, since the holdings mean that the re-
strictions only allude to a voluntary sale or transfer and not to one
caused by operation of law.25 Extrapolation by the courts has not
been evident,26 and their failure to examine the intent of the pro-
visions and the reasons for their existence have led to cursory
interpretations. This in turn has opened the door for the entrance
of many legatees into the corporate affairs, sometimes causing dis-
harmony 7 or liquidation. The provisions were designed and in-
serted to prevent precisely these contingencies.
The plain objectives of the bylaw provisions require an inter-
pretation that imposes the restrictions on the stock in the hands of
the executor notwithstanding the failure to use express, all inclu-
sive, and limiting language.2" Similar provisions, which did not pro-
vide for the obvious eventuality of death, have been interpreted as
being applicable to the shares at the death of the shareholder and
binding upon the executor.2" The court in Boston Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. North Attleborough Chapter of Am. Red Cross,"0 in
very persuasive language, said:
Div. 607, 79 N.Y. Supp. 947 (1903). Cf. Vogel v. Melish, 46 Ill. App. 2d
465, 196 N.E.2d 402 (1964); Storer v. Ripley, 12 Misc. 2d 622, 178
N.Y.S.2d 7 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
" In Taylor's Adm'r v. Taylor, 301 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1957), the court
stated, "The terms of the bylaw . . . seem to be limited to a voluntary
sale, although 'transfer' and 'sale' are stated as alternatives. The use of
the word 'transfer' looks to a sale and has no natural application to any
other disposition." Id. at 583. Compare BALLINTINE, CoRPoRATioNs § 321
(rev. ed. 1946); UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER AcT §§ 1, 22.
"Stern v. Stem, 146 F.2d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Elson v. Security
State Bank, 246 Iowa 601, 67 N.W.2d 525 (1954).
5 See notes 23 & 24 supra.
"' See note 22 supra.
27 One source of disharmony would be the legatee's failure to consent
to an election made by the corporation pursuant to subchapter S of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954 dealing with election of certain small business
corporations to their taxable status. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 1372.
" Mathews v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 1003 (E.D. N.Y. 1964). This
case exemplifies the interrelated problem of evaluation of the shares for the
purpose of gift and estate taxation.
2" Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. North Attleborough Chapter of
Am. Red Cross, 330 Mass. 114, 111 N.E.2d 447 (1953); Garrett v. Phila-
delphia Lawn Mower Co., 39 Pa. Super. 78 (1909).
" Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. North Attleborough Chapter of
Am. Red Cross, 330 Mass. 114, 111 N.E.2d 447 (1953).
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The executors are the present holders and can make the required
transfers. Their title to the stock, although it was specifically
bequeathed, vested in them upon their appointment..... It passed
to them by operation of the law notwithstanding the restrictions.
... Although they hold the stock in the right of another rather
than in their own right... their power to transfer is not there-
by enlarged .... They have no greater rights in the stock than
did the testatrix and they hold the shares subject to the same
restrictions on the transfer which were in effect at the time of
her death .... [T]he executors are ... bound by the conditions
under which the stock was issued and by the contract of their
testatrix 3 l
The court in this case proceeded on the theory that the provisions
represented a valid contract3e 2 between the testatrix and the cor-
poration. Many courts3 have proceeded on the basis that a bylaw
is a contract between the shareholder and the corporation and have
gone so far as to hold that an invalid bylaw can still be a valid
contract as between the shareholder and the corporation. 4 On con-
tract and plain objective theory, one court3 5 has taken issue with
1 Id. at 117, 111 N.E.2d at 449.
12 The English courts rely almost exclusively on the theory of contract,
and, hence, more extensive corporate restrictions on the transfer of stock
is allowed. For example, in It re Smith & Fawcett Ltd., [1942] 1 Ch. 304,
Lord Greene, M.R., in upholding a provision which in part provided, "the
directors may at any time in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion
refuse to register any transfer of shares," stated:
Private Companies are in law separate entities just as much as are
public companies, but from the business and personal point of view
they are much more analogous to partnerships than to public corpo-
rations. Accordingly, it is to be expected that in the articles of such
a company the control of the directors over the membership may be
very strict indeed.
Id. at 306. A private company is a company which: by its articles restricts
the right to transfer its shares; limits the number of members to fifty, not
including employees and former employees, and where two or more hold
one or more shares jointly, they are a single member; prohibits any invita-
tion to the public to subscribe for any shares or debentures of the company.
Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 28, 455(1). See generally
6 HALSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND § 526 (3d ed. 1954).
"'E.g., Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951); Casady v.
Modern Metal Spinning & Mfg. Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 728, 10 Cal. Rep. 790
(1964); Evans v. Dennis, 203 Ga. 232, 46 S.E.2d 122 (1948); Bechtold
v. Coleman Realty Co., 367 Pa. 208, 79 A.2d 661 (1951) (where the
contract theory received its ultimate exposition); Garrett v. Philadelphia
Lawn Mower Co., 39 Pa. Super. 78 (1909).
" New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N.E. 432 (1894);
Blue Mountain Forest Ass'n v. Borrowe, 71 N.H. 69, 51 Atl. 670 (1901).
'Mathew v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 1003 (E.D. N.Y. 1964).
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the "canon of interpretation that requires expansive clarity of ex-
pression"" in the bylaws to achieve the desired ends and stated:
[T]he presence or absence in the contract of the words like
"executors and assigns" or of expressions to the effect that the
contract is to bind the executors and estate of each party, do
not operate, ex proprio vigore, to make the contract "binding" on
the executors after the contracting party's death (for it binds
them without those words) ... .7
Thus, the court in disregarding the narrow interpretation has given
effect and vitality to the desired ends and plain objectives of the
bylaw provisions.
In North Carolina, no cases have arisen that finally determine
this issue. In fact, only one case has reached the supreme court
concerning restrictions on the transfer of stock."8 In that case, the
court adopted a liberal position as to "consent"3 " restrictions and
held such a restriction valid and not contrary to public policy. The
legislature, in the 1955 North Carolina Business Corporation Act,40
has provided that a corporation may, if it so desires, place certain
restrictions upon the transfer of its stock.4 ' The act also provides
86 Id. at 1007.
.7 Id. at 1006.
88 Wright v. Iredell Tel. Co., 182 N.C. 308, 108 S.E. 744 (1921).
89A "consent" restriction is generally one in which the directors, officers
or shareholders of the corporation must consent to a proposed sale or
transfer by a shareholder of his stock. This type of restriction is the most
advantageous to the corporation, since it does not have to expend any of
its surplus or take out business insurance on the shareholders as in a first
option or buy and sell arrangement. The consent restriction is also the
most disfavored by the courts because it is usually highly arbitrary in its
effectuation. See Finch v. Macoupin Tel. & Tel. Co., 146 Ill. App. 158
(1908); Miller v. Farmers Mill & Elevator Co., 78 Neb. 441, 110 N.W. 995
(1907), where it was held to be an unreasonable restraint. See generally
O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting, 65, HARV. L. REv. 773 (1952).
'"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-1 to -175 (1960).
'
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-16(c) (1960), provides:
The bylaws may contain any provisions for the regulation and man-
agement of the affairs of the corporation, including the transfer of
its shares, and restrictions on such transfer, not inconsistent with
the law or the charter.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52(c) (Supp. 1963), provides:
Subject to the provisions of subsections (e) and (f) of this section,
a corporation may, by the action of its board of directors, purchase
and pay for its shares, but only out of surplus and only in the fol-
lowing cases: ....
(4) From any shareholder in the exercise of the corporation's
right to purchase the shares pursuant to restrictions upon the trans-
fer thereof.
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a very healthy climate for the close corporation.4 2 The climate in-
cludes provisions for business insurance on an employee's life,48
which is the general method by which the corporation is enabled
to finance repurchase of the deceased shareholder's stock.44 In view
of its liberal position on the "consent" restriction and the favor-
itism shown the close corporation by the legislature, it would seem
anomalous for the court to interpret narrowly a bylaw provision
restricting the "sale or transfer" of shares of stock merely because
there was no provision for the obvious eventuality of death.
It is submitted that the court in Globe Slicing Mach. Co. was
unjustified in its narrow construction of the bylaw provision.4 5 In
view of the reasons for their existence, the broad language seemed
quite sufficient to bind the executor and to prohibit from entering
the corporate affairs those legatees who could bring disharmony to
Subsections (e) and (f) provide generally that the corporation cannot
purchase or redeem its shares if the corporation is unable to meet its obli-
gations as they become due in the ordinary course of business, liabilities
would exceed the assets, there is an unpaid accrued dividend on shares
entitled to preferential dividends ahead of shares to be purchased, etc. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-52(e), (f) (1960).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) (1960), provides:
Except in cases where the shares of the corporation are at the time
or subsequently become generally traded in the markets maintained
by securities dealers or brokers, no written agreement to which all
of the shareholders have actually assented, whether embodied in
the charter or bylaws or in any side agreement in writing and
signed by all the parties thereto, and which relates to any phase
of the affairs of the corporation, whether to the management of its
business or division of its profits or otherwise, shall be invalid as
between the parties thereto, on the ground that it is an attempt by
the parties thereto to treat the corporation as if it were a partner-
ship or to arrange their relationships in a manner that would be
appropriate only between partners.
For a discussion of this section and the close corporation, see Latty, The
Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act,
34 N.C.L. Rnv. 432, 438 (1956).
"8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-17(b) (4) (1960), provides:
In connection with carrying out the purposes stated in its charter
... every corporation shall also have power: ....
(4) To procure for its benefit insurance on the life of any em-
ployee, including any officer, whose death might cause financial
loss to the corporation, and to this end the corporation is deemed to
have an insurable interest in its employees and officers.
"See text accompanying note 19 supra.
'"In this diversity case, the court was compelled to follow the New
York law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In so
doing, they relied primarily on Lane v. Albertson, 78 App. Div. 607, 79
N.Y. Supp. 947 (1903), which was similar in many respects to the present
case. But query whether that case established, as a matter of law, the policy
of narrow construction of bylaw provisions in New York.
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the close corporation and frustrate its continuance. While it is diffi-
cult to understand the objectives achieved by the decision, it is in
accord with the weight of authority.4 It further demonstrates the
necessity of providing for every possible contingency which might
adversely affect the affairs of the corporation in a sale or transfer
of its shares of stock.' 7
THOMAS C. WETTACH
Labor Law-Secondary Consumer Boycotts, Picketing, and
Publicity-The Landrum-Griffin Amendment to the Labor
Management Relations Act
In two recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has ex-
amined statutory restrictions on secondary boycott activity and, for
the first time, the extension of these restrictions in the labor reform
legislation of 1959. The Court held in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable
Packers' that Congress did not intend that the 1959 Landrum-Grif-
fin amendments2 to section 8(b) (4) of the Labor Management
" See note 22 supra.
" The need for providing for every contingency is shown in Albert E.
Touchet, Inc. v. Thompson, 259 Mass. 220, 156 N.E. 41 (1927), where
the court held that even though the bylaw of the corporation was binding
-on the shareholder, his executor, administrator, or assignee to offer the
stock for appraisal with rights to purchase it in the corporation, it was
,not binding on the deceased shareholder's special administrator, since the
special administrator had not been provided for in the bylaw. But see
Guaranty Laundry Co. v. Pulliam, 198 Okla. 667, 181 P.2d 1007 (1947),
where the court in effect held that restrictions are usually construed to
permit the widest range under the language used.
1377 U.S. 58 (1964).
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents-
(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual
employed by any person engaged in commerce or in any industry
affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course
of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or other-
wise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodi-
ties or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or
restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce, where in either case an object thereof is-
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any
other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing busi-
ness with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other
employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the
representative of his employees unless such labor organization has
[Vol. 43
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Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)' be applied to prohibit secondary
consumer picketing when the public is asked "only to boycott the
primary employer's goods." 4 In a companion decision, NLRB v.
Servette, Inc.,5 handed down the same day, the Court held that
though Congress had expanded the class protected from induce-
ment by subsection (i) of the amended act from "employees" to
"any individual employed by any person," inducement of such indi-
viduals was lawful when it was designed to induce "a policy de-
cision"' or was "an appeal for the exercise of managerial discre-
tion."'
In Fruit Packers, the striking union picketed certain super-
markets that were selling at retail apples packed by the struck
employers. Placards worn by the pickets and handbills distributed
by them asked customers of the supermarkets not to buy the apples.
The customers were not asked to cease dealing with the markets,
nor were employees of the supermarkets asked to cease work, to
been certified as the representative of such employees under the pro-
visions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That nothing contained
in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not
otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing;
Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4)
only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to
prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truth-
fully advising the public, including consumers and members of labor
organizations, that a product or products are produced by an em-
ployer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and
are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does
not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any per-
son other than the primary employer in the course of his employ-
ment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not
to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer en-
gaged in such distribution.
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Grif-
fin Act) § 704(a), 73 Stat. 542, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (Supp. IV, 1963).
'61 Stat. 140 (1947). The 1959 amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act
(a) changed the phrase "employees of any employer" to "any individual
employed by any person engaged in commerce or any industry affecting
commerce," (b) eliminated the qualification of a refusal as "concerted," (c)
added subsection (ii) prohibiting the threatening, coercing, or restraining
of a person engaged in commerce, etc. (d) rewrote the clauses to some
extent, shifting certain objects from clause (A) to clause (B), (e) added
the proviso to clause (B), and (f) added the second proviso protecting
publicity other than picketing.
'377 U.S. at 63.
'377 U.S. 46 (1964).0Id. at 49.
"Id. at 50 n.4.
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refuse to handle the apples, or to honor the picket lines in any way.'
Care was taken by the union to make these distinctions as clear as
possible to all parties.' In Servette, representatives of the striking
union asked supermarket managers to cease dealing in products
supplied by the struck distributor and warned that handbills would
be passed out in front of those markets which continued to deal
with the distributor. In some cases handbills were actually passed
out, asking customers not to buy the Servette-distributed products.
The National Labor Relations Board, following its ruling in
Upholsterers Frame & Bedding Workers (Minneapolis House Fur-
nishing),"° held that the union's actions in Fruit Packers were a per
se violation of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) in that they threatened,
coerced, or restrained a person (i.e., a supermarket, a corporate per-
son) engaged in commerce."' The Board found that the picketing
was not aimed at and did not induce the supermarket employees
(individuals employed by a person engaged in commerce) and thus
did not violate section 8(b) (4) (i) (B), but ruled that, by its very
nature, consumer product picketing could not help but threaten,
coerce, or restrain the supermarkets."2 Since the second proviso to
section 8(b) (4) expressly excepted picketing from the protection
it afforded other truthful publicity, and because Minneapolis House
Furnishing had already rejected any implied protection it might
afford to picketing aimed exclusively'at the consumer public, the
Board did not find it necessary to discuss the proviso again in this
case. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
rejected the Board's holding that picketing was a per se violation of
subsection (ii), observing that section 8(b) (7) demonstrated that
Congress had been more specific when its purpose was to ban all
"[P]ickets were... instructed 'to patrol peacefully in front of the con-
sumer entrances, to stay away from the delivery entrances ... ."' 377 U.S.
at 61.
'Id. at 73-76 (Appendix).
10 132 N.L.R.B. 40 (1961), enforcement denied, 331 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.
1964). In denying enforcement the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
cited the Supreme Court's Fruit Packers decision.
" Fruit & Vegetable Packers (Tree Fruits Labor Committee), 132
N.L.R.B. 1172 (1961).
12 The purpose of picketing Safeway stores was to persuade con-
sumers not to purchase nonunion Washington State apples which
Safeway in turn purchased from members of Tree Fruits. The
natural and forseeable result of such picketing, if successful, would
be to force or require Safeway to reduce or to discontinue alto-
gether its purchases of such apples from the struck employers.
Id. at 1177.
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picketing in a particular circumstance, and held that to find the
picketing in this case was unlawful would require a finding that it
did in fact threaten, coerce, or restrain the supermarkets."3 It re.
manded the case to the Board so that it might hear evidence on
this point. The court of appeals read the publicity proviso as pro-
tecting publicity, other than picketing, even when it did in fact
threaten, coerce, or restrain. Picketing that did not in fact threaten,
coerce, or restrain did not need any protection the proviso might
have afforded.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court majority rejected both views
taken below, reasoning that Congress has prohibited peaceful picket-
ing only when dealing "'explicitly with isolated evils which experi-
ence has established flow from such picketing,' -'i and holding that
no such explicitness concerning product picketing, as contrasted with
general secondary picketing, is to be found in the legislative history
of the amendment. 5 It thus took the position that, absent the
specificity required of picketing ban legislation, secondary consumer
picketing that was limited to following the struck product as a
matter of law did not threaten, coerce, or restrain the secondary
employer. Since the picketing did not threaten, coerce, or restrain,
it did not need the protection of the publicity proviso, and thus the
Court did not have to deal with the exception of picketing from
that protection.
In the companion Servette case, the Board, on the basis of a
high-low level supervisor-manager test established in Local 505,
Teamsters Union (Carolina Lumber)'" and followed in Minneapolis
House Furnishing, decided that the supermarket managers were
high level supervisors whom the union could induce or incourage
to cease doing business with other persons and thus they were not
individuals within the intent of the act.' The Carolina Lumber
test described such high level supervisors as executives who made
managerial decisions and who were not likely to neglect their em-
ployer's interests because of sympathies in common with rank and
" Fruit & Vegetable Packers v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962),
62 CoLum. L. Rlv. 1336.14377 U.S. at 62-63, quoting NLRB v. Drivers Local Union, 362
U.S. 274, 284 (1960).
"The Court rejected indications that at least the opponents of the bill
understood it to prohibit consumer product picketing. 377 U.S. at 66.130 N.L.R.B. 1438 (1961).
Wholesale Delivery Drivers Union (Servette, Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1501
(1961).
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file employees. High level supervisors, although they are not indi-
viduals within the meaning of subsection (i), are protected from
threats, restraint, or coercion by subsection (ii) since it seems clear
that "person" in this subsection means both physical and corporate
persons. On the other hand, low level supervisors such as gang
foremen are not to be induced under this test because they are
likely to have interests closely aligned with labor, including occa-
sionally even union membership. This latter class is protected by
both subsections, as are non-supervisory employees. There is no
clear dividing line that can be drawn between high and low level.
Each new case must be considered on all factors of company organi-
zation including, but not exclusively, the supervisor-manager's
authority and responsibility, his working conditions, his salary, and
his benefits.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, taking a literal view
of the statute's wording, discarded the Carolina Lumber test, but
it reversed the Board on the basis that Servette, a distributor, was
not a producer within the meaning of the publicity proviso and
thus the handbilling activities of the union were not protected by
it.'" This position had been taken by dissenting Board Member
Rodgers, who also determined that the handbills distributed by the
union had not been truthful.'" The Board majority did not elabo-
rate its finding that a distributor such as Servette was not a pro-
ducer, having done so already in a previous case.
20
The Supreme Court, in its unanimous decision, supported the
Board's view of Servette as a producer2' and followed the court
of appeals in its rejection of Carolina Lumber. It held, in a foot-
note to its opinion, that the applicability of subsection (i) turned
not upon the high-low level supervisor-manager distinction but "up-
on whether the union's appeal is to cease performing employment
services, or is an appeal for the exercise of managerial discretion."'
The language of section 8(b) (4), before and after the 1959
amendments, has never been a subject of easy interpretation for
1 Servette, Inc. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1962). See Great
Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1962).
19 133 N.L.R.B. at 1502. See Middle South Broadcasting Co., 133
N.L.R.B. 1698, 1706 (1961); Teamsters Union (Lohman Sales), 132
N.L.R.B. 901, 910 (1961).
° Teamsters Union (Lohman Sales), supra note 19.
21377 U.S. at 55.
" Id. at 50 n.4.
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the courts." To have construed it literally, prior to the amendment,
would have been to ban even primary picketing, 4 and this was not
the intent of Congress.2" Under the original language, the induce-
ment or encouragement had to be concerted, so that an isolated
incident of inducement was not covered.26 Even if the picketing was
at the secondary employer's place of business, it was not barred
unless its object was to cause the secondary employer's employees
to walk out." Supervisors, since they were specifically not "em-
ployees" as defined by the act,2 8 could be induced or encouraged to
support the union, no matter how low their position.29 And the
employees of certain activities, such as government agencies, 30 were
not covered since these activities were not employers subject to the
act.3 '
Congress sought, by the 1959 amendment, 2 to clarify and
broaden the coverage of this section. 3 In attempting to close the
"This section is "surely one of the most labyrinthine provisions ever
included in a federal labor statute . . . ." Aaron, The Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1086, 1113 (1960).
'International Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 366
U.S. 667, 672 (1961).
" NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 672 (1951).2 0 Id. at 670-71.2
,NLRB v. Business Mach. & Office Appliance Mechanics, 228 F.2d
553 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956). "It was not shown
that the picketing had any tendency to induce the employees to strike or
cease performing services." 228 F.2d at 560.
2 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §§ 2(3), (11),
61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), (11) (1959).
"' Sheet Metal Workers (Ferro-Co Corp.), 102 N.L.R.B. 1660 (1953)(substitute foreman); Local 878, Teamsters Union (Arkansas Express),
92 N.L.R.B. 255 (1950) (shipping dock foreman, a union member); Local
294, Teamsters Union (Conway's Express), 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949), aff'd
mb nora. Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952) (management
representatives).3°International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 104 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1953).
"Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 2(2), 61
Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1959). See International Wood-
workers (W. T. Smith Lumber Co.) 116 N.L.R.B. 1756 (1956), enforce-
nent denied sub nom. W. T. Smith Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 246 F.2d 129, 132
(5th Cir. 1957) (railroad); Local 833, UAW (Paper Makers Importing
Co.), 116 N.L.R.B. 267 (1956) (municipal employees). Compare DiGiorgio
Fruit Corp., 87 N.L.R.B. 720, 721 (1949), enforced, 191 F.2d 642 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869 (1951), where a farm labor union was
not prohibited from secondary boycott activity since it was not subject to
the act.
"For the text of the amendment, see note 2 supra. For the textual
changes it made, see note 3 supra.
"'NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 51 (1964); Aaron, supra note
23, at 1114; Cox, The Landrum-Griflin Amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. Rv. 257, 270 (1959).
1964]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
loopholes, it included isolated incidents of inducement by eliminat-
ing the word "concerted" in subsection (i) and enlarged the class
covered by this subsection at the very least to include low level
supervisors, by the change in language to "any individual employed
by any person." Coverage was extended to threats, coercion, and
restraint of any person by the addition of subsection (ii), thus
taking in secondary activities not directed solely at employees. Since
Senate conferees were unable to persuade their House brethren not
to prohibit at least some kinds of secondary picketing, the publicity
proviso was added to protect "informational activity short of picket-
ing."8' The proviso to clause (B) was added to clarify Congress'
intention not to obstruct picketing that was primary. But at least
one author of the amendments, and other persons, have expressed
the old problems were solved, new ones have arisen in the extension
misgivings about the Board's understanding of these changes.8 5 As
of coverage to secondary consumer activity, in the addition of the
proviso excepting certain kinds of this activity, and in the exten-
sion of coverage to a larger class of individuals that are employed.
It is in these areas that the Court has spoken in the two instant cases.
In Fruit Packers, the Supreme Court majority's distinction be-
tween unlawful secondary consumer picketing "to persuade the
customers of the secondary employer to cease trading with him in
order to force him to cease dealing with, or to put pressure upon,
the primary employer,"3' 6 and lawful secondary consumer picketing
"directed only at the struck product" T is not a distinction "alluded to
in the [Congressional] debates,""8 nor made by commentators on
the amendment immediately after its passage. 0 It is, however, a
distinction made by other authorities, 40 including the Restatement
8, 105 CONG. REc. 17898-99 (1959).
"5 Browne, The National Labor Relations Board: Labor Law Rewritten,
49 A.B.A.J. 64 (1963).
"5377 U.S. at 63.8 TIbid.8 1d. at 64.
See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 23; Cox, supra note 33.Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 286-87, 11 N.E.2d 910, 913
(1937). This case held that a unity of interest would permit struck prod-
uct picketing at the secondary employer's place of business but contained
dictum that picketing asking a withdrawal of business from the secondary
employer was illegal. Id. at 286, 11 N.E.2d at 912. See 1 TELLER, LABOR
DIsPuTEs AND COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING § 123 (1940). Compare People v.
Muller, 286 N.Y. 281, 36 N.E.2d 206 (1941), permitting more than struck
product picketing where the secondary employer uses the services of the
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of Torts.41 Here the Court may have chosen to read a distinction
not expressly stated by Congress in order to avoid the constitutional
question of a blanket ban against picketing.42 This possibility was
suggested by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black in which
he held the section, as applied against product picketing, in viola-
tion of the first amendment.43 Black separated the coercive "patrol-
ling" aspect of picketing from the non-coercive "speech" 44 element
and reasoned that since it is the object of the picketing (a consumer
boycott that threatens, coerces, or restrains a neutral secondary
employer) that is determinative of the ban, the amendment is at-
tacking the "speech" element. If the picketing were, for example,
a protest against the supermarkets' own labor practices, the "patrol-
ling" would be unchanged; only the "speech" would be different
and the picketing would be lawful. Mr. Justice Harlan (joined by
Mr. Justice Stewart in dissenting) set out a position supported by
Black that all secondary consumer picketing is covered by the ban
and that none of it is protected by the publicity proviso. But Harlan
argued that it is the "patrolling" element that is being restricted,
especially since other forms of expressing the same "speech" are
permitted.45
Restraints on peaceful picketing were broadly condemned by
the Court in Thornhill v. Alabama.41 But this position has been
modified so that it is now fairly clear that picketing may be pro-
primary employer, with Local 142, Plumbers' Union (Shop-Rite Foods,
Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B. 307 (1961).
1 In all cases, however, the scope of the request must be limited to
A and his products .... B, the retailer, is also not entitled to com-
plain, since the action is not directed at him and his loss of sales,
if any, is due only to the diminution in the prestige of goods which
he buys and markets . . . . If, however, the third persons are re-
quested not to buy other goods from B because he sells A's soap, the
rule stated in this section is inapplicable ....
RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 799, comment on clause (a) (1939). Cf. REsTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 801 (1939).
42 This is the position of one recent treatment of the case. Note, 42
TExAs L. REV. 905 (1964).
377 U.S. at 76-80.
"Id. at 77. See Mr. Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Bakery
Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942).
' "[T]hat Congress in prohibiting secondary consumer picketing has
acted with a discriminating eye is the very thing that renders this provision
invulnerable to constitutional attack." 377 U.S. at 93.
" 310 U.S. 88 (1940). "In the circumstances of our times the dissemina-
tion of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be re-
garded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the
Constitution." Id. at 102.
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hibited if its object is either unlawfu4 7 or "far outweighed" by the
interests that would be harmed by the picketing.48 Even if the
picketing is considered to be speech, it may be restricted to the area
of the primary dispute.4" This line of cases suggests that, recog-
nizing an unequivocal congressional ban on secondary consumer
picketing aimed only at the product and thus compelled to deal with
the constitutional question, the majority opinion in Fruit Packers
could be read as exhibiting a willingness to find that the evils seen
by Congress justified the prohibition."
In the first attempts at dealing with secondary boycotts, the
concern and emphasis was with the detrimental effect on the neutral
secondary employer. "Picketing the premises of a secondary is of
course a prototype secondary boycott, forbidden by the act.'",' Com-
plications arose in the blending of permitted primary effects and
undesired secondary effects of picketing when the primary employer
and secondary employer were doing business on common or adjacent
premises. These complications led the Board, in Sailor's Union
(Moore Dry Dock Co.),5 to declare that picketing at a common
situs was permitted at times when the primary employer was en-
gaged in normal business on the site of the secondary employer,
provided the picketing was performed so as to disclose clearly that
the dispute is with the primary employer only. This rule was
limited by Brewery Drivers (Washington Coca-Cola Bottling
Works)' to situations in which the primary employer had no sepa-
rate place of business that could be picketed. However, this limita-
tion was at least somewhat removed by Local 861, Int'l Bhd. of
"Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
,8 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 477 (1950).
But recognition of peaceful picketing as an exercise of free speech
does not imply that the states must be without power to confine the
sphere of communications to that directly related to the dispute.
Restriction of picketing to the area of the industry within which a
labor dispute arises leaves open to the disputants other traditional
modes of communication.
Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 727-28 (1942).
" See Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. Rxv.
574, 591-602 (1951).
1 Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. R1v.
1363, 1374 (1962).
5292 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950) (primary employer's ship at secondary em-
ployer's dock).
107 N.L.R.B. 299 (1953), enforced, 220 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1955)(picketing at retail outlets asked public not to buy Coca-Cola).
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Elec. Workers (Plauche Elec., Inc.)."' Thus, the lawfulness of such
picketing in such blended situations remains unclear.55
Fruit Packers, however, places little emphasis on the secondary
character of the picketing, i.e., that it is on a clearly secondary site.56
The Court gives lip service to the strict traditional view that this
is a secondary boycott because "its sanctions bear, not upon the
employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third
party who has no concern in it,"" but, by implication, seems to
move toward abandoning it. The aim of the picketing in Fruit
Packers, the Court found, was not "to compel [the neutral second-
ary employer] . . . to stop business with the [primary] employer
in the hope that this will induce the [primary] employer to give in
to his employees' demands."5 Rather, it was primary picketing, in
that it was aimed at sales depended upon by the primary employer,
with inevitable secondary side effects-a drop in the supermarkets'
sales of apples and some contingent economic damage to the markets
-which are unfortunate but not the subject of real concern. When
the side effects are thus de-emphasized, perhaps the picketing could
be viewed as not within section 8(b) (4) at all.59 Whether the
Court could comfortably make the same de-emphasis if the second-
ary employer were a one-product retailer is a question raised by
5' 135 N.L.R.B. 250 (1962) (workers spending entire day on secondary
site after reporting in at primary site).
" See United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492 (1964), the Court's
most recent ruling in this area.
0 When consumer picketing is employed only to persuade customers
not to buy the struck product, the union's appeal is closely confined
to the primary dispute. The site of the appeal is expanded to include
the premises of the secondary employer, but if the appeal succeeds,
the secondary employer's purchases from the struck firm are de-
creased only because the public has diminished its purchase of the
struck product.
377 U.S. at 72. (Emphasis added.) See also Local 761, Int'l Union of
Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961), stating:
Important as is the distinction between legitimate "primary activity"
and banned "secondary activity," it does not present a glaringly
bright line. The objectives of any picketing include a desire to
influence others from withholding from the employer their services
or trade.
Id. at 673.
"' International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d
Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, J.).
8 Ibid.
" See Note, 73 YALE L.J. 1265, 1278 (1964). The author there takes
the position that "the expansion of the concept of primary dispute to en-
compass product picketing may run counter to the rationale of many cases
involving common situs picketing." Ibid.
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Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent.60 On its face, the majority's
decision in Fruit Packers would seem to preclude any other emphasis.
While the above basis can be found for the Fruit Packers de-
cision, Servette established an entirely new rule of labor law by
shifting the test of proscribed section 8(b) (4) inducement from
the type of employee or individual induced to the function that he
is to perform or not to perform. The Court supplies no definition
of the exercise of "managerial discretion" 1 and cites nothing in
explanation of the term, either in congressional action or else-
where.62 Though the new rule would not alter the outcome if ap-
plied by the National Labor Relations Board in the instant case,63
it cannot be dismissed as dicta. 4
" E.g., an "independent gas station owner [who] sells gasoline pur-
chased from a struck gas company," as in Harlan's example. 377 U.S. at 83.
To the one-product retailer, the distinction is certainly of no comfort. If
the picketing is successful, he is put out of business either way. But is his
unity of interest with the gas company sufficient to justify this?
" NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 50 n.4 (1964).
"2 Quaere, when is discretion not managerial and its inducement thus
presumably unlawful under section 8(b) (4) (i) as a withdrawal of serv-
ices, if ever? To remain within the Servette fact situation, if the union had
approached a low level employee, perhaps a union member, who was re-
sponsible for storefront displays and induced him not to use Servette-distrib-
uted products in his displays, would his action be a refusal "to perform
...services," a "refusal in the course of his employment to use ... any
goods," or an exercise of managerial discretion within the rule? A situa-
tion similar to this arose in Local 294, Teamsters Union (Van Transport
Lines), 131 N.L.R.B. 242, enforced, 298 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1961).
" It is doubtful that use of the managerial discretion test would have
changed the results in other cases decided by the Board on the high-low
level principle. See, e.g., Warehouse Employees Union (C. R. Sheaffer &
Sons), 136 N.L.R.B. 968 (1962) (manager refused to accept delivery of
struck products after being informed union would handbill, an activity
deemed legal); Teamsters Union (Editorial "El Imparcial," Inc.), 134
N.L.R.B. 895 (1961); Teamsters Union (Lohman Sales), 132 N.L.R.B.
901 (1961); Excavating & Building Material Chauffeurs Union (Consalvo
Trucking, Inc.), 132 N.L.R.B. 827 (1961) (held, a managerial decision);
Upholsterers Frame & Bedding Workers (Minneapolis House Furnishing),
132 N.L.R.B. 40 (1961), enforcement denied, 331 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1964);
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n (S. M. Kisner & Sons), 131 N.L.R.B.
1196 (1961) (vice president told union "wished" that a subcontract not be
awarded struck employer); Amalgamated Meat Cutters (Peyton Packing
Co.), 131 N.L.R.B. 406 (1961) (meat market manager asked to stop or
slow down buying from struck employer); Local 294, Teamsters Union(Van Transport Lines), 131 N.L.R.B. 242, enforced, 298 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.
1961); Local 324, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers (Brewer's City Coal
Dock), 131 N.L.R.B. 228 (1961) (inducement of top supervisor not to ac-
cept delivery of struck sand); Local 505, Teamsters Union (Carolina
Lumber), 130 N.L.R.B. 1438 (1960).
" Respondent Servette argued that the evidence disclosed that the man-
agers in fact had no managerial discretion to exercise in dealing with
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The liberal rather than the restrictive approach to statutory
interpretation in the labor field is seen in Servette in the Court's
approach to the subsection (i) phrase "any individual employed by
any person." Though Congress intended to close the loophole in
the original section 8(b) (4) whereby "supervisors" 5 were not pro-
tected from inducement, any apparent broadening of the protection
to all persons employed of whatever description had been severely
limited by the Board in decisions following Carolina Lumber.66 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit attempted to correct this
limitation by reading the new phrase in its plain, literal, and broad-
est sense." The Supreme Court agreed,6" but to leave this as its
decision would limit the union's appeal for support in its dispute
to "employers" or "persons engaged in commerce" alone. If the
"person" is not an individual proprietorship or a partnership, but a
corporation, under this literal reading there is no one within the
business enterprise who legally can be induced. To induce the corpo-
rate person it is necessary to induce some individual employed by it.
To avoid this trap it was necessary for the Court to examine the
function that an individual of the now all-inclusive class is to be
induced to perform or not to perform.
There is direct support for the Court's reading of "produced"
in the publicity proviso as intended by Congress to include activi-
ties such as those of Servette.69 If the Court had been intent in
taking the restrictive rather than the liberal approach to statutory
interpretation in the labor field, it could have attached "significance
to the fact that an earlier version of the proviso read: '. . . that goods
are produced or distributed by an employer . . . .' "" The omission
of the italicized phrase could have been read as a deliberate intention
Servette. They had to consult with their supervisors. Brief for Respondent,
pp. 20-22, NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46 (1964). It was also argued
that corporate officers were not included in "any individual." Id. at p. 19.
See Upholsterers Frame & Bedding Workers (Minneapolis House Furnish-
ing), 132 N.L.R.B. 40, 66 (1961). Though it was insisted that the plain
meaning of the statute should be followed. Brief for Respondent, p. 11.
"Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §§ 2(3), (11),
61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), (11) (1959).
" The Board has applied the high-low level test in at least ten other
cases. See cases cited note 63 supra.
67 Servette, Inc. v. NLRB, 310 F2.d 659, 665 (9th Cir. 1962).
98 377 U.S. at 49-50.
"6 "'Produced' means produced, manufactured, mined, handled or in any
other manner worked on . . . ." Fair Labor Standards Act § 3(j), 52 Stat.
1061 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 203(j) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
O 105 CONG. REc. 17333 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
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to exclude distributors' employees from the protection of the pro-
viso rather than an understanding that "produced" included distrib-
uting activities. Such an intention, however, would be subject to
attack as arbitrary. There is no apparent basis for not extending
to distributors' employees a right that seems to be constitutionally
guaranteed.
The close distinctions made by the Court in these two decisions
seem to have been made with a favorable attitude toward the labor
movement. Implicit in them is a view that labor's right to present
its case to the public outweighs the damage that may be caused to
neutrals by necessary means of presenting that case. Yet the criteria
that this view forced upon the Court can be expected to haunt it
in later cases and, more certainly, to cause sleepless nights for
labor counsel. Will the Court protect consumer product picketing
of one-product retailers? If Congress is more explicit in banning
such picketing, will the Court respect its wishes? Most difficult,
what can the unions ask "any individual" to do or not to do? At
first examination, the labor movement might take comfort in an-
swers projected from these two decisions. A wiser approach would
be one tempered by caution.
CHARLES B. RoBsoN, JR.
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